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Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine:
Universal Service, the Power to Tax,
and the Ratification Doctrine
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.*
(T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy.
1
The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.
2
Nothing raises the blood pressure of average Americans more than taxes-a
common aphorism has it that few things in life are certain, save death and taxes.
Moreover, concerns about taxation (at least in part) sparked the American Revolution.
3
From the Boston Tea Party, in December 1773, to the California property tax revolt
leading to the passage of Proposition 13 a little over two hundred years later in 1978, 4
to the present, U.S. taxpayers have proven remarkably resistant to involuntarily
surrendering their property to the government. Taxes may well be the price that we pay
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1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
2. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
3. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOGICAL ORIGINS OFTHE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 4,102,
111-21, 198-218 (1967); Malcolm Gladwell, Tea and Sympathy: The Truth About American
Taxpayers, NEW YORKER, Apr. 19, 1999, at 94.
4. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII A; Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); Amador Valley
Joint High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978); see also Joseph
T. Henke, Financing Public Schools in Califomia: The Aftermath of Serrano v. Priest and
Proposition 13,21 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1986); Kirk Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 Nw. U.
L. REV. 191, 192, 197-202 (2001); Jim Wasserman, 25 Years Later, Bill Comes Due on
California's Proposition 13, SEATrLE TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at A5. For a recent critique of the
long-term effects of Proposition 13, see Joseph T. Halliman, Buffett Suggests Property Taxes
Aren't High Enough in California, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2003, at Al (reporting Warren
Buffett's view that property taxes are far too low in California and that he "strongly suggested
... that the state's property taxes need to be higher").
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for civilized society,5 but many citizens greatly resent having to underwrite the cost of
government.
In light of all this hostility on the part of the voting public, few things inspire greater
dread in most politicians than the prospect of raising taxes. 6 Given the unpopularity of
new or increased levels of taxation and the concomitant and pressing need for
government to raise funds to pay for myriad programs, one should not be at all
surprised to find that politicians might attempt to find ways to tax and run.
An incumbent politician's dream would be to create new and improved government
services (thereby generating good will, credit, and votes) without having to take
responsibility for paying for these services through new or increased taxation (which
leads, with some regularity, to electoral difficulties).7 Indeed, what could be more
desirable than creating a new and useful government program without having to take
any responsibility for paying for it? One means of accomplishing this objective would
be to use deficit spending---effectively printing money. With a depressing regularity,
the federal government and state governments lacking a balanced budget requirement
do just that (spend and borrow) in lieu of embracing the electorally toxic approach of
spend and tax.8
But an even more cowardly stratagem than the "spend and borrow" gambit exists.
Sufficiently devious legislators could attempt to delegate to an administrative agency
responsibility for designing a new social program and, in addition, also delegate to the
agency responsibility for selecting the precise funding mechanism that will pay for it.
Suppose, for example, that Congress told the Federal Communications Commission
("Commission") to "go forth and provide really useful telecommunications services to
a group of favored constituents." 9 Suppose further that Congress did not bother to
define the precise scope of the program or the means to pay for it, except with a
5. See Compafifa Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275
U.S. 87, 100(1927) (reporting Justice Holmes's view that "[t]axes are what we pay for civilized
society").
6. See, e.g., John M. Broder, As California Borrows Time, Other States Scrape
Together Some Budget Solutions, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2003, at A21 (reporting that in 2003 state
governments have "staggered across their budget deadlines with stopgap solutions, short-term
spending plans and continued debate about the most contentious budget items," and noting that
"governors in 29 states are seeking to raise revenues" through tax increases, and observing that
"[b]udget woes have been exacerbated by disputes over the taxes-versus-spending conflict that
has stalled solutions, most notably in California, where Republicans are refusing to consider any
plan that includes new taxes").
7. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POwER WrrHOUT RESPONSIBILY: How CONGRESS ABUSES
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 9-12 (1993).
8. See Dale Russakoff, States Drowning in Fiscal Woes, SEATLETIMES, June 27,2003,
at A6 ("President Bush, who unlike the governors does not face a constitutional requirement to
balance his budget, proposed to increase total spending by 4.2%, anticipating a deficit now
expected to exceed $450 billion.").
9. Cf. 47 U.S.C. § 254(c) (2000) ("Universal service is an evolving level of
telecommunications services that the Commission shall establish periodically under this section,
taking into account advances in telecommunications and information technologies and
services.").
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blanket authorization to assess "fees" on providers of "telecommunications services.
' '
Such a program would raise what should be a very difficult question: May Congress
transfer its power to tax and spend to an independent administrative agency, without
significant limitations on either the objects to be pursued or the means to pay for
achieving them?
The obvious and easy answer should be self-evident: No. If Congress wishes to reap
the benefits of establishing a new social welfare program, it should be prepared to take
political responsibility for finding the means of paying for it. As is so often the case in
life, however, the reality is a bit more complicated.
Black letter constitutional law prohibits Congress from making excessive
delegations of its legislative powers to executive branch entities, including both
independent and presidentially-controlled administrative agencies. Article I, section 1
of the Constitution vests "all legislative Powers herein granted... in a Congress of the
United States" and "[t]his text permits no delegation of those powers."" This means
that "[t]he Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential
legislative functions with which it is thus vested.' Accordingly, "when Congress
confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must 'lay down by
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act]
is directed to conform."
'
"
3
These rules apply with particular force in the context of laws delegating the power
to tax: "'Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress, which is the sole organ for
levying taxes, may act arbitrarily and disregard benefits bestowed by the Government
on a taxpayer and go solely on ability to pay, based on property or income." 4 The
Supreme Court has explained that "[i]n the exercise of its constitutional power to lay
taxes, Congress may select the subjects of taxation, choosing some and omitting
others," pretty much for whatever reasons Congress deems sufficient.'
5
An administrative agency, on the other hand, may not unilaterally institute measures
for raising revenue, much less institute arbitrary revenue measures.' 6 Although the
Supreme Court has permitted some delegations of taxing authority, 17 it has never
10. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (2000) ("Every telecommunications carrier that provides
interstate telecommunications services shall contribute, on an equitable and non-discriminatory
basis, to the specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by the Commission to
preserve and advance universal service.").
11. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
12. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
13. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 409 (1928)) (emphasis in original).
14. Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974).
15. See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 512-14 (1937).
16. See NCTA, 415 U.S. at 340-42; Seafarers Int'l Union v. United States Coast Guard,
81 F.3d 179, 183-86 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
17. See Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1989) ("We find
no support, then, for Mid-America's contention that the text of the Constitution or the practices
of Congress require the application of a different and stricter non-delegation doctrine in cases
where Congress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power.").
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suggested that Congress could escape all political responsibility for material design
elements of a tax program. 1
At various points in time, scholarly commentators have declared 19-or called
for20 -the death of the nondelegation doctrine. Other legal scholars, including
Professors Cass Sunstein 21 and John Manning,22 argue that the nondelegation doctrine
serves important democratic values and should continue to exist (at least in some sort
of watered-down form).
For the most part, the Supreme Court has not shown much interest in enforcing the
doctrine in a meaningful way.2 3 As Professor Sunstein wryly notes, "[wie might say
that the conventional doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and
counting)., 2 4 Notwithstanding the federal courts' apparent lack of interest in
revitalizing and enforcing nondelegation principles, one should not be too eager to
bury the body and move on.
18. See id. at 224 (holding that "Congress must indicate clearly its intention to delegate
to the Executive the discretionary authority to recover administrative costs not inuring directly
to the benefit of regulated parties by imposing additional financial burdens, whether
characterized as 'fees' or 'taxes'..." and noting that "any such delegation must also meet the
normal requirements of the nondelegation doctrine"). Although Mid-America Pipeline squarely
rejected a nondelegation challenge to a user fee established by the Department of
Transportation, there were major differences between the program at issue in Mid-America
Pipeline and the universal service program. Congress established a maximum sum that the
Department of Transportation could collect on an annual basis, incident to an appropriations
bill. See infra text accompanying notes 264-83; see also Mid-America Pipeline, 490 U.S. at
220. Accordingly, Congress itself took responsibility for the precise amount of money to be
collected-in this sense, then, Mid-America Pipeline did not really present a case in which
Congress actually delegated taxing authority to an administrative agency.
19. See, e.g., KENN'eH CULP DAVIS, 1 ADMiNisTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 2, at 76-81
(1958).
20. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermuele, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine,
69 U. CH. L. REv. 1721 (2002).
21. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CI. L. REV. 315, 316-17
(2000) ("The nondelegation canons represent a salutary kind of democracy-forcing minimalism,
designed to ensure that certain choices are made by an institution with a superior democratic
pedigree."); see also Lisa S. Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 87 CORNELL L. Rev. 452, 460-69 (2002) (arguing that administrative law
principles requiring agencies to limit their discretion and avoid ad hoc implementation of laws
through use of administrative standards advances core concerns of the nondelegation doctrine).
22. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon ofAvoidance, 2000
Sup. CT. REV. 223, 277 ("The nondelegation doctrine serves important constitutional interests: It
requires Congress to take responsibility for legislative policy and ensures that such policy passes
through the filter of bicameralism and presentment.").
23. Cf. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472-76 (rejecting nondelegation doctrine challenge to
provisions of the Clean Air Act, Pub, L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (amended 1966, 1970,
1977, 1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-767 1).
24. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 322.
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For a variety of reasons, Congress attempts to escape responsibility for making hard
choices. 25 The principal cause of this behavior is easy enough to understand: hard
choices force legislators to declare themselves in ways that are certain to alienate at
least some members of their constituency. 26 In order to claim credit and escape blame,
members of Congress have a strong incentive to enact vague laws that leave the
operative details (and the political responsibility for them) to someone else.
27
On the other hand, defenders of delegations, such as Professor Jerry Mashaw, argue
that many benefits, including presidential oversight of the regulatory process, result
from moving the locus of decisionmaking from the Congress to administrative
agencies. 28 Others have suggested that administrative agencies are more open than
Congress to meaningful and broad-based public participation.
29
Some congressional delegations reflect a genuine desire to obtain the benefit of
scientific and technical expertise when deciding very difficult questions, such as how to
value human life and regulation of risks to life and health for purposes of establishing
and enforcing environmental, health, and safety regulations. Agency administrators and
staff often have relatively greater expertise in specific areas of policy design and
implementation. These considerations might be as relevant to the design of revenue
programs as they are to the design of environmental, health, and safety programs.
Whatever the merits of delegation in other contexts, however, one should view with
skepticism delegations of authority over the ability to raise and expend revenue. As I
will explain in greater detail below,30 multiple reasons support such a rule.
First, the Constitution singles out the taxing power for special treatment, which
makes it different from other legislative powers. At the Federal Convention in 1787,
the Framers spent many hours debating how best to constrain the federal government's
ability to separate a citizen from his personal wealth. In particular, the Framers were
vitally concerned about ensuring democratic control and accountability over the
revenue and appropriations powers." One of the cornerstones of the "Great
Compromise" that facilitated a deal between the large states and the smaller states was
the vesting of the House of Representatives, the most democratically accountable entity
25. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 9-12, 82-96; see also David Schoenbrod,
Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to My Critics, 20 CARDOZo L. REv. 731, 731-32, 740-41
(1999).
26. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 9-10, 84-89, 92-94; Schoenbrod, Delegation
and Democracy, supra note 25, at 740-41.
27. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 7, at 47-96; see also Peter H. Aranson, Ernest
Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1,40-
45, 55-62 (1982).
28. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 132-56 (1997).
29. See Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781-82 (1999). Query whether Vice President Cheney's energy
policy group, or then-First Lady Hillary Clinton's health care task force, offered greater
transparency and opportunities for public participation than typical congressional legislative
proceedings. See generally Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 2582-83
(2004) (describing the Bush Administration Energy Task Force's highly secretive approach to
formulating national energy policy).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 151-54, 514-29.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 74-154.
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in the Framer's blueprint, with complete control over fiscal policy. Although the final
version of the Origination Clause 32 greatly watered down the House of
Representatives's exclusive control over the federal purse by permitting the Senate to
propose or concur with amendments to revenue and appropriations measures, the
importance that the Framers placed on the power to raise and spend money should
inform nondelegation jurisprudence. 33
Practical reasons also support greater judicial scrutiny of delegations of taxing
authority. Delegations of revenue authority coupled with delegations of spending
authority are a prescription for disaster. No agency should enjoy the power to infinitely
extend its jurisdiction and programs. No responsible government would vest such a
power in a semi-autonomous bureaucracy. Simply put, rational bureaucrats will seek to
expand their dominion to the outer limits of their ability. If given a blank check and a
vague mandate to "do good," those outer limits could prove to be very broad indeed.
If Congress limits either the amount to be collected or the purposes for which the
amount collected can be spent, the problem of uncontrolled growth in the agency's
mandate should not arise. Notwithstanding the very expansive mandates that many
federal agencies enjoy-for example, one of the Commission's prime directives is to
regulate the airwaves for "the public interest, convenience, and necessity, 3 4 which is
not a very instructive standard-an agency cannot generate its own resources to
implement the mandate infinitely. Instead, the agency must seek and obtain
appropriations from Congress to advance its vision of the public good. Incident to this
process, Congress provides both oversight of the agency's action and direct approval,
through an appropriation, of the agency's proposed course of action.35 But should
Congress fail to limit either the amount of money to be raised or the purposes to which
it may be put, the danger of an agency running amok becomes more than merely
theoretical.
Third, and finally, the doctrine of ratification would avoid many of the problems
that would be associated with more aggressive enforcement of the nondelegation
doctrine in other areas. Since 1907 and continuing to the present, the Supreme Court
has held that Congress may ratify an otherwise unlawful tax, thereby saving it from36
invalidation. Moreover, the Court also has held that retroactive taxation is lawful if it
32. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the
House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other
Bills.").
33. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 359 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (arguing that the Senate will not undermine democratic self-government because of the
House's ability to not "only refuse [unjust policies proposed by the smaller states in the Senate],
but they alone can propose the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a
word, hold the purse").
34. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 303, 307(a), 309(a) (2000); see also Nat'l Broad. Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (rejecting nondelegation challenge to the
Communications Act of 1934, which establishes the "public interest" standard).
35. See Schuck, supra note 29, at 783-86 (discussing various oversight mechanisms
and their importance for ensuring that agencies stay within the limits of their delegated
authority).
36. See United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370, 383-85 (1907).
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rationally relates to a legitimate government purpose.37 It would therefore be possible
to require Congress to endorse a particular revenue scheme without requiring Congress
to design the revenue scheme in the first instance. Congress should be required to do so
when taxation is involved because taxation involves not merely a limitation on liberty,
but a coerced transfer of property to the government itself. In this sense, then, taxation
involves both a loss of liberty and property, triggering constitutional concerns
associated with basic notions of due process, in addition to concerns about the
separation of powers.
38
As it happens, such a delegation-a delegation of both taxing authority and
discretion to designate the uses to which the revenue may be put-presently exists in
federal law. Under the universal service program created by 47 U.S.C. § 254, the
Commission enjoys authority to impose taxes and to spend the monies that it raises.39
Congress did not establish any statutory limit on the amount that the Commission may
raise40 nor did it provide any meaningful limits on the exact purposes for which the
money raised may be spent.
41
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Framers were acutely aware of the
dangers of unchecked government power. The power to levy and collect taxes was, in
particular, a matter of great concern among the delegates. 42 Chief Justice John
Marshall's aphorism undoubtedly is true: the power to tax is the power to destroy.43
Congress has used its taxing power to achieve social objectives in circumstances where
its direct regulatory authority has been open to question.44 Moreover, the Supreme
Court generally has permitted Congress to use its taxing authority in this fashion.
It is one thing for Congress to tax a good or service into extinction. It is entirely
another for an independent regulatory agency to do so. To date, the Commission has
set the universal service fee assessments at a relatively modest level; most companies
paying the assessments charge customers an additional 5-10% surcharge on their
monthly bill to recoup the charges. 45 Although a 10% surcharge on a $25 monthly long
distance bill is not shocking, it does represent a significant cost. Any person using long
distance services, a cell phone, or a pager is contributing to the Commission's
37. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30-31, 35 (1994).
38. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv.
1513 (1991) (arguing that enforcement of separation of powers doctrine has the effect of
advancing individual liberty by providing important checks against arbitrary or unjust
government action).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 287-446.
40. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(d) (2000).
41. See id. § 254(c).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 71-154.
43. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,431 (1819).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (upholding confiscatory
taxes on the proceeds of unlawful wagering); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 512-14
(1937) (upholding confiscatory taxes on the sale or transfer of certain disfavored firearms).
45. See In re Matter of Proposed Second Quarter 2002 Universal Serv. Contribution
Factor, 17 F.C.C.R. 4451 (2002) (setting quarterly universal service charges for
telecommunications service providers); Cherie R. Kiser & Angela F. Collins, Regulation on the
Horizon: Are Regulators Poised to Address the Status of 1P Telephony?, 11 CoMMLAw
CONSPEC'rUS 19, 22-23 (2003) (discussing universal service assessments).
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universal service fund. From a separation of powers perspective, the question that begs
to be asked and answered is: How can Congress escape responsibility for either raising
the revenue used to provide universal service subsidies or determining the specific uses
to which those funds may be put?
46
This Article argues for a reinvigoration of the nondelegation doctrine, at least in the
very narrow context of delegations vesting independent agencies with the ability
directly to raise and spend revenue. Taxing powers are, as a matter of history and
practice, different from other sorts of government authority. When government
commands that a citizen surrender money or property, it is essential that the decision
reflect a modicum of democratic accountability. Democratically elected-and
accountable-members of Congress, rather than bureaucrats, should be required to
endorse de facto revenue measures and face the potential wrath of the voters if they
deem the taxes too burdensome or the program's benefits too ephemeral.
In the case of the universal service program, because Congress has failed to limit
either the amount of revenue to be raised or the particular purposes to which the
revenue may be used, it has essentially given the Commission a blank check.
Moreover, the program's design permits Congress to take credit for the benefits it
provides without being accountable for the taxes used to pay for them. Taxation
without democratic accountability is fundamentally unjust and conflicts with the
Framers' design. The federal courts should not permit it.
Under existing legal doctrine, Congress may delegate responsibility for designing
taxation and spending programs to agencies provided that it ultimately ratifies the
agency's work product. Even a completely ultra vires tax collected by the Executive
Branch may be ratified, and thereby validated, through appropriate legislation.47 Thus,
even if Congress attempts to escape responsibility for the implementation of a tax, the
federal courts possess the ability to force Congress to ratify the tax via legislative
approval (and take political responsibility for it) or invalidate the tax (precluding
Congress from claiming responsibility for the benefits that the agency's program would
provide without accepting responsibility for the taxes needed to fund it).
Part I of this Article considers the relevancy of the Origination Clause to the
problem of delegated taxing authority. This part reviews the legislative history of the
clause, giving particular attention to the Framers' concerns about controlling the
exercise of the taxing and spending powers, and its potential relevance to
contemporary concerns about the nondelegation doctrine. Part I examines both the
nondelegation doctrine generally and the more specific prohibition against the
delegation of taxing authority. Part III reviews and critiques the concept of universal
service and the Commission's efforts to implement the program. In Part IV, the Article
considers the fascinating, but largely forgotten, doctrine of congressional ratification of
unlawful taxes and its potential application in the context of the universal service
program. Part IV also argues in favor of enforcing the nondelegation doctrine more
diligently, at least in the context of taxation. The Article concludes that the federal
courts should enforce the nondelegation doctrine more readily in the context of
delegations involving the power to tax. In particular, the courts should invalidate the
46. See Schoenbrod, supra note 25, at 734-35 (describing increased use of delegations
regarding an ever-broader array of subjects).
47. See Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc., 176 F.3d 500, 506-07 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see
also United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370, 383-85 (1907).
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Commission's current universal service funding mechanism, subject to congressional
ratification.
The goal of providing universal service to all households in the United States
probably represents a sound public policy. 48 Even so, the question remains as to who
should be primarily responsible for the design of the universal service program and,
equally importantly, precisely who will pay to make universal service possible. At least
arguably, this is a task for Congress and not the Commission.
I. THE FRAMERS, THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE, AND THE POWER TO TAX
There are at least three separate objections that one could lodge against delegations
of revenue authority in general, and § 254 and the universal service program in
particular. The first relates to the Origination Clause. The Origination Clause requires
that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but
the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills. '49 A statute
originating in the Senate violates the Origination Clause if it comes within the
definition of a revenue-raising bill.50
A separate, but conceptually related, objection arises under the nondelegation
doctrine. Black letter law requires that Congress, when delegating responsibility to an
administrative agency, must provide an "intelligible principle" that effectively
constrains an agency's discretion to act under the delegation.5 Thus, "Congress does
not violate the Constitution merely because it legislates in broad terms, leaving a
certain degree of discretion to executive or judicial actors." 52 Some have argued that §
254 violates the nondelegation doctrine because it vests an undue amount of discretion
53with the Commission to establish and administer the universal service program.
A final argument involves a more specialized iteration of the nondelegation
doctrine: an administrative agency may not interpret an ambiguous statute to confer the
48. See, e.g., Jim Chen, Standing in the Shadows of Giants: The Role of
intergenerational Equity in Telecommunications Reform, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 921,971 (2000)
(endorsing some of the goals the universal service program advances, but seriously questioning
§ 254's funding mechanism as a means of achieving these goals). A vexatious person, however,
might ask if the use of a telephone with nifty "advanced services" really matters all that much to
someone who lacks access to basic health care or prescription drugs. It is an odd entitlement
scheme that places access to telephone service on a higher plane than access to basic health care
services.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
50. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 863 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 495 U.S.
385 (1990).
51. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (holding
that Congress, when delegating power to the Executive Branch, must "lay down by legislative
act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to
conform"); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,472 (2001) (citing and
applying the "intelligible principle" test in the context ofa nondelegation doctrine challenge to a
provision of the Clean Air Act); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 164-65 (1991).
52. Touby, 500 U.S. at 165.
53. See Barbara A. Cherry & Donald D. Nystrom, Universal Service Contributions: An
Unconstitutional Delegation of Taxing Power, 2000 L. REv. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 107, 123-
32.
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power to tax.5 If Congress expressly delegates authority to shape a revenue program,
however, the usual nondelegation doctrine principles will apply to the statute.55 Some
critics have suggested that § 254 violates this more narrow corollary of the
nondelegation doctrine.
56
The Origination Clause represents the best place to begin the analysis because it
provides the most specific textual basis for limiting congressional delegations that
involve revenue authority.57 Unfortunately, it is not a very promising avenue of inquiry
because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Origination Clause very narrowly. One
should keep in mind, however, that although the existence of the Origination Clause
should inform the nondelegation doctrine's application, the nondelegation doctrine
inquiries are separate and distinct questions (which are addressed in Part II).
A. The Origination Clause as a Possible Basis for Challenging § 254's
Constitutionality
The Origination Clause requires that "[a]ll bills for raising Revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives.' 58 As it happens, the Telecommunications Act of
1996 ("TCA") originated in the Senate, not the House of Representatives.
59
Accordingly, if § 254's universal service program constitutes a "revenue" measure for
purposes of the Origination Clause, Congress did not properly enact it.
Since 1789, the Supreme Court has decided eight Origination Clause cases.' In
every case, the Origination Clause-based challenges have failed. Several reasons help
to explain this remarkable lack of success.
The Supreme Court has held that the Origination Clause applies only to general
revenue measures-not to limited or targeted taxes. "The Court has interpreted this
general rule to mean that a statute that creates a particular governmental program and
that raises revenue to support that program, as opposed to a statute that raises revenue
to support government generally, is not a 'Bil[l] for raising Revenue' within the
meaning of the Origination Clause."6' Using this approach, the Supreme Court has
54. See Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-43 (1974).
55. See Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 221-24 (1989).
56. See Cherry & Nystrom, supra note 53, at 133-36.
57. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEo. L.J. 555,
572-73,615-19 (1997); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-73 (1994) (holding that
when specific constitutional text addresses a particular question, that text and not another, more
general text, should be controlling); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1990) (holding that
where "an explicit textual source of constitutional protection" exists, it "must be the guide for
analyzing claims, rather than "the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process"').
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
59. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(enacting S. 652).
60. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990); Skinner v. Mid-America
Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989); Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906); Twin City Bank v.
Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Lumberman's Bank v. Huston, 167 U.S. 203 (1897); United
States v. Norton, 91 U.S. 566 (1875).
61. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 397-98 (alteration in original).
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rejected Origination Clause challenges involving fees on bank notes,62 real property,
and a crime victim's compensation fund.6 4
Moreover, this approach also comports with Justice Story's authoritative
interpretation of the Origination Clause. Justice Story explained that "[t]his provision,
so far as it regards the right to originate what are technically called 'money bills,' is,
beyond all question, borrowed from the British House of Commons, of which it is the
ancient and indisputable privilege and right, that all grants of subsidies and
parliamentary aids shall begin in their house." 65 In a later edition of his work, he noted
that:
The practical construction of the Constitution... and... the history of the origin
of the [constitutional provision] ... proves that it has been confined to bills to
levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and has not been understood to extend to
bills for other purposes, which may incidentally create revenue.
66
Although the utter lack of success enjoyed by litigants raising Origination Clause
claims should have given a prudent lawyer serious pause before proceeding,
telecommunications service providers subject to the universal service fees initiated a
legal challenge to § 254 premised on a violation of the Origination Clause.67 The Fifth
Circuit rejected this claim in summary fashion, reasoning-quite correctly-that the
TCA was not a "bill for raising revenue." Although "[a] different case might be
presented if the program funded were entirely unrelated to the persons paying for the
program, ' ' 68 the universal service fees do not really fit within this exception. The Fifth
Circuit, applying Munoz-Flores, properly concluded that the universal service fees
were part of a special program and generally benefited the persons or entities
responsible for paying them.
69
Given this jurisprudential backdrop, one wonders why telecommunications service
providers pressed an Origination Clause claim before the Fifth Circuit. Indeed, the
Munoz-Flores decision even rejects the argument that an exact correspondence
between the class of payors and beneficiaries must exist to avoid labeling legislation a
"revenue" measure. 70 Thus, the Origination Clause does not itself support a serious
challenge to the universal service program because the TCA was not a "revenue bill"
for purposes of the Clause.
62. Nebeker, 167 U.S. at 203.
63. Millard, 202 U.S. at 436-37.
64. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 397-401.
65. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES, §445,
at 315 (Ronald Rotunda & John Nowak eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
66. JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTIrrToN § 880, at 610-11 (Boston,
Little, Brown 3d ed. 1858) (1833).
67. See Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 426-28 (5th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1210, 1223 (2000), and cert. dismissed, 531 U.S. 975 (2000).
68. Id. at 400 n.7.
69. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 183 F.3d at 427-28.
70. See id. at 400 (holding that earlier cases did not establish a rule "that any bill that
provides for the collection of funds is a revenue bill unless it is designed to benefit the persons
from whom the funds are collected" and noting that "had the Court adopted such a caveat, the
Court in Nebeker would have found the statute to be unconstitutional").
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The formal effect of the Origination Clause, however, provides only part of the
picture. The debates surrounding its enactment should, at least arguably, inform the
separation of powers analysis associated with application of both the general
nondelegation doctrine and the more specific requirement of an express delegation of
revenue raising authority. To the extent that rendering the taxing power democratically
accountable was a primary concern of the Framers, one could plausibly argue that
delegations involving revenue authority should receive closer scrutiny than other kinds
of delegations.
B. A Brief Legislative History of the Origination Clause
The Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia between May 25 and September
17, 1787. 7' One of the most difficult issues facing the delegates concerned the
apportionment of seats in the legislative branch of the federal government. States with
small populations preferred equal representation of the states, which was the existing
practice under the Articles of Confederation. The relatively populous states, such as
Virginia and Massachusetts, preferred that legislative representation reflect a state's
population. In the end, the "Great Compromise" resulted in a Senate featuring equal
apportionment of seats among all states (a rule that the Constitution purports to make
unamendable) 72 and a House of Representatives with seats apportioned based on
relative population (with a slavery-friendly method of counting the population).73
The resolution of the impasse over the method allocating representation in the
House and Senate included an additional compromise that vested the House of
Representatives with exclusive powers over taxation and appropriation measures.
Although the delegates initially had approved, by a unanimous vote, the right of both
houses to originate legislation,74 this approach did not survive the Great Compromise.
The Framers' debates over the question of origination of revenue measures provide a
very helpful context in which to consider the larger nondelegation question.
Prior to June 13, 1787, the working draft of the Constitution permitted either house
to originate taxation and appropriations measures. During that day's debates, Elbridge
Gerry, of Massachusetts, "[m]oved to restrain the Senatorial branch from originating
money bills.",75 He reasoned that "[tihe other branch was more immediately the
representatives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the
purse-strings.
76
71. CALVIN C. JILLSON, CONsTrrIUnON MAKING: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 193 (Agathon Press 1988).
72. See U.S. CONST. art. V (providing that "no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate").
73. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, ci. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed,
three fifths of all other Persons.") (emphasis added).
74. See J1LLSON, supra note 71, at 57.
75. 1 THE RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 233 (Max Farrand ed., 2d
ed. 1937).
76. 1 id.
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James Madison, of Virginia, responded that, unlike Great Britain's House of Lords,
"[t]he Senate would be the representatives of the people as well as the [first] branch
[the House of Representatives]., 77 Madison further argued that:
If [the Senate] s[houl]d have any dangerous influence over it, they would easily
prevail on some member of the latter to originate the bill they wished to be passed.
As the Senate would be generally a more capable sett [sic] of men, it w[oul]d be
wrong to disable them from any preparation of the business, especially of that
which was most important, and in our republics, worse prepared than any other.
78
After a brief general debate, the delegates rejected Gerry's motion, by a margin of
three states in favor and eight opposed.79
The question of democratic control over the appropriations and taxing powers did
not go away. Moreover, the question of apportionment had not been firmly resolved as
of June 13, 1787. In the days that followed, the Convention reached an impasse
between the large and small states regarding the apportionment of seats in the House
and Senate.80 On July 2, 1787, the delegates appointed a special committee to consider
the question of apportionment;8' the Committee of Eleven presented its report to the
Convention on July 5, 17 87 .t2
The Committee of Eleven broke the impasse by proposing the Great Compromise.
8 3
The Great Compromise established a bicameral legislature with proportional
representation in the House of Representatives and equal representation of the states in
the Senate.
8 4
As a concession to the larger states for accepting equal representation of all states in
the Senate, the committee vested the power of originating taxation and appropriations
measures in the House of Representatives and prohibited the Senate from either
originating or amending such legislation.85 The committee's draft provided "[tihat all
Bills for raising or appropriating money and for fixing the salaries of Officers of the
Government of the United States, shall originate in the first Branch of the Legislature,
and shall not be altered or amended by the second Branch-and that no money shall be
77. 1 id.
78. 1 id.
79. 1 id. at 234 n. 15. Madison records the vote as three to seven, but the official journal
reports the vote as three to eight. Later in the deliberations, General Charles Pinckney, of South
Carolina, references a vote of three in favor and eight against. See 1 id. at 546.
80. 2 id. at 12.
81. See 1 id at 509; see also 1 id. at 510-16.
82. 1 id. at 524-25.
83. 2 id. at 7. The Committee of Eleven consisted of Gerry, Ellsworth, Yates, Patterson,
Franklin, Bedford, Martin, Mason, Davie, Rutledge, and Baldwin. 2 id at 12.
84.1 id. at 78.
85. JILlSON, supra note 71, at 133. Speaking before the Maryland House of Delegates,
James McHenry explained: "The Larger States hoped for an advantage by confirming this
privilege to that Branch where their numbers predominated, and it ended in a compromise by
which the Lesser States obtained a power of amendment in the Senate." 3 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 75, at 148; see also 2 id. at 14.
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drawn from the public Treasury but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated by
the first Branch. 86
Thus, vesting the origination power with the House was an integral part of the deal
that resolved the conflict over congressional apportionment: seats in the Senate would
not be apportioned based on population, but only the House of Representatives would
have the power to initiate legislation that raises or spends money. Gerry described the
clause as "of great consequence" and as "the comer stone of the accommodation."
87
Similarly, Caleb Strong, of Massachusetts, viewed "the small States [as having] made a
considerable concession in the article of money bills."88 Benjamin Franklin, of
Pennsylvania, echoed this view, observing that "the two clauses, the originating of
money bills, and the equality of votes in the Senate, [are] essentially connected by the
compromise which had been agreed to."
89
Madison, who successfully had opposed Gerry's earlier motion to restrict the
Senate's power to originate taxation or appropriations measures, immediately objected
to the committee's approach to the origination question. He argued that "[e]xperience
proved that [an origination restriction] had no effect," that the restriction would be "a
source of frequent & obstinate altercations," and he reminded the delegates that the
Convention had rejected an identical proposal earlier (referring to Gerry's June 13,
1787 motion).90 In Madison's view, the solution to the problem of democratic
legitimacy was to apportion seats in both the House and the Senate on the basis of
population.
9 1
Governeur Morris, of Pennsylvania, also opposed the restriction for a different
reason. He argued that the restriction "will disable the second branch from proposing
its own money plans, and giving the people an opportunity of judging by comparison
of the merits of those proposed by the first branch.
92
George Mason, of Virginia, disagreed with Madison and Morris. He suggested that
"[tihe consideration which weighed with the Committee was that the [first] branch
would be the immediate representatives of the people, the [second] would not."93 In
light of this, "[s]hould the latter have the power of giving away the peoples [sic]
money, they might soon forget the Source from whence they received it" and "[w]e
,94
might soon have an aristocracy." Thus, for Mason, the Origination Clause was
essential to ensure that the power to tax and spend could not be exercised without
immediate democratic accountability.
Benjamin Franklin associated himself with Mason's remarks, noting that "it was
always of importance that the people should know who had disposed of their money, &
how it had been disposed of.",95 Franklin added that "those who feel, can best judge"
86. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 76, at 524.
87. 2 id. at 5.
88. 2 id. at 8.
89. 2 id. at 233.
90. See 1 id. at 527.
91. See l id. at 528-29.
92. 1 id. at 543-44.
93. 1 id. at 544.
94. 1 id.
95. 1 id. at 546.
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and "[t]his end would.., be best attained, if money affairs were to be confined to the
immediate representatives of the people."%
Following this debate, a motion to strike the origination restrictions on the Senate
failed by a vote of five to three, with three delegations not voting.97 Accordingly, a
strong proscription against the Senate originating taxation or appropriations measures
remained in the working draft of the Constitution.
But Madison and others opposed to vesting the House of Representatives with the
exclusive power to initiate revenue and spending measures would not give up. After
all, a proposal to include such a restriction had failed only a few weeks earlier by a
margin of eight to three. On the other hand, however, the earlier rejection took place
when the principle of equal suffrage in the Senate had not yet been firmly established.
In a private conversation with John Carroll, of Maryland, Madison explained his
opposition to origination restrictions on the Senate. He believed "[tihat lodging in the
house of representatives the sole right of raising and appropriating money, upon which
the Senate had only a negative, gave to that branch extraordinary power in the
constitution, which must end in its destruction." 98 Moreover, "without equal powers
they [the House and Senate] were not an equal check upon each other-and that this
was the chance that appeared for obtain[ing] an equal suffrage, or a suffrage equal to
wh[a]t we had in the present confed[eratio]n." 99 Thus, Madison viewed the Origination
Clause as mere window dressing, especially when contrasted with some sort of
proportional representation principle in the Senate as well as the House of
Representatives.
On July 16, 1787, the delegates adopted the Great Compromise. Notwithstanding
Madison's objections, the resolution incorporated the strong version of the Origination
Clause and passed by a vote of five to four, with one state delegation abstaining.tm On
July 26, 1787, the delegates charged a "Committee of Detail" with preparing a new
working draft that would reflect and incorporate the various resolutions and
amendments adopted up to that point.'
0 1
On August 6, John Rutledge, of South Carolina, delivered the Report of the
Committee of Detail.10 2 Article IV, section 5 of the working draft included a strong
version of the Origination Clause. It provided that "[a]ll bills for raising or
appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the Government,
shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by
the Senate."' 10 3
The Convention considered this provision on August 8, 1787. At that time, Charles
Pinckney, of South Carolina, moved to strike the provision from the draft. He argued
that "[i]f the Senate can be trusted with the many great powers proposed, it surely may
be trusted with that of originating money bills."' 4 Governeur Morris supported
96. 1 id.
97. See l id. at 547.
98.2 id. at 210-11.
99. 2 id. at 211.
100. 2 id. at 13-15.
101. See 2 id. at 116-17, 128.
102. 2 id. at 177.
103. 2 id. at 178.
104. 2 id. at 224.
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Pinckney's motion, noting that "[i]t is particularly proper that the Senate sh[oul]d[]
have the right of originating money bills."'
0 5
George Mason objected strongly to the motion. Mason argued that "[t]o strike out
the section, was to unhinge the compromise of which it made a part." 6 Mason was
referring to the equal suffrage of all states, regardless of population, in the Senate.
Characterizing the Senate as a bastion of "[a]ristocracy," Mason believed that "[t]he
purse strings should never be put into its hands."'
0 7
Notwithstanding Mason's arguments, the delegates voted in favor of Pinckney's
motion by a margin of seven states in favor and four states against. 08 This vote had the
effect of striking the Origination Clause from the working draft of the Constitution.
Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, was displeased with the Convention's "extremely
objectionable" decision to strike the Origination Clause.' 09 On August 9, 1787,
Randolph gave the Convention notice that he would seek reconsideration of the vote at
a later time. On August 11, 1787, he moved for reconsideration."
0
In support of his position, Randolph noted that he had opposed an origination
restriction when suffrage in the Senate was to be based on proportional representation.
Now that representation in the Senate would be based on equal representation among
the states, "the large states would require this compensation at least.""' Moreover,
retention of the Origination Clause "would make the plan more acceptable to the
people, because they will consider the Senate as the more aristocratic body, and will
expect that the usual guards against its influence be provided according to the example
in G[reat] Britain."'" 2 Randolph argued that "the privilege will give some advantage to
the House of Representatives if it extends to the originating only-but still more, if it
restrains the Senate [from] amending.""' 3 Finally, he asked for the support of the
smaller states, reminding their delegates that the Great Compromise depended upon
this condition in exchange for equality of representation in the Senate.14
Randolph's motion to reconsider passed by a vote of nine states in favor to one state
opposed, with one state abstaining. Two days later, on August 13, 1787, the Federal
Convention took up reconsideration of the Origination Clause.
In a proactive move, Randolph immediately moved to limit the clause to "revenue
raising" bills.' 5 This amendment served to eliminate the objection that the term
"money bills" was overly broad so as to potentially bring within the restriction "all bills
under which money might incidentally arise.
' 1 6
George Mason spoke strongly in favor of vesting the House of Representatives with
control over the power of taxation and spending. Mason's argument largely focused on
105. 2 id.
106. 2 id.
107. 2 id.
108. 2 id. at 224-25.
109. See 2 id. at 230.
110. 2 id. at 262.
111.2 id. at 262-63.
112. 2 id. at 263.
113. 2 id. (alterations in original).
114.2 id.
115. See 2 id. at 262.
116. 2 id. at 262.
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the character of the Senate as distanced from and unaccountable to the voting citizens.
This was so because as constituted "the Senate did not represent the people, but the
States in their political character." ' 1 7 Accordingly, "[i]t was improper therefore that it
should tax the people."" 8 He concluded that "in all events he would contend that the
pursestrings should be in the hands of the Representatives of the people."
'
"
19
Gerry offered his opinion that the citizens' acceptance of the Constitution would be
contingent on the inclusion of an origination restriction. "Taxation and representation
are strongly associated in the minds of the people, and they will not agree that any but
their immediate representatives shall meddle with their purses."' 20 He warned that
"acceptance of the plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate be not restrained from
originating Money bills."'
2
'
Madison responded to Randolph's proposed amendment by observing that "[i]f the
right to originate be vested exclusively in the House of Representatives either the
Senate must yield against the judgment to that House, in which [case] the Utility of the
check will be lost---or the Senate will be inflexible & the House] of Rep[resentative]s
must adapt its Money bill to the views of the Senate, in which case, the exclusive right
will be of no avail." 2 2 Moreover, Madison wholly dismissed Randolph's suggestion
that the Great Compromise hinged on the origination restriction. 23
John Dickinson, of Delaware, spoke in favor of Randolph and Gerry's position. He
asked rhetorically, "has not experience verified the utility of restraining money bills to
the immediate representatives of the people[?]' ' 124 He posited that "all the prejudices of
the people would be offended by refusing this exclusive privilege to the H[ouse][] of
Repres[entative]s[] and these prejudices sh[oulld[] never be disregarded by us when no
essential purpose was to be served."' 125 He predicted that "[wihen this plan goes forth,
it will be attacked by the popular leaders. Aristocracy will be the watchword; the
Shibboleth among its adversaries."'
' 26
Randolph then renewed his plea for reviving the origination restriction, suggesting
that it was "of such consequence, that as he valued the peace of this Country, he would
press the adoption of it." He asked "[w]hen the people behold the Senate, the
countenance of an aristocracy; and in the president, the form at least of a little
monarch, will not their alarms be sufficiently raised without taking from their
immediate representatives, a right which has been so long appropriated to them[?]"' 127
Despite these admonitions, only four states-New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Virginia, and North Carolina-voted in favor of restoring the origination restriction.1
28
117. 2 id. at 273 (emphasis in original).
118. 2 id.
119. 2 id. at 274.
120. 2 id. at 275.
121. 2 id.
122. 2 id. at 277.
123. 2 id.
124. 2 id. at 278.
125. 2 id.
126. 2 id.
127. 2 id. at 278-79.
128. See 2 id. at 279-80; see also JILLSON, supra note 71, at 138.
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Accordingly, the Origination Clause remained dead in the delegates' working draft of
the Constitution.
On August 15, 1787, the delegates considered Article VI, section 12 of the
Committee of Detail's draft. This provision simply provided that "[e]ach House shall
possess the right of originating bills, except in cases beforementioned."' 29 Article IV,
section 5 of the draft, the strong version of the Origination Clause, constituted an
"exception." The delegates, however, had struck this provision and Randolph's effort
to revive it had failed two days earlier on August 13, 1787.
During the debate, Caleb Strong moved to amend Article VI, section 12, to include
a weaker version of the Origination Clause that the delegates had rejected. Strong's
amendment provided that:
Each House shall possess the right of originating all Bills, except Bills for raising
money for the purposes of revenue or for appropriating the same and for the fixing
of salaries of the Officers of Government which shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in
other cases. 1
30
The delegates postponed debate on the amendment without comment, by a vote of six
to five.13 The full convention never returned to this subject-instead, a special
committee decided to incorporate Strong's weakened restriction on the Senate-
originating revenue bills.
On August 31, 1787, the delegates created the Committee of Eleven, consisting of a
delegate from each state, to consider "such parts of the Constitution as have been
postponed, and such parts of reports as have not been acted on."' 132 On September 5,
1787, the Committee proposed a weaker version of the original Origination Clause-
the House of Representatives would have the power to originate revenue measures, but
the Senate would enjoy full powers of amendment to such legislation. The clause
provided that "all Bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
representatives and shall be subject to alterations and amendments by the Senate."1 33
Three days later, on September 8, 1787, the delegates amended the proposed
Origination Clause to strike the language "and shall be subject to alteration and
amendments by the Senate" in favor of the language "but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments as in other bills."'134 The Convention then voted nine to two in
favor of including the amended (and weaker) Origination Clause in the United States
Constitution. 135
The Federal Convention delegates signed the Constitution on September 17, 1787.
Significantly, Randolph, Mason, and Gerry-all supporters of a strong version of the
Origination Clause-refused to sign the draft.
129. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENIION OF 1787, supra note 75, at 181.
130. 2 id. at 294, 297.
131. 2 id.
132. 2 id. at 473.
133. 2 id. at 505.
134. 2 id. at 552.
135. 2 id.
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In late January 1788, Gerry wrote that ceding to the Senate the power to amend
revenue bills "effectually destroyed" the restriction on that body's power over the
purse. Moreover, "[t]he admission.., of the smaller States to an equal representation
in the Senate, never would have been agreed to by the Committee, or by myself, as a
member of it, without [the unmodified Origination Clause].' 36
Madison, who consistently opposed imposing origination restrictions on the Senate,
shamelessly touted the watered down Origination Clause as an important democratic
feature of the plan. At the Virginia ratifying convention, a delegate objected to the
Senate's ability to influence money bills. The delegate viewed this arrangement as "a
departure from that great principle which required that the immediate representatives
of the people only should interfere with money bills."'137 Delegate Grayson asked
rhetorically "[wihy should the senate have a right to intermeddle with money, when the
representation is neither equal nor just?' ' 38
Madison responded that a ban on senatorial amendment would not be feasible and
that the Senate, unlike the British House of Lords, was not based on a hereditary
principle.' 39 He also noted that "[t]he honorable member says, that there is no
difference between the right of originating bills, and proposing amendments.'
'14
In Madison's view, "[there is some difference, though not considerable."' 14 ' He
explained that "[i]f any grievances should happen in consequence of unwise
regulations in revenue matters, the odium would be divided, which will now be thrown
on the house of representatives.' 42 Thus, although in a weak form, the Origination
Clause would ensure democratic accountability for revenue measures by requiring the
House of Representatives to initiate taxing measures; voters would instinctively blame
the House when faced with new or increased taxation.
In the Federalist Papers, Madison again invoked the Origination Clause as an
important democratic feature of the Constitution. In Federalist No. 58, Madison
minimizes concerns about the antidemocratic nature of the Senate. Even if a number of
small states somehow manage to dominate the Senate, "a constitutional and infallible
resource still remains with the larger States by which they will be able at all times to
accomplish their just purposes."' 143 And what is this "infallible resource?" The House
of Representatives: "The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone
can propose the supplies requisite for the support of government."'"4
Now, working to secure ratification of the Constitution, the Origination Clause
morphs into an essential bulwark of democratic control over the federal government
(rather than a silly irrelevancy). "The power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as
the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can ann the
136. 3 id. at 265.
137. 3 id. at 317 (comments of Delegate Grayson).
138. 3 id.
139. 3 id. at 317-18.
140. 3 id. at 318.
141. 3 id.
142. 3 id.
143. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 359 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
144. Id.
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immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance,
and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure."'
' 45
The House will be able to check the Senate routinely, Madison confidently asserted,
citing the "continual triumph of the British House of Commons over the other branches
of government, whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed."' 46 Alexander
Hamilton, in Federalist No. 66, also trotted out the fact that "[t]he exclusive privilege
of originating money bills will belong to the House of Representatives,"' 47 as an
argument against concerns that the Senate would have too much power given its lack of
proportional representation.
Finally, in an early session of Congress, Madison again extolled the virtues of the
Origination Clause. "The constitution... places the power in the House of originating
money bills."'' 48 He explained that "[t]he principal reason why the constitution had
made this distinction was, because they were chosen by the People, and supposed to be
best acquainted with their interests, and ability [to pay taxes].'
' 49
Besides proving that the art of "spin" significantly predated the Clinton
Administration, what are we to make of Madison's repeated invocations of a clause
that he "was for striking out... considering it as of no advantage to the large States as
fettering the Gov[ernment] and as a source of injurious altercations between the two
Houses?"' 50 Obviously, the undemocratic nature of the Senate was a major issue during
the ratification debates-any argument that seemed to enhance the relative stature of
the House probably advanced the cause of ratification. Thus, as a pragmatic politician,
Madison used whatever tools were close at hand to advance the cause of ratification.
C. The Lessons of the Framers' Debate about Political Accountability for Revenue
Measures
The delegates at the Federal Convention of 1787 were acutely concerned with
building a national government that respected the citizenry's desire for democratically
accountable institutions. This concern was greatest with respect to Congress, the
branch possessed of the most far-reaching powers to regulate the citizenry. The
Origination Clause debates demonstrate that the Framers viewed fixing responsibility
for taxing and spending as an essential component of any viable scheme of
government. Although they disagreed about whether a senatorial power of amendment
was consistent with the necessary democratic accountability, no one argued that the
President alone, or in concert with other Executive Branch officers, should possess the
power to tax or spend.
Both supporters and opponents of the Origination Clause in the Founding Era
viewed the Origination Clause as a marker for a broader political principle: taxation
should be, indeed must be, democratically accountable.' 5 1 Moreover, disputes about
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. THE FEDERAUST NO. 66, at 404 (Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
148. 3 THE RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 75, at 356.
149. 3 id.
150. 2 id. at 224.
151. See generally Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and
the Constitution: A Textual and Structural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 673-74 (1999)
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the power of senatorial origination were not really debates about the importance of
vesting taxation and appropriations policy with politically accountable government
officials.
Those supporting a weak restriction on senatorial origination did not do so because
they believed that taxing and spending powers should be insulated from democratic
control. Rather, those supporting an equal voice for the Senate in revenue matters, like
James Madison, did not view the Senate as intrinsically and irredeemably
antidemocratic (notwithstanding that fact that Senators would not be directly elected
and served relatively long terms of office). Thus, the debate was really about whether
the Senate represented an incursion of "aristocracy" into an otherwise democratic
scheme of government.
Given this political history, one would expect that the Supreme Court would enforce
the nondelegation doctrine with particular vigilance in the area of delegations of
revenue authority. This, however, has not been the case.
In fact, the Supreme Court expressly has rejected the idea that delegations of taxing
powers raise special nondelegation doctrine concerns: "We find no support, then, for
[the] contention that the text of the Constitution or the practices of Congress require
the application of a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in cases where
Congress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power.
'152
Moreover, not a single member of the Court dissented from this holding.
Even if the realities of modem government preclude Congress itself from addressing
every detail associated with implementing a complex regulatory scheme, Congress
should be required to take responsibility for decisions to tax. When an agency requires
those it regulates to contribute more to the agency than the benefit the agency itself
confers in exchange, the "fee" in question should be deemed a "tax," and Congress
itself should be required to endorse it. A limited requirement of democratic
accountability in the specific context of revenue measures would not disrupt the
operation of the modem administrative state, but would ensure that responsibility for
basic tax policies rests with those elected to make such decisions.
As noted above, at the Federal Convention, no one suggested that either the
President alone or a group of inferior Executive Branch officers should enjoy the
power to impose taxes or spend government monies absent a congressional
appropriation. 5 3 The only question presented for consideration was whether the failure
to apportion Senate seats based on population made the Senate sufficiently similar to
the House of Lords to justify strict limits on the body's ability to influence fiscal
policies directly. Notwithstanding the objections offered by Gerry, Mason, and
Randolph, the delegates concluded that the Senate's manner of selection and
apportionment did not require limiting its voice in matters of taxing and spending.
Even so, the Origination Clause reflects a symbolic commitment to the principle that
those who tax must be accountable to the people, whether directly (in the case of the
(noting that "[diecisions of governing political and social policy are to be made, for the most
part, by those who are both representative of and accountable to the populace" and "that
ultimate accountability to the populace - if only indirectly - served as the sine qua non of
American government").
152. Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1989).
153. But cf. J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1162, 1183-89 (arguing that the President has inherent power to spend monies in aid of his
constitutional duties under Article 11).
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House of Representatives) or indirectly (in the case of the Senate prior to the
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913).
Even if Congress may delegate details regarding the operation of tax laws to
administrative agencies (like the IRS), the federal courts should ensure that Congress
ultimately bears responsibility for the decision to separate a citizen from her money.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized the need for clear lines of responsibility
in its most recent federalism cases. The need for clear lines of responsibility is no
less pressing in the context of delegations of revenue authority.
If, as the Supreme Court has posited, citizens have difficulty fixing blame when
Congress forces states to undertake particular actions, there is no reason to suppose
that they are any better empowered to react when their monthly cell phone bill reflects
a 10% surcharge for a "universal service fee." When an agency enjoys authority to
design a public welfare program and to determine how to fund it, without any direct
congressional input or oversight, accountability for taxation is lost. A citizen could
blame her cell phone provider, the Commission, or the Congress for the universal
service fee charges appearing on her monthly statements. In all probability, however,
the consumer will blame the service provider or the agency, rather than Congress, for
the obligation to pay the surcharge. In this way, the delegation in § 254 violates the
presumption of democratic accountability for taxation.
II. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRATIC
AccouNTABIrY
Independent of the direct effects of the Origination Clause, congressional
delegations of taxing authority must comport with the requirements of the
nondelegation doctrine. This includes both the general rule that Congress must place
limits on delegations to administrative agencies and a more specific rule against
implied delegations of taxing authority. As will be explained below in some detail, §
254 appears to comply with both doctrines as they presently exist.
A. The Origin and Contemporary Application of the Nondelegation Doctrine
Although Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution provides that "[a]ll
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,"'
155
Congress may constitutionally delegate responsibility to an administrative agency to
create regulations with the force of law necessary to achieve a statutory objective.
Provided that Congress establishes an "intelligible principle" that limits an agency's
decisionmaking power, the delegation does not violate the separation of powers. The
Supreme Court has described Congress's burden when drafting a delegation to an
agency as the "channelization" or "canalization" of the agency's discretion.
15 6
154. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992) (noting that "where
the Federal Government compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal
officials is diminished").
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
156. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772 (1996) (describing Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), in a parenthetical, as "upholding delegation to the United States
Sentencing Commission because of detailed directives channeling agency discretion"); see
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The Supreme Court announced the modem nondelegation doctrine in Field v.
Clark.157 In Field, the Court explained "[tihat Congress cannot delegate legislative
power to the President" and noted that this "is a principle universally recognized as
vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution."'
5 8
The case raised a constitutional challenge to the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890,'59
which granted the President authority to modify, within preset ranges established by
Congress, certain tariffs without seeking congressional approval. 6° The challengers
argued that section 3 of the Act unconstitutionally vested the President with legislative
powers to tax and collect duties.'
61
The Supreme Court sustained the delegation. In doing so, the Justices distinguished
between "the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law."'
62
A few years later, in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,163 Chief Justice Taft
articulated the general test used to determine whether a statute violates the
nondelegation doctrine: "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body... is directed to conform, such legislative action
is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."' 64 Moreover, "in determining what
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring) ("The delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this code is not
canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing."); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress provided "a sufficient
definition of a standard to make the statute [at issue] valid" because "[d]iscretion is not
unconfined and vagrant" but rather "is canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing");
see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944) ("The essentials of the legislative
function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a
defined and binding rule of conduct .... ); id. at 426 ("Only if we could say that there is an
absence of standards.., would we be justified in overriding [Congress's] choice of means for
effecting its declared purpose.").
157. 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). Some earlier cases make vague references to limits on
Congress's ability to delegate, but arguably do not articulate the modem rule against overly
broad delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies. See Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109
YALE L.J. 1399, 1403-04 (2000) (briefly discussing earlier cases and arguing that "[flor almost
two centuries, the Supreme Court has understood [the Article I Vesting Clause] to limit the
extent to which, or the conditions under which, Congress may delegate its lawmaking powers to
executive or administrative officials"). But cf Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 1722
("Nondelegation is nothing more than a controversial theory that floated around the margins of
nineteenth-century constitutionaism-a theory that wasn't clearly adopted by the Supreme
Court until 1892, and even then only in dictum.").
158. Field, 143 U.S. at 692.
159. 51 Cong. Ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 (1890).
160. Id. at 691.
161. Id. at 681.
162. Id. at 693-94 (quoting Cincinnati, Wilmington, & Zanesville R.R. v. Comm'rs of
Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852)).
163. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
164. Id. at 409; see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (applying
the "intelligible principle test" and holding that Congress did not violate the nondelegation
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[each governmental branch] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the
extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and
the inherent necessities of the governmental coordination."'
l6 5
The Supreme Court applied the doctrine most broadly in three cases decided in
1935 and 1936-the last gasp of the Lochner era. Prior to 1935, the federal courts
uniformly had found statutes challenged on nondelegation doctrine grounds to be
constitutional. 1
66
In 1935, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States and Panama Refining
Company v. Ryan, the Supreme Court invalidated challenged provisions of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933167 ("NIRA") because Congress, at least in
the Supreme Court's view, had not sufficiently limited the scope of the powers that it
delegated to the Executive Branch. 68 A year later, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 169 the
Supreme Court invalidated portions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935
on nondelegation doctrine grounds.
Panama Refining involved a challenge to section 9(c) of the NIRA, which
authorized the President to restrict the transportation of petroleum products in
interstate and foreign commerce, and prescribed criminal penalties for violations of the
President's orders. 170 In turn, President Roosevelt issued an Executive Order
conferring on the Secretary of the Interior "all the powers vested in the President 'for
the purposes of enforcing Section 9(C)."
171
Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, found that the statutory provision
failed to define adequately the circumstances and conditions under which one could
lawfully transport petroleum products. 72 Nor did the statute impose any limitations on
the President's authority to establish policies under the NIRA. 7 3 The Court
complained that "Congress left the matter to the President without standard or rule, to
be dealt with as he pleased."' 174 Moreover, the Court expressly rejected the argument
that the delegation passed constitutional muster because the President should be
doctrine by establishing the United States Sentencing Commission to adopt guidelines binding
federal judges).
165. J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406.
166. See, e.g., Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S.
266, 276-77,282 (1933) (upholding a delegation of authority to the Federal Radio Commission
to establish and enforce rules and standards for the issuance of radio station licenses); N.Y.
Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932) (upholding a delegation of
authority to the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate railroad mergers and acquisitions);
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (upholding the Tariff Act
of Sept. 21, 1922); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516-18, 520-22 (1911) (upholding
a delegation of authority to the Secretary of Agriculture, enabling him to promulgate rules and
regulations governing use of the national forests).
167. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,73 Pub. L. No. 67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
168. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541 (1935);
Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935).
169. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
170. Pan. Ref., 293 U.S. at 406.
171. ld. (quoting Exec. Order No. 6204, reprinted in 15 U.S.C.A. § 709 note (1933)).
172. Id. at 417.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 418.
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assumed to act "for what he believes to be the public good."' 75 Rather, "[t]he point is
not one of motives but of constitutional authority, for which the best of motives is not a
substitute." 1
76
Five months after the Panama Refining decision, the Supreme Court took a second
swipe at the Roosevelt Administration's implementation of the NIRA. In Schechter
Poultry, 177 the Justices invalidated yet another provision of the Act.
Schechter Poultry involved a more sweeping delegation of legislative authority to
the President, one authorizing the President to approve "codes of fair competition" for
"all trades and industries."'' 78 Under this authority, the President approved a "Live
Poultry Code" to govern the sale of poultry in New York.179 Schechter Poultry, a New
York company dealing in live poultry, operated slaughterhouses in violation of this
code. The company was charged and convicted of criminal charges arising from these
code violations.'
8 0
The Supreme Court held that Congress had utterly failed to define the term "fair
competition," rendering the President "virtually unfettered" in implementing the
statute.' 8' Accordingly, it invalidated section 3 of the NIRA, observing that "Congress
cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion
to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable for the rehabilitation and
expansion of trade or industry."
18 2
In Carter Coal, the Justices applied the nondelegation doctrine one last time to
invalidate New Deal legislation. The Bituminous Coal Act of 1935 ("BCA") created
joint labor/management boards charged with setting the terms and conditions of
employment in the coal industry, as well as minimum prices for bituminous coal.
183
Section 4 of the BCA provided that these agreements, to be known as "the Bituminous
Coal Code," would have the force and effect of law after a local district board adopted
an agreement. 1
84
The Court invalidated section 4 as an overbroad delegation of government power to
private parties. "This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not
even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to
private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others
in the same business."' 8 5 This scheme was fundamentally unjust because "in the very
nature of things, one person may not be intrusted [sic] with the power to regulate the
175. Id. at 420.
176. Id.
177. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
178. Id. at 521-22.
179. Id. at 525-26.
180. Id. at 519.
181. id. at 532,542. Justice Cardozo, the sole dissenter in Panama Refining, concurred
with the majority in Schechter Poultry. He characterized the Schechter Poultry delegation as
"unconfined and vagrant," a "roving commission to inquire into evils and upon discovery
correct them." Id. at 551.
182. Id. at 537-38.
183. 74 Pub. L. No. 402, 49 Stat. 991 (1935).
184. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 281-82.
185. Id. at 311.
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business of another, and especially of a competitor."' 8 6 Citing Schechter, the Supreme
Court invalidated the program.' 
7
Since 1936, the Supreme Court has not invalidated any federal legislation on the
grounds that it violates the nondelegation doctrine. 88 All the Supreme Court's
subsequent nondelegation doctrine decisions simply invoke Chief Justice Taft's
intelligible principle test, examine the challenged statute to determine whether
sufficient standards and statements of purpose limit the delegation, and then conclude
186. Id.
187. See id. at 311-12.
188. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 769 (1996) (upholding the
delegation of authority to the President to promulgate rules for courts-martial, specifying
aggravating factors for capital sentencing); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167 (1991)
(upholding the delegation of authority to the Attorney General under the Controlled Substances
Act); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (upholding the delegation of
authority to the United States Sentencing Commission); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,
556-57 (1975) (unanimously upholding the delegation to Native American tribes of authority to
regulate the introduction of liquor to Native American reservations); United States v. Sharpnack,
355 U.S. 286, 297 (1958) (upholding the application of the Assimilative Crimes Act to
subsequently adopted state criminal statutes); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537,542-44 (1950) (upholding the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 2523 as
an executive rather than legislative power); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-86
(1948) (upholding the delegation of authority to determine excessive profits); Fahey v.
Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253 (1947) (upholding the delegation of authority to the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board under the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC,
329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (upholding the delegation of authority to the Securities and Exchange
Commission to prevent unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power among security
holders); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 516 (1944) (upholding the delegation of
authority to the Price Administrator to restrain inflation by setting rent controls); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (upholding delegation of authority to Price
Administrator to fix commodity prices that would be fair and equitable, and would effectuate the
purposes of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,600 (1944) (upholding the delegation of authority to the Federal Power
Commission to determine just and reasonable rates); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 226 (1943) (upholding the delegation of authority to the FCC to regulate broadcast
licensing "as public interest, convenience, or necessity" require); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 165 (1941) (upholding the delegation of authority to the National Labor
Relations Board under the National Labor Relations Act); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm'r of
Wage and Hour Div. of the Dept. of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941) (upholding the delegation
of authority to the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor to
establish a uniform minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397 (1940) (upholding a delegation of authority under the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1937); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307
U.S. 533,574 (1939) (upholding the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act); Mulford v. Smith,
307 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1939) (upholding a delegation of authority under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15 (1939) (upholding a delegation of
authority under the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936) (upholding a delegation of authority to the President to
exercise discretion in prohibiting arms sales to certain foreign countries).
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that the delegation meets the standard.' 89 Thus, the post-New Deal decisions "display a
much greater deference to Congress's power to delegate"'19° than did Panama Refining,
Schechter Poultry, or Carter Coal.
Indeed, in 1974, Justice Thurgood Marshall described the nondelegation doctrine as
"moribund."' 9' As a formal matter, however, the nondelegation doctrine remains a part
of the separation of powers doctrine. 19 2 Instead of construing statutes broadly and
invalidating them, however, the Supreme Court has used the nondelegation doctrine to
narrow the scope of legislation that it finds potentially too vague for comfort.
193
In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns,'94 the Supreme Court's most recent case
involving the nondelegation doctrine, the Justices simply ratified the preexisting trend
against vigorous enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine. The Supreme Court
roundly rejected an effort by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit to resurrect the nondelegation doctrine.'
95
The D.C. Circuit became the first federal court in seven decades to apply Chief
Justice Taft's "intelligible principle" test and conclude that legislation insufficiently
constrained an agency's discretion. A panel of the court invalidated the Environmental
Protection Agency's ("EPA") construction of two Clean Air Act 196 sections as
unconstitutional delegations of legislative power.
97
The cases presented a challenge to the EPA's national ambient air quality standards
("NAAQS") for particulate matter and ozone. 98 Although the court recognized that
recent Supreme Court cases have not applied a "strong form of the nondelegation
189. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1384 (D.D.C. 1986) (three-judge
panel), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). Caner Coal did not apply this
standard only because the BCA's coal code provisions transferred government power directly to
private parties, an arrangement that the Supreme Court thought to be per se invalid. See Carter
Coal, 298 U.S. at 310-12. Accordingly, it did not have to inquire into whether Congress
provided sufficient guidelines to the private parties exercising government power.
190. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1384 (quoting Opp Cotton Mills, 312 U.S. at 145).
191. Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 353 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
192. See, e.g., Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1384 (explaining that "[s]uch cases indicate that
while the delegation doctrine may be moribund, it has not yet been officially interred by the
Court").
193. See Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(interpreting ambiguous workplace safety provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
as requiring OSHA to prove the existence of a "significant risk" prior to the enactment of a work
place health standard); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374 n.7 (noting that "[in recent years,
[the Court's] application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the
interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to
statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional").
194. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
195. See id. at 473-76.
196. Clean Air Act, 84 Pub. L. No. 159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
7401-7671).
197. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999), modified,
195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev'd sub nom, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457
(2001).
198. Id. at 1033.
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doctrine,"' 99 the panel argued that the remarkable scope of the delegation at issue,
coupled with its potential real-world effects, required the court to break with the
consistent general trend of sustaining virtually any delegation, however open-ended or
vague. 2°° Because the EPA's construction of its statutory authority was so
unconstrained as to potentially "send industry not just to the brink but hurtling over
it,"' 20' the Constitution required a "'more precise' delegation" instead of the generally
appropriate "vague delegation. ' ' 202 Rather than simply invalidate the problematic
provisions of the Clean Air Act, the panel remanded the regulations, with instructions
to the agency "to extract a determinate standard on its own. 20 3
The D.C. Circuit's decision proved to be remarkably controversial and generated
considerable negative commentary. 2° 4 The Supreme Court granted review and
emphatically reversed the D.C. Circuit, thereby ending the nondelegation doctrine's
Norma Desmond-like return to modem separation of powers doctrine.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia opined that "[tihe scope of discretion §
109(b)(l) allows is in fact well within the outer limits of our nondelegation
precedents. '"2°5 He explained that "[in a delegation challenge, the constitutional
question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the agency.' '206 All
legislative powers belong to the Congress and the Constitution "permits no delegation
of these powers." 207 If a statute purports to vest an Executive Branch entity with
199. Id. at 1038.
200. See id. at 1037-38.
201. Id. at 1037.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 1038 (quoting International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310,
1313) (holding that "[w]here (as here) statutory language and an existing agency interpretation
involve an unconstitutional delegation of power, but an interpretation without the constitutional
weakness is or may be available, our response is not to strike down the statute but to give the
agency an opportunity to extract a determinate standard of its own").
204. See, e.g., Richard 1. Pierce, The Inherent Limits on Judicial Control of Agency
Discretion, 52 ADMiN. L. REV. 63 (2000); Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of
the "New" Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the
Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MicH. L. REv. 303 (1999). But cf Bressman, supra note
21, at 460-62,483-85 (arguing that requiring administrative agencies to promulgate and honor
standards limiting their discretion advances important democratic values, notably including
"accountability, fairness, rationality, and regularity," and warning that "[u]nguided
administrative discretion is a threat to democratic values, even if delegation itself is not").
205. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).
206. Id. at 472.
207. Id. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermuele have put forth a novel argument that suggests
that the nondelegation doctrine either does not, or should not, exist. See Posner & Vermuele,
supra note 20, at 1721-24. They agree with Justice Scalia "that the Constitution bars the
'delegation of legislative power."' Id. at 1723. Posner and Vermuele dispute, however, that
legislation routinely characterized as delegating "legislative" powers actually does so. "A
statutory grant of authority to the executive isn't a transfer of legislative power, but an exercise
of legislative power." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, when executive branch officers act on
delegated authority, they "are exercising executive power, not legislative power." Id. But see
Gary Lawson, Delegations and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REv. 327, 344 (2002) ("Something
is not an exercise of executive power merely because it is carried out by an executive official; it
is executive if it falls within the sphere of activity contained within the eighteenth-century
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legislative powers, the statute is void. Moreover, "[t]he idea that an agency can cure an
unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of
that power seems to us internally contradictory .... Whether the statute delegates
legislative power is a question for the courts, and an agency's voluntary self-denial has
no bearing upon the answer.
2°8
The Justices concluded that the Clean Air Act provisions supplied a sufficient
"intelligible principle" to limit the scope of the agency's discretion and therefore did
not transfer "legislative powers" to the EPA.2° Justice Scalia cautioned that "we have
'almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree
of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law."'210 The
Court left the door open just a crack for future nondelegation doctrine challenges,
noting that "the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the
scope of the power congressionally conferred. ' ' 211 But the main point was clear: most
statutes delegating vast authority to administrative agencies do not raise serious
separation of powers questions.
The Supreme Court's reluctance to enforce the nondelegation doctrine is not
difficult to understand. As Professor Manning has observed, "enforcement of the
nondelegation doctrine necessarily reduces to the question whether a statute confers
too much discretion."212 "Without a reliable metric (other than an I-know-it-when-1-
see-it test), the Court has long doubted its capacity to make principled judgments about
such questions of degree. 213
Professor Sunstein shares very similar concerns. He notes that "the real question is:
How much executive discretion is too much to count as 'executive' ?,,214 The distinction
between a permissible delegation and an impermissible transfer of core legislative
understanding of 'Executive Power."'). Interestingly, Posner and Vermuele do not engage the
Framers' debates over control of the taxing powers, nor do they make any effort to engage the
Origination Clause. See Posner & Vermuele, supra note 20, at 1733-41. They do note that "[i]n
its latest dismissal of Wayman's theory of nondelegable powers, the Court held that even the
taxing power could be conferred upon federal agencies, subject only to the usual intelligible
principle test." Id. at 1756 (referencing Wayman v. Southard, 32 U.S. 1 (1825)). Although this
is accurate in a strict sense, the question of delegating taxing powers to agencies raises deeper-
and harder-questions than Posner and Vermuele acknowledge in their essay. It may be true, in
a generic sense, that "nothing in the language or structure of the Constitution supports" the view
that delegations of lawmaking power to agencies violate the separation of powers. Id. at 1762.
But cf Lawson, supra, at 344 (arguing that law creation represents a fundamentally core
legislative function and arguing that "Congress cannot transform lawmaking into execution (or
judging) by the simple expedient of enacting a statute"). The Origination Clause, and the
debates surrounding it, lends significant support to the idea that Congress-and not the
executive branch-has a special duty to take institutional responsibility for revenue measures.
See supra text and accompanying notes 71-154.
208. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473.
209. See id. at 473-76.
210. Id. at 474-75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
211. Id. at 475.
212. Manning, supra note 22, at 241-42.
213. Id. at 242.
214. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 326-27.
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power "cannot depend on anything qualitative the issue is a quantitative one.
' 21 5
Because of these problems, "the overwhelming likelihood is that judicial enforcement
of the doctrine would produce ad hoc, highly discretionary rulings, giving little
guidance to the lower courts or to Congress itself.,
216
Sunstein warns that "[blecause the underlying issue is one of degree, decisions
invalidating statutes as unduly open-ended are likely to suffer from the appearance, and
perhaps reality, of judicial hostility to the particular program at issue. ' ' 217 Moreover,
beyond "the considerable difficulty of principled enforcement," lies the "absence of
reason to believe that the conventional doctrine would be more good than harm for
modem government. 218
B. The Specific Prohibition Against Implied Delegations of Taxing Authority
In addition to the generic prohibition against the delegation of legislative power to
an administrative agency, a more specific rule prohibits implied delegations of taxing
authority to administrative agencies. The rule sounds much more categorical in theory
than it operates in practice. In theory, Congress must take responsibility for any
revenue generating measure, whether in the form of a law or a regulation. 219 Congress
may not escape political responsibility for raising taxes by the simple expedient of
delegating that power to an agency, whether it be the Internal Revenue Service or the
Customs Service.
In practice, the rule devolves into a mere prohibition against an agency unilaterally
raising revenue without any congressional authorization.220 Broad or vague
congressional authorizations, leaving much of the heavy lifting to an administrative
agency to work out, do not violate the canon against delegating taxing authority to an
agency.221 This means that Congress may, to a large extent, charge an agency with
achieving particular ends and also delegate the means of funding these efforts to the
agency itself.
The characterization of a charge as a "fee" or a "tax" could have important
implications for the nondelegation argument. After all, numerous agencies of the
federal government charge "user fees" incident to their daily operations. Moreover, for
215. Id. at 326.
216. Id. at 327. Professor Gary Lawson's test for an impermissible delegation seems to
suffer from the precise flaws that Sunstein identifies. Lawson argues that "[t]he line between
legislative and executive power (or between legislative and judicial power) must be drawn in the
context of each particular statutory scheme." Lawson, supra note 207, at 376. This is all well
and good as a matter of abstract theory, but he continues: "In every case, Congress must make
the central, fundamental decisions, but Congress can leave ancillary matters to the President or
the courts." Id. at 376-77. This definition is an open invitation to judicial subjectivity. No
matter how hard a judge attempts to enforce these lines, she will be subject to the objection that
she simply dislikes the regulatory scheme Congress has enacted.
217. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 327.
218. Id. at 328.
219. See Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-42 (1974);
Fed. Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 349-51 (1974).
220. See Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 222-24 (1989).
221. See id.
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many years now, Congress has required agencies to recover certain operating expenses
as a matter of course. 222 As it turns out, the characterization of a government charge as
a "fee" or "tax" proves to be far less important than the clarity with which Congress
vests the agency with authority to impose the charge.
In National Cable Television Ass 'n v. United States,223 the Supreme Court of the
United States had to decide whether the Federal Communications Commission lawfully
had imposed a charge on community antenna television service providers. The
Association argued that the "fee" was really an unauthorized tax. The Commission
claimed authority to recover the costs of regulating the cable industry on the basis of
the Independent Offices Appropriation Act ("IOAA"). 224
Acting under authority of the IOAA, the Commission initially implemented only
very modest user fees on persons and entities seeking licenses and other services.
Congress indicated some displeasure with the paltry revenue generated under the initial
fee schedule and the Commission responded by raising user fees to generate more
cash.225 It established a "user fee" of thirty cents per subscriber on community antenna
cable systems ("CATV"), regardless of whether a particular CATV system had sought
any services from the Commission at all. The thirty cents fee represented the
Commission's estimated "value to the recipient" of its regulatory services.
226
If the user fee constituted a "tax," it was not authorized by the IOAA and quite
227possibly could not be authorized without violating the nondelegation doctrine.
Although "Congress may select the subjects of taxation, choosing some and omitting
,228
others," an agency cannot constitutionally exercise this sort of discretion to establish
tax policy because "[tiaxation is a legislative function." 229 A "user fee," on the other
hand, would be consistent with the Act and would not implicate any serious separation
of power questions.
2 30
In order to avoid a nondelegation problem, Justice Douglas read the IOAA
narrowly: "The phrase 'value to the recipient' is, we believe, the measure of the
authorized fee." 231 Thus, the Act did not authorize an agency to assess user fees that
exceeded the value of the benefit that the agency bestowed on the user.
222. See, e.g., Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (1982)
(requiring that federal agencies providing benefits to private sector entities in form of licenses or
other useful services be "self-sustaining to the full extent possible" and mandating user fees that
are "fair and equitable" to those receiving such benefits). Congress enacted this law in 1952; it
was originally designated as 31 U.S.C. 483(a) but was codified into law on September 13, 1982,
at 31 U.S.C. § 9701. See 65 Stat. 290 (1952).
223. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
224. 31 U.S.C. § 483(a) (1952); see supra note 222.
225. See Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S. at 339-40.
226. Id. at 340.
227. Id. at 340-43.
228. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 512-14 (1937).
229. Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S. at 340.
230. See Seafarers Int'l Union v. United States Coast Guard, 81 F.3d 179, 182-83, 186
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that "fees [under the IOAA] cannot be charged based on a perceived
furthering of public policy goals if those fees are unrelated to a specific service provided by the
agency to an identifiable recipient" and holding that "there must always be a statutory basis for
any requirements giving rise to a fee").
231. Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S. at 342-43.
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In the case at bar, the Commission had assessed all the costs of regulation against
the CATV operators, regardless of whether those costs directly benefited the CATV
operators particularly (as opposed to the general public). 232 To the extent that the
Commission's annual thirty cents per subscriber fee exceeded the value of the services
that the Commission provided to the CATV operators, the Act did not authorize the fee
and, because it constituted an unauthorized tax, was null and void.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court took some effort to distinguish a tax from a
fee. Only a legislative body may levy a "tax" and a tax may be based solely on ability
to pay, without regard to any benefit conferred on the taxpayer. 233 A "fee" constitutes a
charge that an agency exacts in return for a benefit voluntarily sought by the payer.
234
An agency usually bestows a fee-based benefit only upon those paying the fee, and not
upon society as a whole.235 The Supreme Court remanded the case to permit the
Commission to evaluate and, if necessary, revise the user fee structure applicable to
CATV operators.236
In a companion case, Federal Power Commission v. New England Power Co.,237 the
Supreme Court repeated its gloss on the IOAA and held that the Federal Power
Commission ("FPC") could not assess fees against persons or entities having no
pending regulatory business before the agency. The Court held that only "specific
charges for specific services to specific individuals or companies" could be assessed
under the IOAA.238 The FPC could not assess and collect generic fees from persons or
entities having no pending business before the agency: "The 'fee' presupposes an
application whether by a single company or by a group of companies., 239 This
construction of the Act "ke[pt] it within the parameters of the 'fee' system and away
from the domain of 'taxes.'240
In recent decisions, federal courts have followed these general definitions in
determining whether a charge constitutes a tax or a fee and have sharpened them to
apply to various government charges. Evaluating the nature of a charge for the
purposes of the federal Tax Injunction Act ('TIA") provides an instructive example.24'
In Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Caffrey,242 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Judicial Circuit surveyed the relevant case law and provided an excellent summary of
the rules that govern in TIA cases. Under the TIA, the concept of a "tax" has a
somewhat broader scope than permitted under either the National Cable Television
Ass'n or New England Power glosses.243 The Valero panel explained that the
232. See id. at 343-44.
233. Id. at 340.
234. See id. at 340-41.
235. Id. at 341.
236. Id. at 344.
237.415 U.S. 345 (1974).
238. Id. at 349.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 351.
241. The Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 75 Pub. L. 332, 50 Stat. 738 (1937) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2004)).
242. 205 F.3d 130 (4th Cir. 2000).
243. Id. at 134 (citing Tramel v. Schrader 505 F.2d 1310, 1315 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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characteristics of a "classic tax" are easily distinguishable from the characteristics of a
"classic fee."
A "classic tax" is a charge imposed by a legislative body upon a large portion of
society in order to raise revenues that will benefit society at large. 24 By way of
contrast, a "classic fee" is a charge that an administrative agency imposes upon persons
or entities that are subject to its regulation. The fee may serve a direct regulatory
purpose or a more indirect purpose such as raising money for a specific account to help
fund the agency's expenses. 245 Unfortunately, few charges fall directly into one of these
categories.
Courts determine whether a charge is a tax or a fee for the purposes of the TIA by
using a three-part test. This test considers "(1) what entity imposes the charge; (2) what
population is subject to the charge; and (3) what purposes are served by the use of the
monies obtained by the charge."24 Often, the results of this test will include
characteristics of both a tax and a fee. When this occurs, courts consider the third
factor to be the most important in making their ultimate decision. 247 When applying the
third (and dispositive) factor, the general rule is that if the fund benefits the general
community, then the charge represents a tax, whereas if only select persons or entities
enjoy the benefits, the charge constitutes a fee.248
The Export Clause of Article I of the Constitution provides yet another context in
which the federal courts have assessed the nature of a government charge. 249 The
Supreme Court consistently has held that this clause prohibits Congress from imposing
any tax on exports, but permits a "user fee" designed to compensate the government for
benefits, services, or facilities provided to an exporter.25° In this context, the Supreme
Court has held that a charge based on the value of cargo, rather than on a fair
approximation of benefits, services, or facilities, constitutes an impermissible tax rather
than a permissible user fee.
25 1
In United States v. United States Shoe Corp., United States Shoe brought a
challenge against the Harbor Maintenance Tax ("HMT"),252 which imposed charges
244. Id. (citing San Juan Cellular Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 967 F.2d 683, 685
(lst Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. River Coal Co., 748 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984)
(reasoning that an abandoned mine reclamation fee "[u]nlike the permit fee... does not confer a
benefit on the operator different from that enjoyed by the general public when environmental
conditions are improved" and holding that the fee "has the essential characteristics of a tax, and
we conclude it is a 'tax' for purposes [of the Bankruptcy Act]").
245. Valero, 205 F.3d at 134.
246. Id.
247. Id. (citing South Carolina v. Block, 717 F.2d at 887 (4th Cir. 1983)).
248. id. at 134.
249. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles
exported from any State."); see United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 362-
63 (1998).
250. United States Shoe, 523 U.S. at 363 (citing Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372,375-76
(1876)).
251. Id. at 369-70.
252. 26 U.S.C. § 446 1(a) (2000).
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based on the value of the cargo being shipped. 2" The Supreme Court invalidated the
HMT on Export Clause grounds.
Justice Ginsburg explained that to "qualify as a permissible user fee," a charge must
relate to "a fair approximation of services, facilities, or benefits furnished to the
exporters. 254 The Supreme Court noted that in the case of the HMT, "[tihe value of
export cargo... does not correlate reliably with the federal harbor services used or
usable by the exporter." 255 In order to "guard against... the imposition of a [tax] under
the pretext of fixing a fee," the Court held "that the HMT violates the Export Clause as
applied to exports."25 6 Although "[t]his does not mean that exporters are exempt from
any and all user fees designed to defray the cost of harbor development and
maintenance," the Court emphasized that "[iut does mean, however, that such a fee
must fairly match the exporters' use of port services and facilities.
'
"
257
Thus, the determination of whether a charge constitutes a tax or a fee turns on the
purposes served by the money collected. That said, one should be careful not to put too
much stock in United States Shoe as an absolute rule against the imposition of fees that
exceed the exact value conveyed to the person or entity paying it. Justice Ginsburg
carefully distinguished other areas in which the federal courts must characterize
charges as "taxes" or "fees" and emphasized that the Supreme Court enforces the
Export Clause with particular vigilance.258
Universal service charges probably should be characterized as "taxes" rather than
"fees." Because an administrative agency, the Commission, levies these charges, the
first part of the Valero test shows the characteristic of a fee.
The second part of the Valero test considers who must pay the charges. The
Commission would probably assert that this part of the test shows another
characteristic of a fee because only telecommunications service providers are directly
subject to the universal service charges. But this is a very superficial analysis.
Telecommunications carriers directly pass on all universal service charges to their
customers. Most do so by including a separate line item on the subscriber's monthly
bill.259 Because approximately 95% of American households have telephones in their
homes a vast majority of the population is subject to these charges. 26° Thus, the
253. See United States Shoe, 523 U.S. at 363 ("The charge is currently set at 0.125% of
the cargo's value.").
254. Id. at 363.
255. Id. at 369.
256. Id. at 370 (citing and quoting Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372, 376 (1876)).
257. Id.
258. See id. at 367-69 (noting that the Supreme Court has upheld "fees" levied on
awards from the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal against a Takings Clause challenge, on
state-owned and operated aircraft against a sovereign immunity claim, and on passengers using
airports against a dormant commerce clause challenge, and suggesting that these challenges
involved "less exacting" provisions than the Export Clause).
259. See John C. Roberts, The Sources of Statutory Meaning: An Archaeological Case
Study of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 53 SMU L. REv. 143, 162 (2000).
260. See WIRELINE COMPETITON BuREAU, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBERSHIP IN THE UNrnED STATES REPORT (May 14, 2004) (data through Nov.
2003), available at http:l/www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/recent.html; see also 14 F.C.C.R. 21, 177
(1999) (reporting that even six years ago 94.2% of U.S. households enjoyed telephone service).
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universal service charges are widely shared by the entire population. This supports the
conclusion that they are a tax, rather than a fee.
The third and most important part of the Valero test-which also controlled in
United States Shoe-focuses on how the fees are spent: precisely who benefits from
universal service fees and to what degree? The Commission claims that the primary
purpose of these funds is to expand and maintain universal service, to provide an
affordable price for telecommunications services in high-cost/rural areas, and to
expand the network by facilitating higher subscription rates through subsidies to low-
income households. The agency further contends that the real beneficiaries of universal
service include the narrow categories of high-cost/rural consumers and low-income
households who will gain more affordable access to telecommunications service, and
the telecommunications providers themselves, due to the expanded telecommunications
network. 6'
These arguments are not persuasive because the subsidization of
telecommunications services for high-cost/rural areas and low-income households is
not the only use for universal service funds.262 Instead, the universe of beneficiaries
and the services provided also includes discounted Internet access for schools,
libraries, and rural health care facilities. The cost associated with providing this access
still falls solely on the telecommunications providers, even though they often will not
be providing either the wiring or the Internet service subsidized by the universal
service charges.
It is difficult to see how those paying the charge benefit directly from funding these
services. Of course, by the same logic that both consumers and telecommunications
service providers benefit from an expanding telecommunications network, one could
also argue that telecommunications consumers and service providers also benefit from
the expanded Internet capabilities that universal service subsidies facilitate. This
argument, however, proves too much. In fact, the entire general population also
benefits from more accessible and higher-quality education and health care
opportunities created through enhanced access to the Internet. In sum, the diffuse
nature of the benefits associated with the schools, libraries, and rural health care
provider subsidy programs suggest that the charge constitutes a tax.
Universal service charges also seem to resemble taxes rather than fees when
considering the United States Shoe test.263 For the purposes of universal service, this
test states that a charge must directly relate to the cost of the benefit rendered by the
agency. In that respect, the charges for each telecommunications provider should be
based on the benefit it receives from the expanded telecommunications network.
Universal service charges, however, are not based on the benefits conferred by the
Commission; instead, they are based on the Commission's perceived need for funds to
underwrite the program. Moreover, the assessments bear no relationship to the net
benefits-the Commission assesses universal service support charges based on the
amount of revenue each provider makes over a period of time.
This appears to be similar to the charge in United States Shoe, the HMT, which the
Customs Service assessed based on value of cargo, rather than the extent and manner
261. See Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393,428 (5th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1210, 1223 (2000), and cert. dismissed, 531 U.S. 975 (2000).
262. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3) (2000).
263. See United States Shoe, 523 U.S. at 363, 367-70.
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of a shipper's port use. Just as the Supreme Court found that the HMT constituted a tax
because it bore no relation to the benefits the government conferred on the payor, the
universal service charges do not convey a benefit proportionate to the charge and
therefore constitute "taxes" rather than "fees."
In the end, it may not matter a great deal whether one can formally characterize
universal service charges as "fees" rather than "taxes." In Skinner v. Mid-America
Pipeline Co.,264 a case rejecting a nondelegation challenge to a user fee, the Supreme
Court did not put much emphasis on the characterization of the charge as a "tax" or
"fee," but seemed to assume that the user fee at issue constituted a "tax" for purposes
of applying the nondelegation doctrine.
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA")
included a provision that directed the Secretary of Transportation to "establish a
schedule of fees based on the usage, in reasonable relationship to volume-miles, miles,
revenues, or an appropriate combination thereof, of natural gas and hazardous liquid
pipelines. ' 65 Any entity operating pipeline facilitates subject to either the Hazardous
Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979266 or the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968267
would be liable for the annual user fees. 68 The statute dedicated the revenues
generated by the user fees to paying the enforcement and administrative costs
associated with the pipeline safety acts.269 Finally, the Department of Transportation
could not assess fees in excess of "105% of the aggregate appropriations made for such
fiscal year for activities to be funded by such fees, 270 that is, Congress would itself
establish the ceiling for the net fees to be collected by the Department on an annual
basis.
Mid-America operated a pipeline subject to the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety
Act and received an assessment of $53,023.52 for 1986.271 It paid the fee under protest
and immediately sued for a refund in federal district court. The district court, adopting
a magistrate judge's decision, held that the pipeline safety fee program represented an
unconstitutional delegation of the taxing power to the Department because "Congress
did not give the kind of guidance to the Secretary necessary to avoid the conclusion
that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated its taxing power to the Executive
,272Branch." A direct appeal to the Supreme Court followed.
The Supreme Court proceeded immediately to the nondelegation question without
pausing to consider whether the pipeline safety assessments constituted "fees" or
"taxes" for purposes of National Cable Television Ass'n. Holding that no support
existed "for Mid-America's contention that the text of the Constitution or the practices
of Congress require the application of a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in
264. See 490 U.S. 212 (1989).
265. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
272 § 7005(a)(1), 100 Stat. 82, 140-41 (codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1682(a) (2004)).
266. 96 Pub. L. 129, 93 Stat. 1003.
267. 90 Pub. L. 481, 82 Stat. 720.
268. Id. § 7005(a)(2).
269. Id. § 7005(a)(3)(A), (B).
270. Id. § 1682(a)(3)(D).
271. Mid-America Pipeline, 490 U.S. at 217.
272. Id. at 217-18.
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cases where Congress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its
taxing power," it reversed the lower court.
2 73
"In light of this conclusion," the Court found it unnecessary to decide "the threshold
question that so exercised the District Court whether the pipeline safety users 'fees'
created by § 7005 are more properly thought of as a form of taxation because some of
the administrative costs paid by the regulated parties actually inure to the benefit of the
public rather than directly to the benefit of those parties. 274 Instead, the Court held
that "[e]ven if the user fees are a form of taxation, we hold that the delegation of
discretionary authority under Congress's taxing power is subject to no constitutional
scrutiny greater than that we have applied to other nondelegation challenges.
'
"
275
The Mid-America Pipeline Court did not overrule either National Cable Television
Ass'n or New England Power Co. Instead, it distinguished them from the case at bar by
noting that these cases "stand only for the proposition that Congress must indicate
clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive the discretionary authority to recover
administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of regulated parties by imposing
additional financial burdens, whether characterized as 'fees' or 'taxes,' on those
parties. 76 Moreover, "any such delegation must also meet the normal requirements of
the nondelegation doctrine."
277
Earlier in the opinion, the Court took some pains to demonstrate the circumscribed
nature of the delegation at issue. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor
noted that the program limited the universe of persons and entities from whom the
Secretary could collect fees, that the funds could be used only for purposes of
administering the Pipeline Safety Acts, and that the fees had to be set generically based
on considerations limited to volume-miles, miles, or revenues.278
Perhaps most importantly, "the Secretary has no discretion whatsoever to expand
the budget for administering the Pipeline Safety Acts because the ceiling on aggregate
fees that may be collected in any fiscal year is set at 105% of the aggregate
appropriations made by Congress for that fiscal year."2 79 In light of these limitations,
the Justices had "no doubt that these multiple restrictions Congress has placed on the
Secretary's discretion to assess pipeline safety user fees satisfy the constitutional
requirements of the nondelegation doctrine as we have previously articulated them.
"2s°
The upshot is that one need not wrestle with the characterization of the universal
service charges as "fees" or "taxes" if the underlying program itself satisfies the
general requirements of the nondelegation doctrine. Even a tax may be delegated,
provided that Congress authorizes the charge by a clear statement. As Justice
273. Id. at 222.
274. Id. at 223.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 224.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 219.
279. Id. at 220.
280. Id.
281. See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 331-32 (noting that certain clear statement canons,
such as a rule against retroactive regulations absent express authorization, have the effect of
limiting delegations to administrative agencies and also impose an "institutional requirement"
that "Congress must make that choice explicitly and take the political heat for deciding to do
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O'Connor explained in Mid-America Pipeline, "[f]rom its earliest days to the present,
Congress, when enacting tax legislation, has varied the degree of specificity and the
consequent degree of discretionary authority delegated to the Executive in such
enactments. 282
Although the Mid-America Pipeline court rejected a special-and stricter-
nondelegation doctrine for delegations of revenue authority, the clear statement rule
has some potential bite. In Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc., 283 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected an effort by the National
Science Foundation ("NSF") to collect special fees when registering Internet domain
names. Acting under contract with NSF, Network Solutions registered Internet domain
names for a fee. Domain name registrants paid "a one time registration fee of $100 []
for the first two-year period, and $50 per year thereafter, with 70% of the fees going to
Network Solutions as 'consideration for the services provided' and 30% set aside, in a
custodial account held by Network Solutions on NSF's behalf, for preserving and
enhancing the 'Intellectual Infrastructure of the Intemet."' 284 The thirty percent
supplemental assessment for registration "was discontinued for registrations made on
or after April 1, 1998. ' '2s
Essentially, from September 14, 1995 to March 30, 1998, NSF assessed and
collected an unauthorized fee on all persons and entities registering Internet names
involving ".com .... .org," ".net," and ".edu" domain names.28 6 The case squares with
National Cable Television Ass'n and New England Power Co. almost perfectly: an
administrative agency attempted to assess fees that went beyond the scope of its
statutory authority (including the Independent Offices Appropriation Act 287 ). The
additional 30% assessment that exceeded the actual cost of administering the domain
name registration program was entirely ultra vires.
Neither the D.C. Circuit nor the federal district court considered the threshold
question of whether the 30% add-on constituted a "tax" or a "fee" very difficult. Both
courts easily concluded that the unauthorized charge was a "tax" for purposes of
National Cable Television Ass'n and New England Power Co. The D.C. Circuit
explained that "[tlo begin, we shall assume, arguendo, that the 30% portion of the
domain name registration fee Network Solutions collected and held for NSF
constituted an illegal tax because, as the district court decided, NSF lacked
congressional authorization., 28 8 As in Mid-America Pipeline, the tax/fee question
became conflated with the larger delegation question.
so"); see also Manning, supra note 22, at 271 ("The central aim of the nondelegation doctrine is
to promote specific rather than general legislative policy-making--that is, to induce Congress to
filter more precise policies through the process of bicameralism and presentment rather than
leaving such policies to be elaborated by agencies or courts outside the legislative process.").
282. Mid-America Pipeline, 490 U.S. at 221.
283. 176 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
284. Id. at 505.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 504-05.
287. 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (2000).
288. Network Solutions, 176 F.3d at 506; see also Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc.,
1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14696, at *5 ("There is no dispute that the Preservation Assessment, as
imposed by NSF in 1995, is an illegal tax.").
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If Congress delegates clearly and with the requisite specificity, it simply does not
matter whether one characterizes the charge as a "fee" or a "tax." Congress may
delegate responsibility for implementing either a fee or a tax to an administrative
agency. An agency, however, utterly lacks any unilateral authority to assess either fees
or taxes absent some sort of congressional authorization. Accordingly, one may put
aside the ultimate resolution of whether universal service charges are "taxes" rather
than "fees" until engaging in a more general nondelegation doctrine analysis-an
analysis that will moot the fee/tax dichotomy. Under Mid-America Pipeline, the real
question is not whether a particular charge is a "fee" or a "tax," but rather whether
Congress has taken sufficient responsibility for establishing it.
III. THE QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE AND THE NONDELEGATION DoCTRINE
Universal service represents the idea that every American should have access to
affordable telecommunications service, and both the Commission and Congress have
worked to achieve this objective for many years. Congress first codified the concept of
289
universal service when it enacted the Communications Act of 1934, which created
the Federal Communications Commission. The 1934 Act authorized the Commission
to regulate commerce in wire and radio communications in order to provide these
services to all Americans at reasonable rates. 90 Since that time, the concept has grown
and expanded to encompass a massive social welfare program funded through
involuntary surcharges on virtually all telecommunications services.
A. The Raison d'Etre of Universal Service
The cost of providing someone in North Dakota with the same telecommunications
services enjoyed by a denizen of Manhattan would be (and is) staggeringly expensive
on a per capita basis. Broadband Internet access, for example, is feasible (given current
costs) only in relatively high-population density areas. It would make very little
289. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 104, 480 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151
(2000) (amended 1996) (creating Commission "[f]or the purpose of regulating interstate and
foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service"); id. at § 201(a) (providing that "[i]t shall be the duty of every
common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio to furnish such
communication service upon reasonable request therefore; and . . . in cases where the
Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds such action necessary or desirable in the public
interest, to establish physical connections with other carriers, to establish through routes and
charges applicable thereto and the divisions of such charges, and to establish and provide
facilities and regulations for operating such through routes."); see also Alenco Communications,
Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 614-15 (5th Cir. 2000) (observing that "[u]niversal service has been
a fundamental goal of federal telecommunications regulation since the passage of the
Communications Act of 1934"). Although neither provision uses the phrase "universal service,"
§§ 151 and 201(a) effectively require telephone service providers to offer service to all would-
be customers and, moreover, consistent with the mandate of § 201(b), to do so at "just and
reasonable rates."
290.47 U.S.C. § 151.
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economic sense to lay broadband fiber optic cable in a town of 200 souls located in
North Dakota. The local residents who might be enticed to subscribe to the service
could never pay the true costs of building and operating such a system. Accordingly,
no rational capitalist would invest the money to build such an infrastructure, precisely
because the project would be a recipe for bankruptcy.
At least arguably, all users of telephone services benefit from universal subscription
to these services: "Because the value of telecommunications service increases to
customers with greater degrees of system interconnectivity, universal service is
regarded as economically valuable by telecommunications firms and customers, even
those who can afford market-priced services."29' But it is possible to overstate the
benefits to urban consumers, many of whom may not have much cause to place
interstate calls to Wyoming. As Professor Rossi observes, "expansion of a network
initially financed by middle-class customers to include the poor, particularly those with
whom middle-class customers rarely interact, will likely provide few benefits of the
sort that the average middle-class customer will be willing to pay for."
' 92
Whether or not urban consumers derive significant benefits from increased
subscription rates, Congress has mandated that telecommunications service providers
underwrite the full costs of paying for the program and these service providers, in turn,
directly have passed these charges along to consumers. Thus, individual consumers
effectively have funded universal service programs through assessments imposed by
service providers to recoup the Commission's demands for tribute.
47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000) mandates that the Commission establish a comprehensive
system of fees to subsidize consumers living in rural and other high-cost areas and to
subsidize basic telephony for low-income households; it also mandates subsidized
telecommunications services to schools, libraries, and rural health care providers.
Section 254 leaves open the question of precisely what services should be available on
a nationwide basis, and at what cost-these most basic questions lie entirely within the
Commission's discretion.29 3
Universal service then, is a social welfare subsidy program that benefits certain
consumers of telecommunications services by imposing taxes on other consumers.
294
291. Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive Retail Electric Power Markets:
Whither the Duty to Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 27, 39 (2000).
292. Id.; see also James Alleman et al., Universal Service: The Poverty of Policy, 71 U.
CoLO. L. REV. 849, 856, 862-63 (2000) (arguing that benefits universal service provides to most
average consumers are, at best, quite limited relative to the charges assessed to pay for the
program).
293. See In re Federal-State Joint Board, 18 F.C.C.R. 2932 (2003) (NPRM)
(considering, but rejecting, the addition of new and expanded services for inclusion in the
federal universal service program); In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 17
F.C.C.R. 24,952, 24,974-83 (2002) (report and order of second further notice of proposed
rulemaking) (acknowledging that carriers simply pass along universal service fees to their
customers); see also Phil Weiser, Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U.
CoLO. L. REV. 819, 824 (2000) (noting that Congress "did not provide much guidance as to
exactly how it should be implemented" and instead "handed the ball to the FCC, mandating that
the FCC work with a Joint Federal-State Board... to figure it out").
294. See Rossi, supra note 291, at 39-40; see also Weiser, supra note 293, at 824-25
(arguing that "[iun essence, the FCC has been saddled with the task of designing a program
similar to the Medicaid Act's system of providing medical service to the poor" incident to "a
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Those paying the bill supposedly benefit from having the theoretical ability to call
persons enjoying service only by virtue of the universal service subsidies.295 Congress
decided virtually none of the major design elements of the universal service program,
preferring instead to leave (quite literally) all the details to the Commission.
B. Universal Service from the Pre-Carterfone Era to the Present
Since the inception of the Federal Radio Commission in 1928,296 and continuing
with the creation of the Federal Communications Commission in 1934, the federal
government has pursued a policy of providing "universal" telephone service to all
residents and businesses in the United States. For most of the period from 1928 to the
present, the objective was not so much assuring that everyone actually enjoyed
telephone service, but rather ensuring that, if someone could afford to pay for it, such
service would be available.
The idea was not unique to either Congress or the Commission. Instead, the concept
of universal service was a marketing strategy developed and promoted by American
Telephone & Telegraph ("AT&T") as a justification for unlimited consolidation of
local telephone service providers.
297
AT&T's former Chairman, Theodore Vail, repeatedly argued for, "One Policy, One
System, Universal Service."298 A turn of the century AT&T advertisement explains that
"[b]ecause these are the fundamental needs of a nation of telephone users, the Bell
grant-in-aid program where the federal government sets basic standards, provides monetary
support, and leaves the implementation-as well as elective supplementation-to the states").
295. Cf. Rossi, supra note 291, at 39-40 (noting that middle-class consumers may not
put much value on ability to call beneficiaries of universal service subsidies). This argument
does not really survive close examination. If someone in New York City regularly flies to San
Francisco, charging her a 10% tax on the ticket to provide a subsidy for air service to Pierre,
South Dakota, would not convey a meaningful benefit. A benefit exists only if the person either
wishes to fly to Pierre, South Dakota or hopes that someone from Pierre, South Dakota will
come to New York City for a visit. Neither condition seems very probable and the passenger
would probably object to being forced to subsidize a service that she will never use. See
ELtZABETH E. BAILEY ET AL., DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES 27-37 (1985). The government
wisely abandoned this type of regulation in favor of free and open competition, with fares
tracking actual costs. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40,101-120) (2004)); see also J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel
F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1068, 1110-13 (1997) (discussing economics of commercial airline industry before and after
deregulation). Of course, this change in regulatory policy had the effect of severely reducing
service to low-population rural areas. The same basic rules of economics apply to the provision
of telephony-but for the universal service mandate, rural residents would enjoy more limited
telecommunications services precisely because they are either unable or unwilling to pay the
true cost of such services.
296. Act of Mar. 28, 1928, ch. 263, Pub. L. No. 195 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 83, 85, 89, 91) (repealed 1934).
297. See Milton Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone History: A Reconstruction, 17
TELECOMMS. POL'y 352, 353-57 (1993) (describing AT&T's business strategy).
298. MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 1.3, at 12
(1992) (quoting AT&T Chairman Theodore Vail).
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System must provide universal service." 299 "By his motto, 'One System, One Policy,
Universal Service,' Vail meant that service would be 'universal' only in the sense that
any subscriber could place a call to any other subscriber, because networks would be
interconnected. ' ' 300 The federal government essentially embraced AT&T's model of
one service provider facilitating universal service to the nation-but only in the sense
of the availability of service to those willing to pay for it.30 1
In exchange for monopoly status, incumbent telephone companies agreed to accept
rate regulation and to provide universal service. "Common carriers could not
discriminate among 'similarly situated' users, which in practice meant that they had a
limited capacity to price service as a function of demand and marketplace conditions
rather than being subject to a regulator-managed calculation of carrier costs and a fair
rate of return."
302
As Professor Robert Frieden has explained, "Governments negotiated a regulatory
compact with common carriers, providing the carriers with valuable insulation from
competition and reduced civil and criminal liability in exchange for governmental
authority to regulate prices, revenues, and many other aspects of a carrier's corporate
and operational behavior." 3 3 In addition, "[t]he government could require the
telecommunications common carrier to provide service to any customer within a
geographical area who was ready, willing, and able to take service.
' '304
Federal and state regulators worked to keep the cost of residential local telephone
service artificially low. In a regime characterized by monopoly and pervasive rate
regulation, a highly Byzantine system of cross-subsidies advanced the universal service
program. 30 5 Long-distance service users paid disproportionately higher rates than local
callers, with the costs of the local network being taxed against long-distance customers.
Local business customers paid higher rates than local residential customers. Nor did
rates reflect traffic patterns or population: low-volume high-cost calls were tariffed at
299. AT&T, The Chain of Communication (undated advertisement, on file with the
Indiana Law Journal).
300. Alleman et al., supra note 292, at 860.
301. See Howard A. Shelanski, A Comment on Competition and Controversy in Local
Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1617, 1624-29 (1999); see also William J. Byrnes,
Telecommunications Regulation: Something Old and Something New, in THE COMMUNICATIONS
ACT: A LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY OF THE MAJOR AMENDMENTS, 1934-1996 31 (Max D. Paglin et al.
eds., 1999). Professor Shelanski argues persuasively that simply mandating interconnection of
competing local and long-distance telephone networks could have accomplished the same
objective, potentially at a lower cost and without embracing the problems associated with
regulation of a monopoly. See Shelanski, supra, at 1625-27.
302. Robert M. Frieden, Universal Service: When Technologies Converge and
Regulatory Models Diverge, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 401 (2000).
303. Id. at 400.
304. Id. at 401.
305. See Shelanski, supra note 301, at 1624-29. The system of structural subsidies
involved (mis)allocating system costs to interstate, rather than local, telephone service; charging
business customers artificially high rates for local service; charging artificially high rates for
interstate and intrastate toll calls; and employing artificial state-wide cost averaging to
understate the cost of providing service in sparsely populated areas. See Byrnes, supra note 301,
at 89-100.
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the same rates as high-volume low-cost calls between major urban centers." The
entire scheme worked to make residential local service highly affordable, even in
relatively high-cost rural areas.30 7 The regulators' goal was to keep residential
customers happy with their local telephone rates by making these rates as low as
possible.
Beginning with Carterfone30 8 and continuing with the Execunet litigation, 3°9 the
Federal Communications Commission embarked on a fundamental shift in regulatory
paradigms. Rather than rely on monopoly service from AT&T, the agency would
instead work to facilitate a competitive market for local and long-distance telephony.
If the government permits competition for long-distance service between St. Louis
and Chicago, AT&T cannot continue to charge monopoly rates well in excess of the
company's true costs for providing that service. Monies generated from this route and
used to subsidize local residential service would cease to be available. AT&T would
face the choice of either raising local residential rates or finding another source of
monopoly profits. A third option also exists: if AT&T could convince regulators to
assess fees on long-distance calls, those fees could be used to subsidize directly the
local residential rates.
The breakup of AT&T in 1984, incident to a federal district court's modified final
judgment in a massive antitrust case,310 greatly exacerbated the problem first created by
limited competition in the long-distance market. Until 1983, AT&T's internal rate
structure largely funded the universal service program.31 1 By divorcing the provision of
local and long-distance communication services altogether, however, the local
Regional Bell Operating Companies ("RBOCs") were no longer able to subsidize local
residential service with artificially high interstate and international rates. Business rates
could still be kept artificially high in low-cost areas, with the monopoly returns used in
part to offset the cost of residential service.
Even so, the modified final judgment severely limited AT&T's ability to continue
its system of pervasive cross-subsidies. However, because local telephone service
remained essentially a monopoly, the universal service program could still rely, more
or less, on a system of implicit subsidies to lower the costs for some consumers by
artificially raising the cost for others, supplemented by monies paid by competitive
306. For a brief discussion of the system of various cross-subsidies, see THOMAS G.
KRATrENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAw & PoLIcY 349-52 (2d ed. 1998).
307. See Shelanski, supra note 301, at 1628 (noting that "the development of a system
of implicit subsidies to keep residential rates low was an important part of the story").
308. See In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 14 F.C.C.2d
571 (1968); In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420
(1968); see also Glen 0. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&Tand the Changing World
of Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517, 521-23 (1988) (discussing and critiquing the
Carterfone decision and its effects).
309. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 980 (1978); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also
Robinson, supra note 308, at 523-26 (discussing MCI's entry into the long-distance service
market and its effects on preexisting regulatory policies).
310. See Robinson, supra note 308, at 540 (noting that "[t]he divestiture was not
effective until 1984").
311. See H. Walker Feaster, III, Semiannual Report of FCC Inspector General (June
11, 2002), at http://www.fcc.gov/oig/sar902.pdf.
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long-distance service providers for interconnection of long distance calls with the local
loop.
3 12
In response to the changed market conditions created by the division of AT&T, the
Commission established a regulatory "Universal Service Fund" to maintain artificially
low-priced local telephone service by providing support to incumbent local exchange
carriers that provided service to low-income households or high-cost areas.313 The
Commission generated funds to support local telephone companies in rural and high-
cost areas by imposing interconnection fees 31 4 on long-distance carriers. The
interconnection fees ensured that incumbent telephone companies providing residential
and business service would be able to continue doing so at rates at or below actual
cost.315
The Communications Act of 1996316 dealt the preexisting system of universal
service a fatal blow. By opening up the local telephone market to competition, 317 the
last remaining part of the old universal service program, based on a system of
pervasive cross-subsidies, fell. Congress, recognizing the effect that competition would
have on the existing universal service program, enacted 47 U.S.C. § 254, which
expressly created a direct subsidy system to facilitate universal access to telephony.
At the same time, Congress expanded the scope of services covered under the rubric
of "universal service." 318 In addition to provisions for affordable basic telephone
312. See Rural Tel. Coalition v. FCC, 838 F.2d 1307, 1310-15 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
313. See id. (describing and upholding Commission's use of access charges to fund
universal service program after divestiture of RBOCs from AT&T).
314. "Interconnection fees" are charges that regulators impose on long-distance
companies to reimburse local telephone companies for connecting interstate and international
calls to their customers; the charges help to pay for the maintenance and operation of the local
telephone system (or "local loop").
315. See Alleman et al., supra note 292, at 860-61 ("When a portion of long distance
was divested from local service in 1984, this flow of funds had to be handled on an arms-length
basis, so that the old subsidy flow was replaced by the 'access charges' that local companies
charged long distance carriers to originate or terminate long distance calls."); see also Rural Tel.
Coalition, 838 F.2d at 1310-12, 1314-15 (describing changes in telephone market after
divestiture and upholding assessment of new access charges to offset losses associated with new
competition in some markets).
316. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
317. See Jaison R. Abel, Entry Into Regulated Monopoly Markets: The Development of
a Competitive Fringe in the Local Telephone Industry, 45 J.L. & EcoN. 289, 289-90 (2002)
(noting that "[w]ith the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, explicit state and local
regulatory barriers to entry that acted to shield incumbent local exchange cariers (ILECs) from
competitive entry have been removed .... [Tihis industry once served solely by regulated
monopoly providers of local telephone service has now become an industry consisting of
incumbent dominant firms (namely, ILECs) facing entry by small fringe competitors").
318. See Weiser, supra note 293, at 824-25 (noting that "[i]n 1996, Congress codified
the decades-old principle that telephone users should be afforded access to the telephone
network at reasonable rates, regardless of where they live" and predicting that "the FCC must
confront a series of technical, economic, and political minefields" in order to implement this
program under the terms and conditions that Congress set forth).
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service for individual consumers, the 1996 Act provided for telecommunications and
Internet services for schools, libraries, and rural health care facilities.
319
Since 1996, the Federal Communications Commission has worked to devise a
system of direct universal service "fees" that would replicate the economic results that
existed under the system of pervasive cross-subsidies. Congress had very high hopes: it
not only wanted the Commission to create an overt universal service program, it also
wanted the Commission to design a support system that was (and is) competitively
neutral. That is to say, Congress wanted the universal service system of taxes and
subsidies to have no competitive effect on the relationship between incumbent local
exchange carriers ("ILECs") and new market entrants (competitive local exchange
carriers, or "CLECs"). To put the matter more directly, Congress wished to have its
universal service cake and eat it too.
C. Section 254 and the Universal Service Program
In 1996, the Commission created three quasi-private entities to administer the
universal service programs. It directed the Universal Service Administrative Company
("USAC") to manage low-income and high-cost support, 320 while the Schools and
Libraries Corporation and the Rural Health Care Corporation would oversee the new
support mechanisms laid out in the 1996 Act. In 1999, the Commission incorporated
the latter two organizations into the US AC.321 The USAC now administers the support
mechanisms of universal service through three divisions: the Schools and Libraries
Division, the Rural Health Care Division, and the High Cost and Low Income
Division. 322 Each of these programs will be considered in greater detail in Part III.D.
Contributions to the Universal Service Fund ("USF") from telecommunications
carriers and other entities providing interstate telecommunications services currently
fund the universal service programs. 323 The USAC calculates, on a quarterly basis, the
level of contribution for each provider by multiplying the provider's universal service
revenue base by the relevant universal service contribution factor. 324 For example, in
2002, the USAC required each provider to contribute 8.77% of its interstate service
revenue to the Universal Service Fund. 325 Due to competition from wireless service
providers, contribution rates generally have risen for traditional long-distance carriers
as revenues have fallen.
319. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
320. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOLs AND LIBRARIES PROGRAM:
UPDATE ON E-RATE FUNDING, GAO-01-672, at 2 n.3 (May 2001), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO1672.pdf [hereinafter UPDATE ON E-RATE FUNDING].
321. 47 C.F.R. § 54.701(b) (2004).
322. Id. § 54.701(c).
323. 47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
324. See 47 C.F.R. § 54.709(a). The revenue base is the "contributors' interstate and
international revenues derived from domestic end users for... telecommunications services."
Id. § 54.709(a)(1). The quarterly contribution factor will be "based on the ratio of total projected
quarterly expenses of the universal service support mechanisms to total end-user interstate and
international telecommunications revenues .... " Id. § 54.709(a)(2).
325. See Edie Herman, Telecom, COMM. DAILY, June 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL
5241458.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Because the guiding language of the 1996 Act stipulates only that these
contributions be "equitable and nondiscriminatory," 326 the Commission has given the
carriers and providers of interstate telecommunications services great flexibility as to
how they collect their contributions. 327 Many choose to recover these contributions
directly from their consumers through line-item charges.
328
The funding rates that the USAC has required interstate telecommunications
providers to contribute have consistently increased since the inception of the statutory
universal service program. Rate increases have occurred with such regularity because
funding requests have grown nearly threefold between 1997 and 2002, while, at the
same time, interstate telecommunications revenues have fallen, especially for the
larger, more established providers, such as AT&T.329 Until recently, established
telecommunications providers have complained that, notwithstanding the consistent
increases in the base rate, they were forced to charge their customers more than the
USAC-mandated revenue rate because the Commission had used past revenues, rather
than projected revenues, to establish the contribution factor.
Over the past five years, several market forces have caused a drop in revenue. The
rise of cell phones (55 million in 1997 to 109 million in 2002), voice over the Internet,
the entry of local phone companies into the long distance market, and the bundling of
various services have all contributed to an overall decline in revenues for the major
universal service fund contributors. 30 Accordingly, major increases in the contribution
factor have proven necessary to cover the drop in contributions.
331
For example, AT&T has been losing interstate telecommunications revenue due to
relatively new telecommunications providers like Verizon, increased Internet and
wireless telecommunications use, pre-paid phone cards, and the ubiquitous "10-10"
numbers. 332 Because AT&T has been obligated to pay USF charges based on revenues
collected for the previous two quarters-when the company's revenues were higher-it
326.47 U.S.C. § 254(d).
327. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776,9210-
11, 853 (1997) (report and order).
328. See In re Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 17 F.C.C.R.
3752, 3792, 91 (2002) (further notice of proposed rulemaking and report and order) (noting
"carriers' common use of line item surcharges on customers' monthly statements to recoup USF
assessments); see also In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. at
9199, 828, 9211-12, 855 (permitting carriers subject to USF assessments to recoup such
assessments by passing costs on to customers, provided that those carriers disclose "complete
and truthful information regarding their contribution amount")
329. See FCC Applies Unused E-Rate Funds to Reduce Carrier USF Payments, 12
TEixo Bus. REP. 1 (2002); see also Bruce Mohl, Consumers Absorb Federal Fee Raises
Charged to Carriers, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2002, at F3.
330. See Almar Latour, Local.Phone Companies Face Siege in an Industry in Turmoil,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2003, at AI, A6 (referencing the market forces, but not the statistics).
331. See Paul Davidson, Mobile Users to See Higher Service Fees, USA TODAY, Dec.
3, 2002, at B 1.
332. See Mohl, supra note 329, at F3; see also Heather Forsgren Weaver, Migration to
Wireless Causes Problems for Universal-Service Fund, Says Regulator, RCR WIRELESS NEWS,
June 24, 2002, at 10, available at 2002 WL 10371042.
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had to charge a rate of 11.5% or higher to its customers in order to recoup the 8.77%
contribution factor mandated by the USAC and the Commission.333
Conversely, the newer service providers-who have been consistently growing
since entering the market-benefited substantially from the agency's use of a
retrospective formula because their revenues were (and are) growing over time. In
consequence, these carriers were collecting a percentage against much larger revenues
than two quarters ago. This allowed the newer providers to either charge their
consumers a rate lower than the USAC required rates, or charge the 8.77% rate and
reap the economic windfall of overcollection. Despite repeated requests by AT&T and
other major telecommunications providers, the Commission did not provide any relief
until December 2002.
In February 2002, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
("NPRM") seeking comments on changing the contribution factor formula from a
retrospective to a projected revenue basis. 334 The Commission also sought comments
on the desirability of moving from a revenue-based system to a connection-based
system of assessing universal service contributions. Finally, the Commission sought
input regarding new regulations that would prescribe the precise manner through which
telecommunications firms recover their universal service assessments from their
customers.335
In December 2002, the Commission adopted interim rules that permit service
providers to use projected revenue estimates, rather than past revenue collections, to
determine the relevant contribution factor from their customers. 336 "[linstead of
assessing universal service contributions based on revenues accrued as much as six
months prior, USAC will assess contributions based on projections provided by
contributors of their collected end-user interstate and international telecommunications
revenues for the following quarter."
337
The Commission believes that "[b]ecause contributors will be assessed in the period
for which revenues are projected, the modified methodology will eliminate the interval
between the accrual of revenues and the assessment of universal service contributions
based on those revenues." 33s This change "mitigates the anti-competitive effects of the
current system" and will help "to ensure the sufficiency and stability of the universal
service fund.,
33 9
Migration to a system based on the connections and capacity of each contributor
represents the Commission's long-term solution of matching universal service
consumer charges to carder assessments.34° Under this approach, each contributor
333. See Herman, supra note 325.
334. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 17 F.C.C.R. 3752 (2002)
(further notice of proposed rulemaking and order).
335. See id. at 3754-62.
336. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 17 F.C.C.R. at 24,954-
55 (2002) (report and order of second further notice of proposed rulemaking).
337. Id. at 24,969, 25,014-017; see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.706, 54.709 (2003).
338. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 17 F.C.C.R. at 24,969 (report
and order of second further notice of proposed rulemaking).
339. Id. at 24,969-70.
340. See id. at 24,954-57, 24,964-83; see also Davidson, supra note 331, at B I (noting
the shift to projected income will reduce universal service fees for wireline service while raising
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would be charged a flat monthly rate for every residential, single-line business and
mobile wireless connection.341 This methodology could nearly double the average
household universal charge for, residential customers. 342 Multi-line business
connections would be assessed fees to recover the balance of the carriers' universal
service contributions based on the capacity of the connections provided.343 The
Commission hopes that by moving to a connection based assessment system it will be
easier for contributors to recover their universal service assessments from their
customers on a more predictable basis.
D. The Dedicated Universal Service Programs
The universal service program comprises three separate and discrete subsidy
programs: schools and libraries, rural health care, and high cost/low income. Each
program's main features are discussed briefly below.
1. Schools and Libraries Division
When the Telecommunications Act of 1996 expanded the definition of universal
service to include schools and libraries, it gave the Commission broad discretion to
determine what kinds of services should be provided to the new beneficiaries. The
guiding language of the statute allows the Commission to designate "additional
services '"344 and to provide these services to schools and libraries for "educational
purposes." 345 In response, the Commission created the Schools and Libraries Support
Mechanism, which is more commonly known as the "E-rate" program.
This program provides discounted telecommunications services, Internet access, and
the internal connections necessary to provide these services to eligible schools and
libraries. The Commission placed an annual cap of $2.25 billion to provide for these
services, with any unused funds to be carried over to the next year of the program.346
To be eligible for this program, a school must be an elementary or secondary school as
defined by 20 U.S.C. §§ 7801(18), (3 8 ).347 Only those schools having an endowment
exceeding $50,000,000 or operating as a for-profit business are ineligible for E-rate
fees for wireless services and stating that the Commission is "expected to move to a flat
universal service fee of about $1 per phone line or number").
341. A staff study suggests that the net universal service charge for residential and
business customers would remain more or less constant, regardless of the methodology that the
Commission ultimately selects. Wireline Competition Bureau Staff Study of Alternative
Contribution Methodologies, 18 F.C.C.R. 3009, 3010-14 (2003). The average net contribution
for residential consumers would be between $2 and $4 per month and between $1 and $1.50 for
business customers. See id. at 3010-13.
342. See id. at 3011-13 (showing average charges of $3.47 to $3.81 per month, as
opposed to charges of $2.17 to $2.68 under other methodologies).
343. See Commission Seeks Comment on Staff Study Regarding Alternative
Contribution Methodologies, 18 F.C.C.R. 3006, 3006-07 (2003).
344. 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(3) (2000).
345. Id. § 254(h)(1)(B).
346. 47 C.F.R. § 54.507(a) (2003).
347. Id. § 54.501(b).
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funds.348 A library must be an independent, not-for-profit entity whose budget is
completely separate from any school to qualify for funding.
349
The Schools and Libraries Division ("SLD") of the USAC does not disperse funds
directly to schools and libraries. Instead, a school or library must apply for E-rate
discounts that the SLD reimburses directly to the service providers. There are many
steps in this process.
350
Several problems have arisen with the operation of the Schools and Libraries
Support Mechanism. In the program's first year, the agency committed $1.7 billion to
eligible schools and libraries.351 In each year since, however, the requests from eligible
schools and libraries have exceeded the Commission's $2.25 billion mandated cap.
Although the requests exceeded the cap by only $110 million in 1999, the Commission
estimates that E-rate funding requests will soon exceed $5 billion per year, more than
double the $2.25 billion spending cap.
352
This cap on program funding has resulted in many schools' requests for internal
connections not being funded. In 2001, eligible applicants requested over $5.2 billion
348. id. § 54.501(b)(2)-(3).
349. Id. § 54.501(c).
350. A school or library must first submit a technology plan to the USAC which lays
out its goals and strategies for the best use of the requested technology, including training of
staff, a budget for hardware, software, and other nondiscounted elements of the plan, and an
evaluation process to monitor the progress of the facility in its use of the new technology. See
USAC, THE TECHNOLOGY PLAN SHows How TECHNOLOGY WILL IMPROVE EDUCATION OR
LIBRARY SERVICES, at http://www.sl.universalservice.orglovcrview/techplan.asp (last visited
Feb. 27, 2005). Next, the facility must submit an FCC Form 470 to the USAC in order to notify
service providers that the facility is seeking the discounted services. See USAC, THE FCC FORM
470 OPENS A COMPETITIVE PROCESS FOR THE SERVICES DESIRED, at
http://www.sl.universalservice.orgloverview/form470.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2005); see also
47 C.F.R. § 54.504(b) (2003). After the school or library submits a Form 470 and selects a
service provider, the facility then submits a Form 471, which is the actual request for funding.
The SLD uses this form to calculate the percentage of the discount which the facility will be
entitled to receive. See USAC, THE FCC FORM 471 SEEKS FUNDING FOR ELIGIBLE SERVICES
COMPETITIVELY BID, at http://www.sl.universalservice.orgloverview/for-71.asp (last visited
Feb. 27, 2005); see also 47 C.F.R. § 54.504(c) (2003). The agency will then review and process
Form 471 and will send both the vendor and the facility a funding commitment letter,
authorizing work to begin. See USAC, THE FUNDING COMMITMENT DECISION LEtTER CONTAINS
SLD DECISIONS ON FUNDING REQUESTS, at http:llwww.sl.universalservice.org/overview/fcdl.asp
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005). Once work begins, the facility must submit a Form 486, in order to
verify that only those services that have begun being delivered will be reimbursed. See USAC,
THE FCC FORM 486 TELts SLD THAT DELIVERY OF SERVICES HAS BEGUN, at
http://www.sl.universalservice .org/overview/form486.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). Finally, in
order to be reimbursed, the service providers must submit either an FCC Form 472 or Form 474,
which shows an invoice for completed work. See USAC, THE INVOICE (FCC FORM 472 OR FCC
FORM 474) TELLS SLD TO PAY THE SERVICE PROVIDER, at
http://www.sl.universalservice.org/overview/invoice.asp (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
351. See USAC, WELCOME TO FUNDING YEAR 1998, at
http://www.sl.universalservice.org/finding/yl/ (last modified Apr. 3, 2003).
352. See In re Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support Mechanism, 17
F.C.C.R. 11,521, 4 (2002) (first report and order).
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for service, with $1.7 billion of the requests dedicated to telecommunications services
and Internet access.
353
Under the USAC's funding priorities, only $517 million would be left to fund the
$3.5 billion in requests for internal connections. This is not even enough to cover the
$1.6 billion in requests made by those schools and libraries eligible for the 90% upper
level of funding discounts. 35 4 When funds are insufficient to fund completely a
discount level, the SLD must divide the total amount of support remaining by the total
amount requested at the discount level to produce a pro-rata factor of disbursement.
355
If the current trend of increased requests continues, the SLD will soon face a year in
which requests for telecommunications and Internet access alone exceed the funding
cap, and no school will receive funding for internal connections. Although the USAC
gives it the lowest priority, the demand for internal connection discounts has
consistently accounted for over 50% of all E-rate funds requested.356 With the number
of requests increasing each year, this means that fewer and fewer schools will receive
funding for this much sought-after service.
In some respects, this might not be entirely a bad thing. It appears that some schools
receiving funding for internal connections really do not need it.357 Despite the
safeguards of the SLD requirement of a technology plan, a report exists of one facility
receiving funding to install internal connections capable to supportfive times the actual
number of computers that they possess. 358 Other cases of misused funds have been
reported. In the first years of the program, the agency approved millions of dollars of
E-rate funds for ineligible products and services. 359 Congress seems to have finally
noticed these anomalies in the E-rate program's administration and has launched an
investigation into the E-rate program.
360
Other inequities exist. Although poorer schools are more likely to receive internal
connection funding under the USAC's priority structure, richer schools receive indirect
benefits that their poorer counterparts do not. Many schools in wealthy areas already
had extensive technology budgets before the beginning of the E-rate program. These
353. UPDATE ON E-RATE FUNDING, supra note 320, at 5.
354. id.
355.47 C.F.R. § 54.507(g)(1)(iv) (2003).
356. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOLS AND LIBRARIES PROGRAM: UPDATE
ON STATE-LEvEL FUNDING BY CATEGORY OF SERVICE, GAO-01-673, at 5 (May 2001), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01673.pdf.
357. See Gregg Toppo, Congressman: E-Rate Program 'Easily Ripped Off,' USA
TODAY, June 18,2004, at 3B (describing $100 million in subsidies paid to Puerto Rican schools
in 1998 for equipment that, in 2004, "still sits in a warehouse" and on "Internet service unused
for years" and reporting that "[o]f 122 FCC audits in the past year [2003]" some "32% revealed
'substantial problems' with how the money was spent").
358. Lee Bergquist, Phone Users Pay Bill for School Technology; $111 Million
Allocated; Skeptics Say it Doesn't Ensure Better Education, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL,
March 18, 2002, at IA.
359. Agencies, WASHINGTON INTERNET DAILY, Dec. 20, 2000, available at
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=e799828c la2ed37bad729ef458cO6cdc&-
docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=fef3c6lb06fcdfdae231576863b30634.
360. See Sam Dillon, School Internet Program Lacks Oversight, Investigator Says,
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A22; Toppo, supra note 357, at 3B.
[Vol. 80:239
2005] RECONSIDERING THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 289
schools are able to apply for and receive E-rate funds and use their own technology
budgets to offset other programs that poorer schools cannot afford.36'
Compounding the problem of increasing funding requests is the fact that, each year,
facilities successfully requesting funding fail to actually use the funds, resulting in a
substantial percentage of the funds committed for the Schools and Libraries Support
Mechanism going unspent. In a May 2001 GAO report, the auditing agency found that
$1.3 billion of the $3.7 billion, or 35% of funding set aside for applicants during the
first two years of the program, had gone unused.362
Since its inception in 1998, a myriad of other problems have surfaced in the
implementation of the E-rate program. Although each facility must submit a technology
plan to the USAC, many do not live up to the plan's goals. The technology plan asks
schools to present evidence of staff training to use the technology. Unfortunately, the
U.S. Department of Education has found that this type of training is often a single
seminar with one expert attempting to instruct hundreds of teachers at a time.
363
Additionally, an Education Weekly survey found that a majority of teachers have had
less than five hours of technology training. 364 However, lack of training is not the only
problem faced by schools wishing to use E-rate funds. The poorest schools receiving
funds for internal connections often have outdated computers and insufficient software
to make using technology in the curriculum worthwhile.
365
A recent internal audit confirmed that the E-rate program has been subject to lax
accounting and oversight, leading to highly questionable E-rate grant awards. 366 H.
Walker Feaster, III, the Federal Communications Commission's Inspector General,
"estimated that since the program began disbursing in 1998 it had given upward of
200,000 grants," but that the Commission and USAC "have carried out or overseen
fewer than 200 audits." 367 "Across the nation in recent months-in El Paso and in New
York and Pennsylvania, in Puerto Rico and Atlanta, in Milwaukee and Chicago-
investigations or audits of the program have turned up not only waste but also bid-
rigging and other fraud, according to lawmakers and investigators. '" 368 Congress plans
to conduct its own investigation into the E-rate program in hopes of identifying and
361. Cf Ann McFeatters, A Federal Promise to Hook Kids to the Web Lurches Along
Amid Controversy, Red Tape, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 30, 2000, at A16 (stating that
richer schools have money for new computers, while poorer schools lag behind with outdated
computers).
362. UPDATE ON E-RATE FUNDING, supra note 320, at 6. Rather than reallocating this
money to other schools that requested but were initially denied funds for internal connections
services, the USAC decided to place these unused funds into an interest bearing account. Id. The
Commission did not determine what to do with the unused funds until June 2002, when, at the
request of AT&T and other major telecommunications providers, it voted to temporarily apply
these funds to reduce the size of the contributions carriers were required to make to the
Universal Service Fund. Edie Herman, FCC Applies Unused E-Rate Funds to Reduce Carrier
USF Payments, COMM. DAILY, June 14, 2002.
363. McFeatters, supra note 361.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. See Dillon, supra note 360, at A22; Sam Dillon, Waste and Fraud Besiege U.S.
Program to Link Poor Schools to Internet, N.Y. TiMEs, June 17, 2004, at A20.
367. Dillon, supra note 360.
368. Dillon, Waste and Fraud, supra note 366.
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correcting the problems 369 and may enact legislation to "beef up oversight" of the E-
rate program.370 A report issued in June 2004 by the Federal Communications
Commission, which oversees the E-rate providers, said forty-two criminal
investigations were under way.371
2. Rural Health Care Division
Section 254 also provided for the funding of telecommunications and Internet
services to rural health care providers.372 To implement this aspect of the universal
service program, the USAC created the Rural Health Care Division ("RHCD"). The
RHCD administers a program that offers funding to assist rural health care providers,
helping them to gain access to telecommunications services at rates no higher than
those in the nearest city with a population of at least 50,000 within the state.373
To be eligible for these services, a health care provider must be located in a rural
area and be a not-for-profit hospital, a local health department or agency, a community
mental health center, a health center providing health care to migrants, a post-
secondary educational institution offering health care instruction, a community
organization providing health care services, or a consortium of health care providers
consisting of one or more of the proceeding entities.3 74 The RHCD only provides
funding for services relating to Internet access and internal connections necessary to
implement "essential telemedicine applications." 375 Based on the state of the rural
health community and available technology in 1997, the Commission capped the
376
annual level of universal support for the RHCD at $400 million.
Similar to the provision for schools and libraries, funding for the Rural Health Care
Support Mechanism does not go directly to the rural health care providers. The process
for requesting these funds is extraordinarily cumbersome and may discourage eligible
facilities from applying.
377
369. See id.; see also Toppo, supra note 357, at 3B ("The $2.25 billion federal program
that wires public schools and libraries to the Internet is 'an invitation for disaster' that needs
closer scrutiny, the head of a congressional subcommittee [Rep. Jim Greenwood] said
Thursday.").
370. Paul Davidson, Gregg Toppo & Jayne O'Donnell, Fraud, Waste Mar Plan to Wire
Schools to Net, USA TODAY, June 9, 2004, at IA.
371. Dillon, Waste and Fraud, supra note 366.
372.47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
373. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. at 9093, $ 608
(report and order).
374.47 C.F.R. § 54.601(a)(2) (2003).
375. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. at 9094,
611.
376. See 47 C.F.R. § 54.623; see also In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal
Service, 12 F.C.C.R. at 9141, 705.
377. The health care provider ("HCP") must first submit an FCC Form 465, which
certifies the HCP's eligibility and states the HCP's requests for services. See USAC, PROCESS
OVERVIEW, at http://www.rhc.universalservice.orgloverview/processoverview.asp (last modified
Mar. 23, 2004). Upon approval of Form 465, the RHCD posts Form 465 and opens up a 28-day
competitive bidding cycle. Id. The HCP then selects the most cost-efficient telecommunications
carrier and sends it an FCC Form 468, which verifies the type of service order and is to be
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Congress envisioned that the Rural Health Care Support Mechanism would ensure
that persons living in rural parts of the country would enjoy meaningful access to the
best and latest health care services. 378 Proponents of telemedicine hoped that RHCD
funding would allow doctors practicing in major urban centers to diagnose and treat
patients in rural areas by watching live videos transferred over high-speed Internet
connections. 37 9 Since its inception, the Rural Health Care Support Mechanism has
funded telecommunications and information services for rural health care providers in
forty states and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
380
Many problems with the agency's implementation of the program have seriously
reduced participation rates by eligible health care providers and raised the costs of
program administration to unacceptably high levels. For example, procedural problems
have resulted in the Rural Health Care Support Mechanism being the least utilized
program in the new and expanded universal service program. During its first two years
of existence, the RHCD was an abysmal failure. Of the 22,000 rural health care
providers contacted by the USAC, only 3000 expressed an interest in the program, and
less than 600 filed formal applications.
381
Moreover, the complicated application process led to only 68 of 452 applicants
being awarded funds in the first eighteen months of the program.382 The funds
distributed to these 68 applicants totaled less than $300,000, much less than the $1.4
million it cost the RHCD to administer the program during this same eighteen month
time period.383
completed and returned to the HCP. Id. The HCP then completes an FCC Form 466, which
verifies the service requested and that the carrier selected is the most cost-efficient, and sends
this form along with Form 468 to the RHCD. Id. If the RHCD approves the 466/468 packet, it
will send a funding commitment letter and a copy of FCC Form 467, which is a receipt of
service confirmation form, to both the HCP and the carrier. Id. The HCP then completes Form
467 and returns it to the RHCD, which then reviews it. If the agency approves the Form 467, it
then issues an HCP support schedule to the HCP and the telecommunications carrier, allowing
the carrier to begin crediting the HCP's account with the support mechanism discount. Id.
378. See FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, Keynote Address, FCC/HOST Forum on
Promoting Standards in Telehealth, July 17, 1997, 1997 FCC Lexis 3766, at *2 ("It is in rural
America that distance is most likely to be a major impediment to timely access to health care
services. ... Telehealth can make medical expertise available to these trauma patients and many
others who are kept from superior health care by the surmountable obstacles of geography and
distance."); see also Christopher Guttman-McCabe, Comment, Telemedicine's Imperiled
Future?: Funding, Reimbursement, Licensing and Privacy Hurdles Face a Developing
Technology, 14 J. CONTEMp. HEALThi L. & POL'" 161, 169 (1997) ("The clear intent of Congress
is to offset the actual cost of telemedicine to rural health care providers. Through the use of the
USF, telecommunications providers are able to offer services to rural health care providers
below the actual cost of the service. The combined actions of the FCC and Congress send a
strong policy message: the federal government wants to facilitate the continued growth of
telemedicine.").
379. See Jube Shiver, Jr., For Doctors, Blocked Internet Artery; Technology:
Bureaucratic Delays Stall Promising Program to Improve Rural Health Care, Los ANGELES
TImES, Sept. 19, 1999, at A8.
380. See USAC, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 37, available at
http://www.universalservice.org/reports/2001/.
381. Shiver, supra note 379.
382. Id.
383. Id.
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In recent years, the program has not fared much better. The Commission narrowed
the definition of "health care provider" and determined that this term did not include
emergency medical service facilities or long-term care facilities, such as nursing homes
and hospices.384 This decision significantly reduced the number of eligible rural health
care providers nationwide from an estimated 22,000 to an estimated 9000; even so,
only 700 providers received assistance in 2001.385 As of February 2002, the RHCD had
only distributed $13 million of a potential $900 million in funds during the first three
years of the program.386 Although a handful of rural health care providers might be
pleased with the results of this program, based on the program's poor results, a
reasonable observer might seriously question the program's efficacy.
In April 2002, in hopes of improving the program's effectiveness, the Commission
released an NPRM that proposed a variety of changes in the operation of the RHCD
program. 387 In this NPRM, the Commission sought comment regarding whether it
should reexamine the interpretation of the terms "health care provider" and "rural
health clinic" to include those entities that, in addition to serving rural health care
providers, function in capacities that fall outside the existing definition.388 Given the
rapid growth of online capabilities, applications, and users, the Commission also
sought comment on whether to provide discounts on Internet access charges.
389
Similarly, the agency sought comment on how to limit waste and fraud in
circumstances where providers perform a significant amount of non-health related
activities. 390
In addition, the Commission sought comment on several possible changes to the
Rural Health Care Support Mechanism. These included the following: ways to
streamline the application process; 39' pro-rata reductions if approved funding requests
exceed the annual cap of $400 million; 392 and ways to prevent waste, fraud, and
abuse. 393 Lastly, the agency included a general request for comment on any additional
rule changes that would improve the rules and policies of the Rural Health Care
Universal Support Mechanism.
394
384. In re Rural Health Care Support Mechanism, 17 F.C.C.R. 7806, 7809-10, 8
(1998).
385. Id. at 7810, 10 (commenting on the number of providers that received assistance
in 2001).
386. See USAC, supra note 380, at 37.
387. See In re Rural Health Care Support Mechanism, 17 F.C.C.R. 7806.
388. Id. at 7813.
389. id. at 7813-17.
390. Id. at 7826-28. The Commission additionally sought comment on the calculation
of discounted services. At the time, the agency used comparisons to technically similar services
and to rates of the state's nearest city with at least 50,000 inhabitants. The NPRM invited
comment on the costs and benefits of altering comparisons to functionally similar services and
to rates of any city within the state. See id. at 7818-24.
391. ld. at 7825.
392. Id. at 7825-26.
393. Id. at 7826-28.
394. ld. at 7828.
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On November 17, 2003, the Commission adopted new rules that revamped the
RHCD program.395 The Commission adopted rules for expanding the eligibility for
health care providers, providing support for discounted Internet access, and modifying
the calculation of discounted services to allow for more flexibility.
396
By reinterpreting the terms "health care provider" and "rural health care clinic," the
Commission has enlarged the eligible entities for universal service support.
Specifically, the agency determined that dedicated emergency departments of rural for-
profit hospitals will be eligible to receive prorated support and non-profit entities that
function as health care providers on a part-time basis will be eligible to receive
support.397 Moreover, although the Commission had previously declined to offer
support for Internet access, the agency determined that eligible rural health care
providers may now receive a 25% discount on those monthly costs. 391 Lastly, the
Commission modified its policy regarding the calculation of discounted services.
399
The Commission's modifications to the Rural Heath Care Support Mechanism
adopted in the Order took effect on July 1, 2004. 400 Whether these "new and
improved" eligibility and program design rules will bolster participation rates in the
RHCD program from the current extraordinarily low levels remains to be seen.
401
3. High Cost and Low Income Division
In addition to the new provisions to support schools, libraries, and rural health care
providers, § 254 sought to extend the original universal service goal of providing
affordable telecommunications services regardless of location or income level. The
USAC strives to accomplish this goal by using the High Cost and Low Income Support
395. See In re Rural Health Care Support Mechanism, 18 F.C.C.R. 24,546 (2003)
(report and order, order on reconsideration, and further notice of proposed rulemaking).
396. Id. at 24,552-70.
397. Id. at 24,553-54.
398. Id. at 24,560.
399. Id. at 24,563-70. The previous rules compared technically similar services of
urban and rural areas, while the newly adopted rules specify that the services may be
functionally similar from the perspective of the end user. This adjustment better complies with
Congress's directive to ensure comparable services for rural carriers. Similarly, the Commission
extended the maximum distance for distance-based charges to equal the distance from the rural
health care provider to the state's largest city, as opposed to the nearest same-state city with a
population of 50,000 or more. The agency also amended its policy to enable rural health care
providers to receive discounts for satellite services regardless of the availability of terrestrial-
based services. These discounts, however, are to be limited to the amount the providers would
have received for the land-based alternatives.
400. Id. at 24,576. The Commission also denied a petition for the reconsideration of the
current policy regarding support for satellite services for mobile rural health clinics, and it
requested additional comment on modification of the definition of "rural area" universal service
rural health care support.
401. The Commission appended a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to its
November 17, 2003 Report and Order. See In re Rural Health Care Support Mechanism, 18
F.C.C.R. at 24,578-81. The Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeks further comments on
the Commission's definition of "rural area," support for satellite services for mobile rural health
clinics, and other administrative matters. See id. at 24,578-80.
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Mechanisms. 40 2 The agency created these programs to provide support to telephone
companies that offer affordable telecommunications services to residents of rural,
insular, and high-cost areas at rates comparable to those being charged for similar
services in urban areas. 4 3 The High Cost and Low Income Division of the USAC
administers both programs. 4 4
The Low Income Support Mechanism provides discounts to low-income consumers
for the activation and maintenance of telecommunications services they otherwise
might not be able to afford. 405 Whether or not the beneficiaries of the program would
simply go without telephone service in its absence is a highly debatable question.
40 6
The High Cost Support Mechanism ("HCSM") funds eligible telecommunications
carriers who provide services to rural, insular, and high cost areas. There are a variety
of support options for these carriers, including high cost loop support for rural carriers,
forward-looking support for non-rural carriers, local switching support, long-term
support for interstate access charges, interstate common line support, and interstate
access support.
40 7
To be eligible for these support mechanisms, a telecommunications carrier must be
certified as an eligible telecommunications carrier ("ETC") by the state in which it
seeks to provide service. 40 8 There are many types of ETCs that are eligible to
participate in the HCSM, including incumbent local exchange carriers, competitive
ETCs, wireless carriers, telephone cooperatives, and independent telephone
companies.
409
Although many categories of carriers theoretically are eligible for HCSM funds, the
Commission's procedure for gaining ETC status makes it quite difficult for non-
incumbent local exchange carriers to receive these funds.4 10 Incumbent local exchange
carriers are, by their nature, ETCs, if they serve high-cost areas and are eligible to
receive substantial funding from the HCSM. However, if a competitive ETC begins to
service the incumbent's area, the incumbent's level of support will be reduced.4 '
Therefore, the incumbent has a strong incentive to remain the sole telecommunication
service provider for a high-cost area, if possible. If another carrier applies for ETC
status in the same service area, the incumbent local exchange carrier can oppose the
application and delay the state's decision by way of numerous discovery requests and
402. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. at 8792-94.
403. USAC, supra note 380, at 4; see also 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3) (2004).
404. See 47 C.F.R. § 54.701(c)(iii) (2003).
405. USAC, supra note 380, at 8.
406. See Alleman et al., supra note 292, at 856-57, 861, 865-66 (arguing that low-
income households subscribe to unsubsidized telecommunications and media services, such as
cable or satellite television, at rates virtually equal to households with significantly higher
household income).
407. USAC, supra note 380, at 6.
408. See 47 C.F.R. § 54.201.
409. USAC, supra note 380, at 6.
410. See Jim Chen, Subsidized Rural Telephony and the Public Interest: A Case Study
in Cooperative Federalism and Its Pitfalls 14, 18-22 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Indiana Law Journal) [hereinafter Chen, Subsidized Rural Telephony].
411. Shira Levine, Liberty, Justice, and Telephone Service for All: The concept of
universal service has been a linchpin of telecommunications policy. Can that policy be modified
to fit a competitive market?, AMERICA's NETWORK, Nov. 1, 2001, at 22.
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lengthy hearings.4 2 This process has made it extremely difficult for competitive ETCs
to enter into incumbent local exchange carriers' service areas.
On February 27, 2004, the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service ("Joint
Board") released its Recommended Decision in response to a request by the
Commission to review rules regarding universal service support.4 13 Although it
determined that states should remain free to determine their own requirements for
ETCs, the Joint Board recommended the adoption of a core set of minimum permissive
qualifications to ensure a more predictable national application process.4 1 4 Even if
these recommendations were adopted, the problem of barriers to program participation
by would-be ETCs would remain a serious one.
In 2001, eighteen competitive carriers received HCSM support for providing
service to high cost areas, compared to over twelve-hundred incumbent local exchange
carriers.415 In the previous year, only three competitive carriers received HCSM
416support. The creation of recommended "permissive" rules to govern ETC eligibility
decisions will not resolve the problem of reticent state Public Service Commissions
("PSCs") impeding CLEC participation in USF programs.
The Low Income Support Mechanism ("LISM") assists local service providers who
provide telecommunication access to low-income customers. The LISM focuses on
three programs to reduce costs for these customers. The "Lifeline" program provides
support to telephone companies that provide reduced services for qualified low-income
consumers. 417 The Lifeline service can save a low-income subscriber between $5.25
and $8.50 each month on local monthly phone charges. 418 The "Link Up" program
reimburses local telephone service providers that offer a reduction for telephone
service activation to low-income consumers. The benefit to the consumer is a discount
of up to 50% of the customary initiation fee, not exceeding thirty-dollars.4 9 The LISM
also reimburses a service provider for the costs associated with providing low-income
consumers toll limitation service, including toll blocking and toll control.420 An
individual must meet the state's eligibility requirements or participate in a federal
assistance program, such as Medicaid or food stamps, before he is qualified to be a
low-income consumer.
42 1
As with the RHCD, underutilization constitutes a substantial problem for the LISM.
Both the Lifeline and Link Up programs can be administered by individual states
422
412. Id.
413. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Recommended Decision,
19 F.C.C.R. 4257 (2004).
414. Id. at 4258. In addition, the Joint Board proposed limiting high-cost support to
single connections to the public telephone network as opposed to the current rules that make
support available for multiple connections. See id. at 4279-87.
415. USAC, supra note 380, at 6.
416. Id.
417. See 47 C.F.R. § 54.401(a) (2003).
418. USAC, supra note 380, at 8.
419. 47 C.F.R. § 54.41 l(a)(1).
420. USAC, supra note 380, at 8; see also 47 C.F.R. § 54.400(b)-(d) (defining the
terms "toll blocking," "toll control," and "toll limitation").
421. See 47 C.F.R. § 54.409(a)-(b).
422. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.409, 54.415.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
and, in fact, many states mandate this administration. In some states, such as New York
and California, state governments have made publicity of these programs a priority and
these efforts have yielded relatively high levels of participation by eligible
households.423
In other states, however, these programs have been poorly publicized. In early 2002,
the AARP began its own advertising campaign for Lifeline and Link Up in Florida
because only about 13% of the eligible consumers in Florida were using these
services.424 The Commission requires that telephone companies publicize the Lifeline
program "in a manner reasonably designed to reach those likely to qualify.,
425
Oftentimes, phone companies fulfill this requirement simply by placing an insert into
each customer's monthly phone bill. 26 Unfortunately, this notice is often one of many
inserts within the bill, all of which, upon receipt, usually make a short one-way trip into
the nearest trash can. No similar requirement exists for phone companies to publicize
the Link Up program.
On April 29, 2004, the Commission released a Report and Order and Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking in which the agency modified its rules to improve the
effectiveness of the low-income support mechanism. 427 The Commission expanded its
federal default eligibility requirements, 428 adopted federal certification and verification
procedures,429 and embraced outreach guidelines to improve subscribership to the
universal service program of Lifeline/Link-Up. 2 0 In addition to the measures adopted,
the Commission sought comment on whether the agency should approve even more
inclusive income-based criteria.43'
Although states have the authority to establish their own criteria for Lifeline/Link-
Up programs, states may choose to use federal standards as their default criteria. 43 2 In
response to a recommendation of the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,
the Commission revised the current rules to include both income-based and program-
based criteria. The newly adopted rules allow consumers with income at or below
135% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines to be eligible to participate in Lifeline/Link-
Up.
4 3 3
423. Eve Tahmincioglu, Phone Aid Not Connecting with Poor, ST. PErERSBuRG TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1998, at 1H.
424. Dave Simanoff, AARP Encourages Floridians to Keep in Touch, TAMPA TRIB.,
April 5, 2002, at 2.
425. See 47 C.F.R. § 54.405(b).
426. Tahrmincioglu, supra note 423, at 1H.
427. Lifeline and Link-Up, 19 F.C.C.R. 8302 (2004) (report and order and further
notice of proposed rulemaking).
428. Id. at 8307-15.
429. Id. at 8317-24.
430. Id. at 8325-29.
431. Id. at 8305.
432. Id. at 8307.
433. Id. at 8308. The Commission sought comment on whether the federal income-
based criteria should be increased from 135% to 150% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines and
whether the adoption of advertising rules would promote the goals of the universal service
programs. Id. at 8308-11.
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The Commission also adopted various certification and verification procedures.
4 34
The agency encourages, but does not require, states to adopt automatic enrollment
means of certifying eligible consumers. Additionally, enrolling consumers must now
provide documentation of income eligibility, and an ETC officer must review the
documents. Finally, all states must now establish procedures to verify consumer's
continued eligibility.
435
In order to improve subscribership, the Commission adopted the Joint Board's
recommendation to set guidelines for states and carriers to reach eligible consumers.
The agency suggested that states and carriers (1) make efforts to reach households that
have no telephone service, (2) direct advertising toward sizeable non-English speaking
communities, and (3) work with any related government programs providing
436
assistance.
As with the Commission's efforts to improve the RHCD programs, only time will
tell whether these efforts to refine the eligibility and operational rules for the low-
income support program will materially improve the program's operation. At a
minimum, however, the Commission's apparently ceaseless tinkering with the USF
program rules and policies suggests that the agency recognizes that the federal USF
programs are not working as intended.
E. From Here to Eternity: The Unending and Ever-Expanding Quest for Universal
Service
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the goal of universal service has shifted
and changed over time. Originally universal service was merely a promise to provide
service on demand to any paying customer; it now represents a new government
entitlement program that subsidizes a growing number of telecommunications services.
As competitive service providers colonize the last source of cross subsidies, local
business service, the cost of universal service will have to be paid entirely through
direct taxes on consumers of various telecommunications services.
The Commission's implementation of the universal service program reflects all the
problems usually associated with designing and executing a massive welfare program.
As Professor Weiser has argued, "[iun essence, the FCC has been saddled with the task
of designing a program similar to the Medicaid Act's system of providing medical
service to the poor .... 4" And, like Medicaid, the cost of administering the universal
service program is staggering, even while large segments of the program seem to be
dismal failures (e.g., the rural health care provider program) or incredibly wasteful
(e.g., the schools and libraries program).
One can mount a sustained and powerful attack against the Commission's
implementation of the universal service program on public policy grounds.43" The
purpose of providing a relatively detailed description of the federal universal service
program and its implementation is to give interested observers a sense of the scope of
434. Id. at 8317.
435. Id. at 8322.
436. Id. at 8326.
437. Weiser, supra note 293, at 824.
438. See infra text and accompanying notes 530-58 (setting forth sustained and varied
objections to the universal service program on public policy grounds).
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the delegation that § 254 represents. In my view, Congress should be required to take
greater direct responsibility for the design and execution of the universal service
behemoth. Section 254 does not establish the particular services that must (or must not)
be provided or the precise mechanisms that will be used to pay for these services.
Congress essentially punted all the hard questions away to the Commission, telling it to
work out all the relevant details.
To be sure, this approach does not represent an entirely novel approach to
telecommunications regulation-many provisions of the Communications Act vest
great discretion with the Commission to make and administer vitally important
policies.439 Yet, § 254 does differ from other relatively broad delegations of regulatory
authority to the Commission because it vests the Commission with the ability to assess
taxes on telecommunications services, thereby favoring some services and potentially
disfavoring others. Even if Congress could constitutionally delegate the universal
service program design to the Commission, it should not also be permitted to delegate
responsibility for funding the program.
F. Despite Its Extraordinary Breadth, § 254 Does Not Violate the Nondelegation
Doctrine
As noted earlier, some commentators have argued that § 254, which establishes the
universal service program, violates the nondelegation doctrine. 40 The nondelegation
doctrine requires only that "Congress [I delineate the general policy, the public agency
which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.
'A
In the case of § 254, Congress established both the objects of the program and the
means of paying for the attainment of those objects. It would be difficult to make a
plausible claim that the delegation is too open-ended to survive generic delegation
doctrine scrutiny." 2 Indeed, one must entirely disregard the most recent Supreme Court
precedents regarding the nondelegation doctrine to advance such arguments. Fairly
read, the Supreme Court's decisions strongly suggest that § 254 does not constitute an
unlawful delegation of the taxing power, nor does it violate the more generic
prohibition against unconstrained delegations of policymaking authority.
443
439. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2000) (empowering the Commission to encourage
new technologies and services); id. § 303 (authorizing the Commission to issue licenses for
radio and television stations as "public interest, convenience, and necessity" requires).
440. See Cherry & Nystrom, supra note 53, at 123-32.
441. Am. Power & Light Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946); see
supra text and accompanying notes 188-93 (discussing the nondelegation doctrine).
442. But cf. Cherry & Nystrom, supra note 53, at 123-36 (arguing to the contrary).
443. But cf. Barbara A. Cherry, Challenging the Constitutionality of Universal Service
Contributions: Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 2001 L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L.
423, 426 (2001) ("In light of Whitman ... there should be renewed efforts to review the
constitutionality of the universal service provisions of § 254 by the courts under the
nondelegation doctrine."). Cherry argues that Whitman effectively should prevent reviewing
courts from applying Chevron analysis to agency interpretations of vague statutes because the
court must first engage in a nondelegation analysis that will be outcome determinative. See
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Cherry, supra ("it is
clear that the Court would find the Fifth Circuit's evasion of the delegation challenge to §
254(h) through agency deference under Chevron step-two analysis to be improper"). Thus, she
[Vol. 80:239
2005] RECONSIDERING THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 299
This conclusion is less an indictment of the critics of the universal service program
than a reflection of the moribund state of the nondelegation doctrine. Unlike NCTA and
New England Power, and consistent with Mid-America Pipeline, Congress has
delegated revenue raising authority to the Federal Communications Commission to
fund the universal service program. Although this delegation is, de facto, a limited
power to impose taxes on communications services, this fact simply does not matter for
purposes of applying the "no delegation of taxing authority" rule. Based on Mid-
America Pipeline's holding that no special rules govern the delegation of revenue
authority, "4 a reviewing court should sustain § 254's funding mechanism against
either a generic nondelegation doctrine challenge or a challenge premised on the more
specific rule against implied delegation of taxation powers.
IV. AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF A LIMITED REVIVAL OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
DELEGATING BASIC REVENUE DECISIONS TO INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Although § 254 survives the application of the contemporary incarnation of both the
general nondelegation doctrine and the more specific rule against the implied
delegation of taxing powers, there are some very good reasons why this should not be
so. In particular, the Framers were extremely concerned with fixing responsibility for
revenue policy and limiting its exercise to the branch of government most subject to
direct democratic accountability. As Professor Lawson has noted, "[tihe delegation
phenomenon raises fundamental questions about democracy, accountability, and the
argues that Whitman will preempt Chevron analysis in a case raising a renewed nondelegation
challenge to the universal service program. In my view, Whitman offers very little comfort to
advocates of a renewed or reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine. Chevron analysis takes place
only after the resolution of any delegation doctrine issues that might exist-if a statute is so
vague that it fails nondelegation doctrine analysis then the court never gets to Chevron. But
Justice Scalia's opinion in Whitman restates and reaffirms that almost any delegation meets the
intelligible principle standard. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 457
(2001).Indeed, he goes out of his way to cite with approval a host of post-New Deal era cases
sanctioning incredibly broad delegations to administrative agencies. Id. at 473-74. In light of
this, one has to possess tremendous optimism to think that application of the Whitman standard
would change the result in Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel. If a delegation self-evidently
meets the existing nondelegation standard, why should a reviewing court bother to state the
obvious? In sum, even if the Fifth Circuit's analysis was incomplete, it represents at most
harmless error. If a delegation is vague-but permissibly so-Chevron applies and an agency's
interpretation of the permissibly vague language controls over other reasonable readings of the
language.
The more difficult problem is squaring Whitman with United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218 (2001). According to Mead Corp., Chevron deference applies only when Congress
delegates lawmaking power to an agency. Id. at 229-31; see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why
Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54
ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 747-54 (2002). Yet, the delegation of lawmaking power seems to run
against Justice Scalia's admonition that "legislative power" cannot be transferred to Executive
Branch agencies. Thus, under Mead Corp., Chevron deference seems to apply only when
Congress has intentionally delegated lawmaking power to an agency. Somehow, the lawmaking
power transferred to an agency to write binding rules does not constitute "legislative power" for
purposes of applying the nondelegation doctrine. The Justices have not yet addressed precisely
why and how this is so.
444. Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 109 U.S. 212, 223 (1989).
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enterprise of American governance."445 This seems especially true when the exercise of
taxation powers is at issue,
Sound policy also supports a stronger version of the "no delegation of taxing
authority" rule. An agency free to tax for an open-ended purpose can grow at will,
largely free and clear from the need to seek additional authorizations from Congress.
The recent financial scandals associated with the $2.25 billion per year E-rate
program 446 demonstrate that Congress has (at least to date) failed to exercise adequate
oversight of the USF program. Congressional control over an agency's access to
operating monies is an important check on agency behavior. An agency free to raise
revenue without congressional oversight or approval runs the risk of unchecked growth
with insufficient oversight, which appears to be the case with several of the USF
programs.
A. The Doctrine of Retroactive Ratification and Its Potential Use as the Answer to
the Problem of Delegations of Revenue Authority
The Supreme Court has held that Congress may retroactively approve an
unauthorized tax, thereby saving it from being voided judicially. Although the doctrine
is somewhat obscure-and finds its roots in a case decided in 1907447-it remains good
law. Moreover, the lower federal courts have applied this doctrine with some regularity
over the last twenty years, most recently in 1999.
In United States v. Heinszen Co.,"s the Supreme Court decided a case challenging
tariffs collected in the Philippines. Following the U.S. invasion and occupation of the
Philippines in 1898, the Secretary of War, acting with the President's consent,
established a system of tariffs for goods imported into the country. 449 Although
.Congress had not authorized the imposition of these tariffs, the federal government
began assessing and collecting duties on all goods from abroad coming into the
Philippines based on the Secretary's order. In 1902, Congress enacted legislation
establishing a system of duties for goods imported into the Philippines; this legislation
authorized tariffs only prospectively, however. For the period from 1898 to 1902, no
congressionally authorized system of duties existed--only the system unilaterally
created and enforced by the Executive Branch was in place.
From 1898 to 1902, Heinszen paid the tariffs due under the Secretary's tariff
schedule. Thereafter, the company sued for a refund, arguing that the tariff scheme was
ultra vires, unlawful, and void. During the pendency of the litigation, Congress enacted
a law that purported to endorse the tariffs established by the President for the period
from 1898 to 1902.40 Heinszen argued that the attempted ratification of the tax,
retroactive for a period of over eight years, was an unconstitutional deprivation of due
process. The Court of Claims agreed with Heinszen, finding that "the act of Congress
445. Lawson, supra note 207, at 332.
446. See Dillon, Waste and Fraud, supra note 366, at A20; Davidson, Toppo &
O'Donnell, supra note 370, at Al.
447. United States v. Heinszen Co., 206 U.S. 370 (1907).
448. Id.
449. Id. at 378.
450. Id. at 380-81.
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of June 30, 1906, ratifying the collection of duties was beyond the power of Congress
to enact.,
45 1
On review, the Supreme Court reversed, even though it was "obvious that the court
below correctly held that such tariff exactions were illegal. 45 2 The tariffs were illegal
because Congress had not authorized any tariffs for goods coming into the Philippines
from 1898 to 1902. Accordingly, "the only question open for consideration [was]
whether the court below erred in refusing to give effect to the act of Congress of June
30, 1906, which ratified the collection of the duties levied under the order of the
President., 453 The "simple question" presented for decision was "whether Congress
possessed the power to ratify which it assumed to exercise.
' 454
By a vote of seven to two, the Supreme Court found that Congress could ratify a tax
that was unlawfully collected at some prior point in time.
That where an agent, without precedent authority, has exercised in the name of the
principal a power which the principal had the capacity to bestow, the principal
may ratify and affirm the unauthorized act, and thus retroactively give it validity
when rights of third persons have not intervened, is so elementary as to need but
statement.
455
For the majority, then, the case presented an almost embarrassingly easy question.
4 56
Even if the tax was ultra vires at the time of its collection, the subsequent
congressional ratification totally divested Heinszen of any right to a refund. If
Congress could have authorized the tariffs before they were collected, then "it had
power to ratify the acts which it might have authorized. 457 Moreover, "it may [] cure
irregularities, and confirm proceedings which without the confirmation would be void,
because unauthorized, provided such confirmation does not interfere with intervening
rights."458 In the case at bar,
[iut is then evident, speaking generally, both on principle and authority, that
Congress had the power to pass the ratifying act of June 30, 1906, and that that act
bars the plaintiff's right to recover, unless by the application of some exception
this case is taken out of the operation of the general rule.
459
451. Id. at 382.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Id.; see also Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U.S. 687, 690 (1878)
(permitting ex post ratification of a tax collected without congressional authorization for public
works improvements projects in District of Columbia).
456. Heinszen, 206 U.S. at 382-83 ('That the power of ratification as to matters within
their authority may be exercised by Congress, state governments or municipal corporations, is
also elementary. We shall not stop to review the whole subject or cite the numerous cases
contained in the books dealing with the matter, but content ourselves with referring to two cases
as to the power of Congress, which are apposite and illustrative.").
457. Id. at 384.
458. Id.
459. Id.
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The Justices found no reason not to apply the general rule in the case.
Along the way, the Court rejected a strong due process claim that retroactive
taxation was fundamentally unjust. Although the Supreme Court decided Heinszen at
the height of the Lochner era, the Justices found the due process claim utterly lacking
in merit. "In other words, as a necessary result of the power to ratify, it followed that
the right to recover the duties in question was subject to the exercise by Congress of its
undoubted power to ratify."'46 Even though ratification postdated the assessment and
collection of the taxes by a period of four to eight years (depending on when the
taxpayer paid particular monies during the period 1898 to 1902), no due process
violation existed. Because Congress has the right to ratify an ultra vires act, no claim of
entitlement to a refund could arise, for recognizing such a claim would divest Congress
of its undoubted power of ratification (even up to eight years later).
"Nor does the mere fact that at the time the ratifying statute was enacted this action
was pending for the recovery of the sums paid, cause the statute to be repugnant to the
Constitution."4' Thus, if Congress sees the potential for a recovery that it does not
like, it can prefigure a preferred result by utilizing the ratification process.
The only rule for ratification is that Congress must ratify by a plain statement. If the
ratification utilizes vague or ambiguous language, a court need not find that a
ratification has occurred. 462 In the statute at issue, however, Congress used language
that unquestionably sought to ratify the tariffs.
463
Since deciding Heinszen, the Supreme Court consistently has held that Congress
may retroactively ratify an act that it could have undertaken in the first instance.4 The
Court has, however, established some limits to the use of ratification.
In 1919, Florida's legislature attempted to ratify the collection of certain
unauthorized tolls for the use of a lock on a canal. 65 The disputed tolls arose in and
prior to 1917. At that time, Forbes Pioneer Boat Line ("Forbes") paid tolls for the use
of the lock. Forbes subsequently sued the state of Florida in state court for a refund. In
1919, on the very day that the Supreme Court of Florida issued a decision in favor of
Forbes's claim, the state legislature enacted a bill that purported to ratify the tolls. The
Supreme Court of the United States granted review.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes stated the question as "whether a
state legislature can take away from a private party a right to recover money that is due
460. Id. at 386.
461. Id. at 387.
462. See id. at 387-90.
463. See id. at 381 ("That the tariff duties, both import and export, imposed by the
authorities of the United States or of the provisional military government thereof in the
Philippine Islands prior to March eight, nineteen hundred and two, at all ports and places in said
islands, and upon all goods, wares, and merchandise imported into said islands from the United
States, or from foreign countries, or exported from said islands, are hereby legalized and ratified,
... and confirmed as fully to all intents and purposes as if the same had by prior act of Congress
been specifically authorized and directed.").
464. See, e.g., Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 301-02 (1937)
(citing and applying Heinszen to permit retroactive taxation); Graham v. Goodcell, 282 U.S.
409, 427-31 (1931) (same); Rafferty v. Smith, Bell & Co., 257 U.S. 226, 232 (1921) (same).
465. See Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 258 U.S. 338 (1922).
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when the act is passed." 466 He went on to answer this question in the negative. "A tax
may be imposed in respect of past benefits, so that if instead of calling it a ratification
Congress had pukported to impose the tax for the first time the enactment would have
been within its power," but the "ratification of an act is not good if attempted at a time
when the ratifying authority could not lawfully do the act." 67 Applying these
principles, the Supreme Court found the Florida legislation "invalid."" 8
Justice Holmes explained that
if the Legislature of Florida had attempted to make the plaintiff pay in 1919 for
passages through the lock of a canal, that took place before 1917, without any
promise of reward, there is nothing in the case as it stands to indicate that it could
have done so any more effectively than it could have made a man pay a baker for a
gratuitous deposit of rolls.4
69
Thus, Florida could not enact a retroactive toll, even if it might be permitted to enact a
retroactive tax. For reasons that the Court does not fully explain, retroactive tolls are
fundamentally unjust, whereas retroactive taxes are not. In any event, the Court
concluded that because the tolls were not foreseeable, the state legislature could not
assess them retroactively.
470
In later cases decided during the Lochner era, the Supreme Court applied the
Forbes rule to some, but not all, retroactive taxes. 471 Thus, two sometimes conflicting
lines of cases both remained on the books and valid, even though they seemed to call
for conflicting results on the same facts: Heinszen permitted retroactive ratification of
unlawful acts, whereas Forbes purported to limit the scope of retrospective
legislation. 72
In 1981, Justice White dissented from the Supreme Court's refusal to hear a South
Dakota case involving a statute that imposed a new sales tax retroactively from 1981 to
1969. 73 Justice White noted that "[tihe difficulty in discerning the difference between
466. Id. at 339.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. See id. at 340 ("We must assume that the plaintiff went through the canal relying
upon its legal rights and it is not to be deprived of them because the Legislature forgot.").
471. See, e.g., Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 595-99 (1931) ("The Commonwealth
was without authority by subsequent legislation, whether enacted under the guise of its power to
tax or otherwise, to alter their effect or to impair or destroy rights which had vested under
them."); see also Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440,445-46 (1928) (disallowing retroactive
gift tax); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 146-47 (1927) (same). For an extended discussion
of these cases, see Faith Colson, Note, The Supreme Court Sounds the Death Knell for Due
Process Challenges to Retroactive Tax Legislation, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 243, 252-57 (1995).
472. For thoughtful consideration of the problem of retroactive legislation, see
Frederick A. Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxation, 48 HARV. L. REv. 592 (1935); Charles B.
Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 692 (1960); W. David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in
Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 Cu. L. REv. 216 (1960).
473. See Van Emmerik v. Janklow, 454 U.S. 1131, 1131-32 (1982) (denial of cert.)
(White, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's decision to dismiss the petition for certiorari and
INDIANA L4W JOURNAL
permissible curative legislation and unconstitutionally retroactive legislation is
apparent from an examination of our cases.' 474
He explained that "Heinszen and Forbes appear to stand for the proposition that
administrative, procedural, and technical defects unrelated to the underlying policy
may be remedied by curative legislation, while legislative policy may not be changed
retroactively., 475 That said, "Heinszen and Forbes offer little guidance as to whether a
retroactive tax increase constitutes a change in legislative policy.' 4 76 He argued that the
Court, in declining to review the case, was shirking its "duty to define the boundary
between permissible and impermissible retroactive tax increases.'
4 77
The teaching of Heinszen is remarkably simple: the case holds that if a direct
retroactive tax would be valid, a legislature may ratify a tax that was unauthorized at
the time of collection. Logically, then, the only real question regarding the scope of
Heinszen relates to the ability of a legislative body to assess retrospective taxes. During
the Lochner era, the Supreme Court permitted some retrospective taxes and rejected
others. Since 1937, however, the trend in Supreme Court decisions has been quite
clear: unless wholly irrational or unjust, retrospective taxes do not violate the Due
Process Clauses.478 As one observer has noted, the Supreme Court's pre-1937 cases
invalidating retroactive taxes "have been confined to their facts.' 479
United States v. Carlton resolves any residual doubts about the validity of
retroactive taxes, at least insofar as the Due Process Clauses are concerned. Writing for
the Court, Justice Blackmun declared that "[t]his Court repeatedly has upheld
retroactive tax legislation against a due process challenge.' '480 Although the Supreme
Court had used a test inquiring into whether a particular retroactive tax was so "harsh
and oppressive ' 481 as to violate substantive due process, this formulation "'does not
differ from the prohibition against arbitrary or irrational legislation' that applies
generally to enactments in the sphere of economic policy.', 482 If a retroactive tax
scheme rationally relates to a legitimate government interest, it is consistent with the
requirements of due process of law.483
The Carlton Court went out of its way to disavow, utterly, the Lochner-era cases
subjecting retroactive taxes to a more demanding standard of review. "Those cases
were decided during an era characterized by exacting review of economic legislation
under an approach that 'has long been discarded. ' '484 The Court explained that "[t]o
the extent that their authority survives, they do not control here., 48 5 Accordingly, it is
arguing that the case presented novel and important questions of federal constitutional law that
required plenary Supreme Court review and a decision).
474. Id. at 1132.
475. Id. at 1133.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 1133-34.
478. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30-31 (1994); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191-92 (1992); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-49 (1938).
479. Colson, supra note 471, at 254.
480. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30.
481. Henry, 305 U.S. at 147.
482. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30 (quoting Pension Guar. Benefit Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.,
467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984)).
483. See id. at 30-31.
484. Id. at 34 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)).
485. Id.
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no overstatement to suggest that after Carlton, "constitutional review of retroactive
application of tax laws is officially dead.'A8
6
Two years earlier, in a somewhat more cautious opinion, Justice O'Connor noted in
General Motors Corp. v. Romein that "[rietroactive legislation presents problems of
unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it
can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions.4
87
However, the requisite standard of review applicable to such enactments remained "a
legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means.
'488
Taken together, Carlton and Romein effectively end meaningful substantive due
process review of retroactive taxes. Unless a tax is wholly arbitrary and utterly
outrageous, it is consistent with due process. When read against the conflicting lines of
authority created by Heinszen and Forbes, it would appear that the Heinszen rule
remains good law whereas the Forbes rule does not. If a legislative body could enact a
retroactive tax, it may ratify a tax that was ultra vires when collected. Moreover, the
test for permissible ratification is the least demanding known to modem constitutional
law: the rationality test.
B. A Cautionary Note on the Takings Clause
Even though the Due Process Clauses no longer appear to provide an avenue of
relief for persons subject to a retroactive tax, the Takings Clause might provide a basis
for invalidation of a sufficiently unforeseen retroactive liability. In Eastern Enterprises
v. Apfel,489 a four Justice plurality of the Supreme Court used the Takings Clause to
invalidate certain funding provisions of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of
1992.49 Justice Kennedy, using a due process analysis, reached the same conclusion as
the plurality and voted to invalidate the law, thereby providing a critical fifth vote to
strike down the statute.491
Under the Act, the former employers of now-retired coal miners were required to
fund health care benefits for the retired miners and their dependents. Eastern
Enterprises faced an assessment of over $5 million dollars for a single year's obligation
under the Act.492 Rather than simply pay the assessment, Eastern Enterprises
challenged the retroactive funding obligation on due process and takings grounds. The
lower courts rejected the company's claims, but the Supreme Court reversed.
Writing for the plurality, Justice O'Connor found that the retroactive funding
provision was sufficiently harsh and oppressive to constitute a regulatory taking. In her
view, the employers could not have foreseen the imposition of heavy new funding
burdens for retired employees' health benefits, in some cases literally decades after the
486. Colson, supra note 471, at 271; see id. at 262 (noting "the result... of the Court's
holding is that constitutional review of retroactive application of tax statutes is dead").
487. 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992).
488. Id.
489. 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion).
490. See id. at 504, 522-24, 528-29 (plurality opinion) (analyzing the Coal Industry
Retiree Health Benefits Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 3036 (codified as amended
at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1992)).
491. See id. at 540-41, 547-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
492. Id. at 517.
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employment relationships had ceased to exist.493 Because the law had the effect of
imposing new legal obligations on long since terminated employment relationships, the
law constituted a regulatory taking.
Justice Kennedy voted to invalidate the law, but insisted on applying due process
analysis, rather than the Takings Clause. In his view, the imposition of significant new
liabilities for long since ended employment relationships was sufficiently arbitrary to
violate basic notions of fairness. 494 Because the law imposed significant, unforeseen
new liabilities years after the fact, it was sufficiently unjust and irrational to transgress
the requirements of due process of law. Had the employers known that they would (or
even might) be liable for millions in additional health care costs at the time they made
employment decisions, they might well have made different choices (i.e., employed
fewer workers).
As I have argued previously, a retroactive tax that has significant, unforeseen
economic effects would be subject to a Takings Clause challenge and might well be
judicially invalidated on that basis.495 Although the Due Process Clauses require only
minimal rationality, the Takings Clause appears to impose stronger limits on the
retroactive imposition of new civil liabilities.
This analysis would not be helpful in attacking the universal service program,
primarily because § 254 puts everyone on notice that the Commission will assess
charges to create a pot of money that will subsidize a class of defined beneficiaries.496
The law is entirely prospective in its design and effects. Moreover, even if a reviewing
court were to hold that § 254 delegates too much revenue authority, and requires
Congress to ratify the Commission's universal service program design, the level of
retroactivity involved would not approach the degree at issue in Eastern Enterprises.
That said, Eastern Enterprises suggests that some limits probably exist on
Congress's ability to ratify a tax after the fact. If, a decade after judicial invalidation of
an ultra vires tax, Congress attempted to ratify the tax and demand payment of it, a
strong argument would exist that the enactment violates the Takings Clause and,
accordingly, is void. In this regard, it bears noting that the Supreme Court's ratification
cases involve retroactivity of only a few years' time. Such limited retroactivity would
probably not violate the Takings Clause, even as broadly construed in Eastern
Enterprises.
493. See id. at 523-24, 530-35.
494. See id. at 549. But cf. Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of
Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977) (arguing that any change in
tax laws upsets somebody's prior expectations and that, given the inevitability of this problem
and the absence of a logical stopping point, federal courts should not seek to police retroactivity
in tax law).
495. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper
Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 728-34
(2002).
496. But cf. Stuart Buck, TELRIC vs. Universal Service: A Takings Violation?, 56 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1, 21, 33-54 (2003) (arguing that federal universal service program funding scheme
might violate Takings Clause by undercompensating ILECs for cost of building and maintaining
local loop and other components of telephone network).
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C. Heinszen in the Circuit Courts
Notwithstanding the due process and takings questions, the lower federal courts
consistently have followed Heinszen over the last thirty years. For example, in Purvis
v. United States, 497 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited and applied
Heinszen to sustain retroactive provisions of the Interest Equalization Tax Act of
1964.498 The Purvis panel explained that "the Court early recognized the power of
Congress to ratify unauthorized Executive action taken in the area reserved to
Congress, and thus retroactively to validate such action.
'499
Moreover, concerns about the potential unfairness of retroactive validation of
executive action should be directed to Congress, and not the federal courts:
We feel we can confidently leave to Congress, as a purely political matter, the
control of such instances of interaction between the departments. If at any time
Congress feels the President to be overreaching in seeking to create legislative
consequences from Executive proclamation or request, it can reject the request for
retroactive application.5
Thus, because Congress will remain politically accountable for its decision to ratify (or
not) the President's actions, the judiciary need not actively police the use of this power.
Twelve years after Purvis, in 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit applied Heinszen to sustain ratification of an unauthorized FICA tax.
501
Citing Heinszen, the court noted that "Congress could ratify admittedly unlawful
collections of duties even after the plaintiff had brought [an] action to recover the
duties paid.
' 50 2
In 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
applied Heinszen to permit ratification of an unlawful fee collected on behalf of the
National Science Foundation ("NSF"). 50 3 The NSF hired Network Solutions to oversee
the registration of Internet domain names.5 4 Under its agreement with NSF, Network
Solutions imposed fees to cover its costs, plus a 30% surcharge to create a fund that
would support improvements to the Internet.505 These improvements would benefit the
general public, rather than the holders of particular domain names.
The district court and the D.C. Circuit both viewed the surcharge, which Congress
had not approved, as an unauthorized tax.5° 6 Congress, within mere weeks of the
497. 501 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1974).
498. Id. at 312-13 (discussing the Interest Equalization Tax Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-563, 78 Stat. 809 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 263, 1232, 4911-20, 4931, 6011,
6076 (1964)).
499. Id. at 314.
500. Id.
501. See Canisius Coll. v. United States, 799 F.2d 18, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1986).
502. Id. at 26.
503. See Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc., 176 F.3d 500, 506-07 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
504. See id. at 503-05.
505. Id. at 505; see supra notes 281-86 and accompanying text (presenting additional
background information about this case).
506. Id. at 506 ("To begin, we shall assume, arguendo, that the 30% portion of the
domain name registration fee Network Solutions collected and held for NSF constituted an
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district court's initial decision declaring the surcharge invalid, 5° 7 enacted legislation to
save Network Solution's 30% surcharge on registration services.5 0 8 Both the district
court 509 and the D.C. Circuit 10 found that this retroactive endorsement satisfied
Heinszen and validated the otherwise invalid tax. The D.C. Circuit explained that "[an
old Supreme Court case-rarely cited but never overruled-stands for the proposition
that Congress 'has the power to ratify the acts which it might have authorized' in the
first place, so long as the ratification 'does not interfere with intervening rights.'
5 1 l
The Network Solutions panel properly found that Congress intended to ratify the
preservation assessment via section 8003 of the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and
Recessions Act and that it possessed the power to impose such a tax on domain
registrations in the first instance. 512 "If a prior act of Congress had directed NSF to
collect $30 for each new registration and $15 thereafter and to retain the funds in order
to support the Internet, we perceive no reason-registrants have offered none-why
such legislation would not have been within Congress's constitutional power under
Article I, Section 8.'
513
D. Toward a Renewed Nondelegation Doctrine in the Area of Taxation
The Heinszen rule, coupled with Congress's ability to impose taxes retroactively,
would make it relatively easy to resuscitate the nondelegation doctrine in the area of
delegations of revenue authority. Congress could, in the first instance, ask an agency to
design and implement a benefits program without establishing either the precise
objectives it would achieve or the means to pay for achieving those objectives. Section
254 would fit this paradigm very nicely: Congress painted in very broad strokes and
took virtually no responsibility for any of the major details of implementing or funding
the universal service program.
The program would be subject to judicial invalidation, however, unless and until
Congress itself ratified the precise mechanisms selected by the administrative agency.
Network Solutions provides a very good example. Congress thought that a fund to
advance the Internet was a sound policy and ratified the NSF's otherwise ultra vires
program. In so doing, Congress resolved all difficulties arising under the nondelegation
doctrine.
illegal tax because, as the district court decided, NSF lacked congressional authorization."); see
also Thomas v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. 97-2412 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14696, at *6
(D.D.C. Aug. 28, 1998) ("There is no dispute that the Preservation Assessment, as imposed by
NSF in 1995, is an illegal tax."), affd, 176 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
507. The district court invalidated the surcharge on April 6, 1998. President Clinton
signed the legislation that included the ratification clause on May 1, 1998, only three weeks
later. See Thomas, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14696, at *3-4.
508. See 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Recessions Act, Pub. L. No. 105-174,
§ 8003, 112 Stat. 58, 93-94 (1998).
509. Thomas, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14696, at *6 (holding that "it is settled law that if
Congress ratifies a tax, it is proper under the Constitution, even though Congressional approval
might postdate the initial imposition and collection of the tax").
510. See Thomas, 176 F.3d at 506-07.
511. Id. at 506 (quoting United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370, 384 (1907)).
512. See id. at 506-07.
513. Id. at 507.
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Congress itself, by ratifying the NSF's preservation fee program, entirely negated
any delegation problems. As Judge Randolph explained, "Section 8003 delegated to
NSF no discretionary authority, much less the power to enact tax legislation or to fix
tax rates. ' s 4 At the time Congress enacted the ratification, "Congress then knew how
much Network Solutions had been charging registrants, the period during which the
charges had been imposed... and what portion of the charges-30%-had gone to
NSF and for what purpose." 51 5 For all intents and purposes, the ratification was no
different than the imposition of a retroactive tax on domain registrations, retroactive
for three years.
The ratification legislation did not convey any additional discretion to NSF on a
going forward basis. Congress ratified the fee that NSF had been charging, not some
other fee. NSF lacked any authority to modify the charge or institute a new or different
charge. Of course, NSF could have unilaterally demanded payments for some other
purpose, in some different amount. If the agency were to do so, the charges would be
unlawful, unless and until Congress enacted legislation ratifying this new course of
agency action.
Ratification permits an agency to act, but ultimately requires Congress to take
political responsibility for the action. It represents a sound compromise between the
extremes of sustaining any wholesale delegation of revenue authority to an agency or
disallowing any agency role in the process of paying for benefit programs.5 16 Congress
may obtain the help of agency expertise in designing the program and the mechanisms
that will pay for it,517 but Congress must ultimately accept, in a very direct way,
political responsibility for enacting the taxes (or "fees" or "charges").
As Professor Manning has observed, "[t]he nondelegation doctrine serves important
constitutional interests: It requires Congress to take responsibility for legislative policy
and ensures that such policy passes through the filter of bicameralism and
presentment., 518 Greater reliance on the ratification doctrine in cases presenting
wholesale delegations of revenue authority would advance these values in a significant
way.
Moreover, no good reason exists for assuming that the nondelegation doctrine could
not be more sensitive in some areas than it is in others. The Supreme Court itself said
as much in Whitman,5 19 and some scholarly commentators have advocated such an
approach.52° Professor Rappaport, in particular, believes that the nondelegation
doctrine's bite should vary depending on the precise nature of the delegation at
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4-6
(1998); see also Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731-32, 738-43 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring); Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges As Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1710-12,
1714-23, 1821-24 (1998); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon of
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1121 (1990).
517. See Krotoszynski, supra note 443, at 739-41, 750-54.
518. Manning, supra note 22, at 277.
519. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,475-76 (2001).
520. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line
Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v.
City of New York, 76 TUL. L. REv. 265 (2001).
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issue.521 Unlike Professor Rappaport, I propose applying the standard nondelegation
test (as Mid-America Pipeline effectively requires), but doing so with an eye toward
the potential curative effect of the ratification doctrine.
522
Professor Sunstein has suggested that a revised nondelegation doctrine that looks to
subject matter, rather than the scope or degree of delegation, might be more plausible
than a strong, generic nondelegation doctrine.5 23 The ratification doctrine, coupled with
the National Cable Television Ass n and New England Power requirement of a clear
textual authorization to an agency to impose charges, rests on a subject matter
distinction, rather than a "hard-to-manage question [about] whether the legislature has
exceeded the permissible level of discretion." 524 Consistent with this approach, forcing
Congress to make greater use of the ratification doctrine would not involve the
judiciary in as many difficult judgment calls as would a generalized reinvigoration of
the nondelegation doctrine.
Along similar lines, Professor Manning suggests that "[tihe central aim of the
nondelegation doctrine is to promote specific rather than general legislative
policymaking-that is, to induce Congress to filter more precise policies through the
process of bicameralism and presentment rather than leaving such policies to be
elaborated by agencies or courts outside the legislative process.5 25 Increased reliance
on the ratification doctrine in circumstances where Congress vests an agency with the
power to raise revenues would advance the values that Manning identifies; it would
require Congress to validate the imposition of de facto taxes on the public or acquiesce
in judicial invalidation of the taxes.
Finally, ratification is not an impermissible legislative veto. INS v. Chadha
526
prohibits Congress from delegating authority to an administrative agency while
attempting to reserve a power to superintend the delegated authority. If Congress told
NSF to establish a system of fees to create a fund to improve the Internet, and then
purported to vest a single house or a single committee with oversight powers over the
exercise of that delegated authority, a separation of powers problem would exist."' In
cases where ratification could apply, Congress has, in point of fact, not delegated
authority to the agency in the first place. In other cases, the scope of the delegation is
not sufficiently sweeping to encompass the agency's proposed course of action.
Finally, we could posit a class of cases in which the delegation might be too sweeping,
521. See id. at 271-72, 345-55, 369-72.
522. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying rationality test to
invalidate Colorado's Amendment 2, even though plausible reasons for adopting Amendment 2
existed); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying rationality
test to invalidate city's refusal to issue a permit for group home for adults with developmental
disabilities).
523. See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 338.
524. Id.; see also Schuck, supra note 29, at 792-93 ("In the end, the nondelegation
doctrine is a prescription for judicial supervision of both the substance and forms of legislation
and hence politics and public policy, without the existence or even the possibility of any
coherent, principled, or manageable judicial standards.").
525. Manning, supra note 22, at 271.
526. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
527. See id. at 944-51, 956-59.
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given the subject matter at issue and Congress's failure to provide significant
limitations on its exercise.
Moreover, no presentment problem exists when Congress exercises its power of
ratification. For a ratification to occur, both houses must enact a bill approving the
agency's action; this bill, like any other bill, would be presented to the President for his
signature or veto. Presumably, the President would approve most ratification measures,
because they would simply affirm prior action by the administration or an
"independent" agency staffed in substantial measure with members of the President's
political party. Regardless of how the President responds to the ratification measure,
the constitutional requirement of presentment would be met.
Consistent with the doctrine of ratification, reviewing courts could reasonably
require Congress to ratify when the scope of a delegation is unclear. Mid-America
Pipeline and National Cable Television Ass'n together stand for the proposition that
delegations of revenue authority must be express. If an agency does not have a clear
textual mandate to tax, federal courts should force the agency to resort to the
ratification process or face judicial invalidation of its work product.
On the other hand, the current nondelegation doctrine does not require invalidation
when Congress has delegated in a clear fashion. The question then arises as to whether
the nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to take on any responsibility for the
design of a revenue program beyond a bare authorization to tax. Read broadly, Mid-
America Pipeline seems to suggest that if Congress delegates revenue authority in a
clear fashion, the terms of the delegation are not subject to any special analysis simply
because they involve taxation. The case certainly would bear this interpretation.
If one focuses on the design of the program in Mid-America Pipeline, however, the
matter becomes somewhat more complicated. The revenue program at issue in Mid-
America Pipeline defined who would pay the charges, the basis on which the agency
would assess the charges, and how much the pipeline operators would pay in any given
528year. Congress itself set a ceiling for the maximum amount to be collected each year
through an annual appropriations measure: "the Secretary has no discretion whatsoever
to expand the budget for administering the Pipeline Safety Acts because the ceiling on
aggregate fees that may be collected in any fiscal year is set at 105% of the aggregate
appropriations made by Congress for that fiscal year.'
5 29
Given that Congress established, on an annual basis, the net level of taxation that
the Department of Transportation could impose on pipeline operators, and that
Congress had established the basis on which the taxation would occur, the case did not
really involve a delegation at all. Congress not only had the ability to ratify, but in fact
ratified, through the annual appropriation, the Department's execution of the pipeline
safety programs. Presumably if Congress had concerns about the precise means the
Department used to assess the fees, it would have amended the program incident to
setting the annual appropriation for pipeline safety.
In many ways, then, Mid-America Pipeline did not present a particularly strong case
for applying the nondelegation doctrine. Unless the separation of powers doctrine
simply barred Congress from delegating any aspect of a revenue program to an agency,
the delegation at issue was not problematic. Moreover, given that Congress often
528. See Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 2t2, 215-16, 219-20 (1989).
529. Id. at 220.
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delegates discretion to the Internal Revenue Service to implement tax policies without
direct congressional approval of the agency's work, a holding that prohibited any
delegation of discretion to an agency implementing a revenue program would have
been wholly unprecedented and a clear break with decades of settled administrative
law practice.
Section 254 presents a very different case. Congress has not established the precise
services to be subsidized and, on the contrary, has urged the Commission to add new
services over time. Indeed, universal service funds could be used to pay for services
that did not even exist in 1996, when Congress enacted § 254. This might not be
problematic, had Congress established clear limits on the amount of money that the
Commission could raise and spend. By way of contrast, the revenue program sustained
in Mid-America Pipeline had clear limits on the purpose for which monies could be
spent, the ways in which money could be raised, and the net amount of funds that could
be raised in a given fiscal year. Section 254 has none of these important safeguards.
This analysis should not lead to an immediate conclusion that § 254 is
unconstitutional and that the universal service program should be struck down (and
monies collected rebated). Instead, it suggests that Congress should be required to
ratify the Commission's plan, just as Congress ratified the NSF's decision to create a
fund to promote the Internet. Section 254 obviously informs telecommunications
service providers that taxes of some sort will be assessed on their products; it goes a
long way toward ameliorating concerns about notice and unfair retroactive taxation. At
the end of the day, however, citizens should not be required to pay universal service
fees unless and until Congress itself endorses the charges and the services funded by
the program.
Beyond serving the separation of powers and the Framers' enduring concerns about
democratic accountability for revenue measures, imposing a ratification requirement
would also set a ceiling on universal service fees unless and until Congress again
ratified the program. In essence, this approach reads § 254 as a mandate to create a
universal service plan, with the plan going into effect, at least temporarily, pending
formal congressional ratification.
If Congress wishes to avoid the ratification requirement, it could amend § 254 to
limit either the purposes for which universal service monies can be spent or, in the
alternative, cap the total funds to be raised via universal service charges. If it prefers to
do neither of these things, leaving § 254 "as is, where is," the federal courts should
require ratification as a precondition of forced payment.
E. The Universal Service Program Represents Poor Public Policy
Even if the universal service program does not violate the nondelegation doctrine, it
reflects a poor means of achieving the goal of universal access to basic
telecommunications services. Administration of the program is expensive, with double
assessments and collections. Portions of the program, such as the assistance for rural
medical care providers, are abject failures.53° Other aspects of the program, such as
funding for Internet wiring for schools and libraries, have proven wildly popular--even
when the schools and libraries lack any computers to put the shiny new wiring to work
530. See supra text and accompanying notes 372-401.
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for its intended purpose. 531 The program, at least at the federal level, is bloated and
poorly administered. 2 Funding decisions seem arbitrary and wasteful. The system is
no less costly and no more effective than the system of cross-subsidies that Congress
intended for it to replace.
The current universal service policy also is incoherent. Simply put, you cannot
subsidize one part of an integrated network without creating competitive benefits that
have effects across the entire network. As one observer has noted, "[s]tranded cost and
universal service provisions, for radically different reasons, adopt a regulatory attitude
that is more reminiscent of the unitary Bell System than it is consonant with the
regulatory ambitions of the Telecommunications Act."
533
The idea that providing ILECs with universal service monies will not enhance the
ability of the ILECs to fend off competitors is sheer fantasy. Any subsidy for a portion
of an integrated network will have spillover effects that will lower the costs of
operating the nonsubsidized portion of the network. If Congress wished to create a
truly competitively neutral program, it should have devised a system of tax credits or
direct subsidies to service subscribers, rather than service providers.5 34 Moreover,
Congress should have encouraged the use of new competitive technologies in high cost
and rural areas-such as satellite and cell phones-rather than continuing to support
the provision of wireline services. In many developing countries, wireless telephone
systems are the only game in town.
535
State PSCs, however, tend to favor preexisting wireline technologies over newer,
wireless ones. As Professor Chen has argued, it is very difficult to justify this
preference on sound policy grounds.536 As Rosston and Wimmer put it, "in rural, high-
cost areas, customers who make few calls may be better off if they are allowed to use a
wireless service with a low monthly rate and a relatively high per-minite charge."5 37 If
531. See supra text and accompanying notes 344-71.
532. See supra text and accompanying notes 440-47.
533. Chen, Shadows of Giants, supra note 48, at 924.
534. See id. at 945 ("Numerous commentators have lamented Congress's failure to
authorize direct subsidies for universal service, drawn from general tax revenues rather than
surcharges on telecommunications services.").
535. See Rebecca Carroll, Americans Cutting Cord on Land Line to Go Mobile,
SEA'rLE TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003, at A4 ("Cellphones overtook land-line phones earliest in some
developing countries that hadn't laid land lines by the time cellular technology arrived. In
Cambodia, for instance, nearly 90% of phones are cellular."); see also Jason Roy Flaherty, Note,
Reallocating the Instructional Television Fixed Service Electromagnetic Spectrum at 2.5 GHz,
96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1177, 1177 (noting that "[w]ireless communications services is one the
fastest growing segments of the communications industry" and reporting that "half of all
telecommunications services [in the United States] will be wireless by the year 2010").
536. See Chen, Subsidized Rural Telephony, supra note 410, at 33-39,54-55; see also
Alleman et al., supra note 292, at 856 ("We argue that the current manipulation of telecom rates
exists, not because it is necessary to promote subscription, but simply because the public choice
process prefers the current rates to those a competitive market would produce."); Gregory L.
Rosston & Bradley S. Wimmer, The ABC's of Universal Service: Arbitrage, Big Bucks, and
Competition, 50 HASTINGs L.J. 1585, 1605-07 (1999) (describing service provider participation
requirements and how incumbents benefit from these requirements in securing universal service
contracts).
537. Rosston & Wimmer, supra note 536, at 1607.
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access for rural consumers can be achieved more cheaply and efficiently using cell or
satellite phone service, why insist on wireline technologies or define universal service
program participation requirements in ways that strongly disadvantage wireless
carriers?
5 38
The answer should be obvious: wireline systems require huge capital outlays and
create greater rents for the incumbent local exchange carriers. By defining program
participation requirements in ways that inevitably favor incumbent wireline service
providers, state regulators ensure that the bulk of universal service subsidies will go to
the ILECs, and not the CLECs.53 9 These subsidies, in turn, will enable the ILECs to
retain their competitive advantage in providing local telephone service, and will
enhance their ability to provide intrastate and interstate telephone service. To state the
matter simply, the universal service program has the untoward effect of impeding the
conditions necessary to break the local telephone service monopoly.
Other problems exist. For example, the universal service program design is radically
unprogressive and arguably hurts as many poor consumers as it benefits. "Because the
burden of this funding is concentrated on certain telecommunications services, rather
than drawn from general revenues, the base of the 'tax' is relatively narrow, and the
markups on the prices of services generating the subsidy are quite high., 540 A single,
low-income mother, living in the Bronx, with a cell phone for personal safety, pays
10% or more of her monthly wireless telephone bill to support universal service for
wealthy Montana residents living on ranchettes. The program makes no allowance for
ability to pay, but raises prices for all consumers of telecommunications services.
Conceivably, the single mother makes lots of calls to rural Montana, but this
proposition is most unlikely.
If urban air travelers were required to pay a 10% fee to ensure that the airport in
Staunton, Virginia ("SHD") remained open with jet service to major destinations, there
would be a great deal of grumbling. The fact that someone living in New York might
be able to fly to SHD would not seem like a very good exchange for a 10% surcharge
on a ticket from New York City to Los Angeles, California. Yet, this is precisely how
the universal service program operates: it taxes urban consumers, regardless of ability
to pay, in order to subsidize rural consumers (regardless of ability to pay).
If ensuring that rural residents have access to telephone service and/or the Internet
truly serves the public good, then general public revenues should be used to provide
the necessary subsidies. 541 "More limited programs, targeted at marginal subscribers,
538. See Chen, Subsidized Rural Telphony, supra note 410, at 54-56.
539. See generally Rosston & Wimmer, supra note 536, at 1607 (arguing that a free
choice between a subsidized wireless service and wireline service cannot be made "because
regulators require a local usage component" and "such an option will not be available because
only plans with local usage components will be supported").
540. Alleman et al., supra note 292, at 869.
541. Professor Chen states the matter straightforwardly:
The cure for universal service is equally simple. No one seriously disputes the
desirability, or at least the plausibility, of a public role in ensuring educational
access to the Internet. Doing so through a general tax rather than an internal
subsidy drawn from other telecommunications users would not only simplify the
administration of the Telecommunications Act but also improve overall economic
welfare.
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could meet this objective at lower cost, and with less interference with a competitive
market."
542
In virtually no other industry are consumers in one area directly taxed to provide
service to consumers in another area. For example, rural electrification enjoys federal
subsidies under the Rural Electrification Act, 543 but the federal government does not
assess "universal service" fees on urban customers to pay the costs associated with
rural electrification.
544
Urban electricity customers arguably benefit from a national electricity grid with
universal service. Residents of urban areas, when traveling, might find it inconvenient
if large swaths of the country lacked electrical power. The ability to access persons
living in rural areas also would be reduced in the absence of electricity. The same
arguments that support the urban to rural subsidy in the context of telephony could be
trotted out in favor of forced subsidies for rural electric customers.
545
Under the Rural Electrification Act, however, local rural communities receive
federally subsidized loans, which they must themselves repay, to underwrite the cost of
transmission lines and other infrastructure requirements.546 Rural electric cooperatives
organize to build and operate rural electric services and pay the costs of doing so
(albeit with artificially lower costs because of the federal subsidy). This model makes a
great deal more sense than taxing a single mother in the Bronx to subsidize Harrison
Ford's air conditioning bill in rural Montana.
5 47
Even if one embraces the objectives that the universal service program exists to
advance, the program's design and execution do not ensure that the most needy persons
obtain the maximum benefits. Some commentators fault the program as an "inefficient.
. means of obtaining its intended goal" for a number of reasons, including its failure
to target "marginal" and "needy" subscribers, problematic pricing practices that will
Chen, Shadows of Giants, supra note 48, at 971.
542. Alleman et at., supra note 292, at 856.
543. Rural Electrification Act of 1936, ch. 432, 49 Stat. 1363 (1936) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2000)).
544. See Joel A. Youngblood, Note, Alive and Well; The Rural Electrification Act
Preempts State Condemnation Law: City of Morgan City v. South Louisiana Electric
Cooperative Ass'n, 16 ENERGY L.J. 489, 489-96 (1995) (discussing history and operation of the
Rural Electrification Act of 1936, which provides subsidized financing for qualifying rural
electrification projects); see also Richard P. Keck, Reevaluating the Rural Electrification
Administration: A New Deal for the Taxpayer, 16 ENvTL. L. 39, 42-61 (1985) (providing a
history of the REA and a comprehensive description of its subsidy programs from a decidedly
skeptical point of view).
545. See Rossi, supra note 290, at 39-40 (noting that universal service concepts have
no logical stopping point and that "taken to its extreme it could require not only subsidization of
the network, but a redistributive tax to pay to provide computers or other electronic devices to
consumers who cannot afford to pay for these").
546. See Youngblood, supra note 544, at 490-96; Keck, supra note 544, at 46-48,51-
61.
547. See Alleman et al., supra note 292, at 870 (arguing that "since rural customers
generally rely more heavily on long distance service, raising long distance rates to subsidize
rural subscribers is counterproductive" and noting that "it is far from clear that all rural
subscribers are needy").
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not "obtain the desired goal," and revenue devices to underwrite the program that are
"counter-productive." 548
It is far from certain exactly how much effect the universal service program has in
boosting telephone subscription rates. "In the United States, as in most western
European countries, the vast majority of households now subscribe to telephone
service." 549 In light of this fact, "[i]t is difficult to argue that the external benefit to
existing subscribers is high when new subscribers are added" to the system. 550 If
adding new subscribers really enhanced the value of the system, private
telecommunications firms probably would underwrite some part of the cost of
providing universal service because these expenditures "would increase demand for
services by inframarginal subscribers.
' 5 1
The universal service program, with its multilayered collection and administration
systems, is a veritable hydra. The Commission assesses fees on service providers, who
then pass these charges on to consumers. Each transaction creates administrative
costs.552 As Alleman, Rappaport, and Weller have argued, "if promoting subscription
were the real goal of universal service policy, then subsidizing rates for local service
generally is an extremely inefficient means of achieving that goal. 553 One analyst
estimates that the program costs $1.65 for every $1.00 in subsidy that it generates and
distributes. 54
The spending side is little better. Both state and federal authorities appropriate
universal service funds. These subsidies often go to incumbent telephone companies,
which can offset universal service charges by meeting universal service needs. The
accounting necessary to keep track of these matters could easily engage an army of
accountants.
555
It would be much easier to offer refundable tax credits to persons living in rural or
high cost areas for telephone service of their choice. Some might elect to purchase
wireline service from an ILEC, other beneficiaries might opt for a cell phone instead.
548. See id. at 861.
549. Id. at 862 (quoting ALEXANDER BiENFANTE, FCC, TELEPHONE SUBSCRIBERS INTHE
UNrTED STATES 1 (2001)).
550. Id.
551. Id. at 862-63.
552. See Chen, Shadows of Giants, supra note 48, at 971.
553. Alleman et al., supra note 292, at 863; see also Rosston & Wimmer, supra note
536, at 1587 ("Universal service programs, as currently structured, rely on arbitrary definitions
to determine which providers will be taxed, how much they will be taxed, and which ones are
eligible for support. As a result, universal service programs not only distort consumer behavior
by artificially raising prices but alter firms' actions so they can either avoid taxes or to [sic] gain
access to subsidies.").
554. See JERRY HAUSMAN, TAXATION BY TELECOMMUNICATION REGULATION: THE
ECONOMICS OF THE E-RATE 13-14 (1998); see also Rosston & Wimmer, supra note 536, at
1587-88 (predicting that "[a]s the universal service programs grow, firms will devote more
resources to avoid paying the increased charges to fund the system" and characterizing such
"avoidance activity" as "non-productive").
555. See Alleman et al., supra note 292, at 869 (noting that "distorting the prices of
telecommunications services is a particularly costly method for financing universal service
subsidies" and cataloguing some of the inefficiencies associated with the universal service
program).
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Consumers, rather than bureaucrats, would be empowered to select the telephone
delivery system that best met their needs as they (and not some state PSC
administrator) see them.55 6 The truly poor would still be entitled to universal service if
the tax credit program was fully refundable.
Indeed, one would imagine that a refundable tax credit, if assignable, would create a
wave of new competition for rural/high-cost area and low-income consumers. Provided
that the credit was sufficiently generous, various service providers would directly
market products to potential consumers in exchange for an assignment of the universal
service credit. It seems likely that more and better service would result for most
consumers-to say nothing of the jump start that such an approach would provide for
competition in providing local telephone service.
There is also little reason to believe that consumers are less able than the
Commission or state PSCs to decide precisely what telecommunications services are
most essential. In fact, subscription rates for unsubsidized telecommunications and
media services are fairly constant across household income levels. 7 Studies of
subscription rates across household income "confirm that consumers, even those with
low incomes, choose to purchase packages of wireless, cable, and other services with
prices at least as high as local phone prices would be in the absence of the current
subsidy.' 558 One could plausibly claim that universal service presently represents a
welfare program for the former Bell Operating Companies, and little more.
In sum, even if the universal service program is constitutional, it represents a rather
poor means of achieving admittedly laudable ends. Congress should rethink its
approach and junk universal service in favor of more direct-and economically
efficient-subsidy schemes.
CONCLUSION
In some instances, agencies have imposed taxes in circumstances where Congress
has not authorized any imposition of taxes. Such cases present easy nondelegation
doctrine questions: under National Cable Television Ass'n and New England Power,
agencies may not infer a generalized power to tax from a limited authorization to
impose charges on the entities they regulate. Accordingly, cases like Network Solutions
demonstrate that, when an agency oversteps the bounds of a delegation of revenue
authority, the federal courts will enforce the nondelegation doctrine and disallow the
ultra vires collection of revenue (whether styled as a "tax" or a "fee").
The question that remains to be answered is: How should federal courts react when
Congress authorizes a tax, but fails to limit either the amount of the tax or the ability of
the agency to spend the monies raised through the tax? Under the doctrine of
ratification, some particularly open-ended delegations of revenue authority should be
invalidated, subject to retroactive ratification by Congress. Section 254 presents a good
candidate for invalidation because Congress failed to specify either the level of
taxation or to provide limits on the benefits to be funded by the revenue generated. On
556. See Rosston & Wimmer, supra note 536, at 1607 ("By allowing consumers the
option of choosing between a wireline and wireless offering, both of which are subsidized,
consumers will determine which service best matches their needs.").
557. See Alleman et al., supra note 292, at 865-66.
558. Id. at 866.
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these facts, the delegation goes too far, and should be invalidated-subject, of course,
to ratification.
In the end, any serious effort to enforce the nondelegation doctrine necessarily will
require courts to engage in an inquiry into whether a particular delegation "goes too
far." In the limited case of delegations of revenue authority, the Supreme Court should
enforce the "intelligible principle" requirement vigilantly and require recourse to the
ratification doctrine when Congress has enacted some sort of open-ended authorization
to impose charges. Although Mid-America Pipeline holds that no special nondelegation
rules govern delegations of revenue powers, the facts of the case made it a particularly
poor vehicle for arguing that Congress had failed to provide sufficient guidance to the
agency charged with implementing the statute.
When read and understood in context, Mid-America Pipeline does not pose a
significant barrier to a renewed commitment to enforcing the nondelegation doctrine in
the area of open-ended mandates to tax. When Congress itself establishes both the
precise amount to be collected and the means for doing so, no plausible nondelegation
doctrine objection exists. In the case of the universal service program, however,
Congress has failed to set the exact metes and bounds of the Commission's taxing and
spending authority.
In sum, the Supreme Court should revive the nondelegation doctrine in a limited
way by requiring Congress to ratify agency actions that raise revenue in the absence of
an express and limited delegation. Because § 254 limits neither the objects of the
universal service program nor the funds to be expended to achieve them, the federal
courts should require Congress to meet the requirements of the ratification doctrine.
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